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
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Mark N. Gose, Major, USAF
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science

**THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN BUILDING POLITICAL COMMUNITY:
THE CASE OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES**

by

MARK N. GOSE

B.A., New Mexico State University, 1982

M.A., U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 1987

A dissertation submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Colorado in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

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This thesis for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by


Mark N. Gose

has been approved for the

Department of

Political Science

by


William Safran
J. Samuel Fitch

Date NOV. 29, 1995

Gose, Mark N. (Ph.D., Political Science)

The Role of the Military in Building Political Community: The Case of the Two German States

Thesis Directed by Professor William Safran

The dissertation attempts to show the role of the military in constructing new national political community in Cold-War partitioned nation-states. These previously established nations -- divided through war and forced to rebuild separate socio-political societies -- face unique situations and challenges to nation-building that differ from those of other types of nations in general. The primary thesis is that, because of the consequent need to rapidly engineer political change in these cases, the resurrection and maintenance of a military may especially contribute to the process of political socialization for creating a new and distinct political community. Moreover, since the militaries in these types of states are commonly the result of universal mass conscription, there may exist an important opportunity for influencing large numbers of young people.

This thesis assumes political community is represented primarily by three vital intervening outcomes of the political socialization process: a distinct *political culture*, a separate *cultural identity*, and a *perception of legitimacy for the new socio-political system*. These intervening outcomes also act as indicators, or definers, of the particular political community, and, thus, are its three main components. Using a framework of analysis based upon these three outcomes/indicators, the study focuses on the two states of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War. In so doing, the case-study attempts to first identify any conscious political socialization processes implemented by the two militaries, and then tries to link these processes to the two distinct German political communities.

By analyzing survey, interview and archival data, along with secondary sources, the dissertation first clearly shows that the civilian and military leadership of both German states did, in fact, consciously use the military institution as an instrument for creating distinct political communities. Second, the research provides evidence that two distinct political communities indeed developed in the two sides of divided Germany by the time of unification in 1990. Third, the data analysis, however, suggests the military institution was largely unsuccessful in the nation-building process, and instead, other institutions appear to have been more influential in affecting the nature of the two separate German political communities. Several plausible rival explanations are provided including, 1) support from that research suggesting that children and young people are most susceptible to attitude change, and thus, childhood institutions are most effective, 2) the role of other primary agents of political socialization, 3) the impact of regional influences, and 4) the possible inadequacies of political socialization techniques in the military.

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The contributions of the military to political modernization ... are not only economic; the military also serves as an agent of social change. At a minimum, this implies that the army becomes a device for developing a sense of identity - a social psychological element of national unity..."

Morris Janowitz¹

A. Introduction

There is general consensus that the military can play several important roles in the development and maintenance of nation-states and their respective polities. However, aside from the more recognized *functional* missions such as maintaining domestic stability, providing national defense and security, or supplying the means for foreign influence, can the military also play a vital *societal* role in the creation and maintenance of the "nation" component of the "nation-state"? That is, can the military help build a distinct national "political community"?

While the opening quotation from Janowitz, along with common sense, might suggest an affirmative answer to this question, related research provides only limited evidence supporting the view of the military as an important political socializer. At least this is the case from the perspective of militaries in the First and Third Worlds. One group of countries, however, in which the military may nevertheless act as a vital contributor in this regard is the small sample of partitioned nation-states. These countries are previously homogeneous societies divided through war and, consequently, forced to develop separate socio-political communities on the ruins of the old -- a situation requiring a transformation of the earlier single nation into two distinct nations. This is indeed the situation in several countries divided as a result of World War II and the subsequent Cold War.

¹ See Janowitz (1964), p.80.

Because of the need to engineer rapid political change in these cases of partitioned nations, it also frequently becomes necessary to reconstruct, or at least modify, the very foundations of the national collectivity. This usually means introducing distinct, often altered, socio-political norms and values into the society. Furthermore, the military -- especially a conscripted military -- may prove vital in this process of nation-building, national integration, or even what could be termed national transformation. And again, this situation is different from the more common processes usually represented in the related research which has traditionally focused on the ongoing political integration and development of either established societies or newly developing nations.

Thus, in the case of partitioned nations, the nature and origin of both the new state and its armed forces may enhance the military's role as a vital institutional player in the political socialization process. This role also may be further expanded because of the prevalent use of mass military conscription in these states, which, in itself, provides a significant opportunity for reaching those large segments of the young adult population who are required to undergo military service and training.

This dissertation, therefore, focuses on *the role of the military in building a distinct political community within partitioned nation-states* -- a new political community dictated by tremendous social and political upheaval in the aftermath of war, and necessary in order to differentiate from the "other nation" in existence. Consequently, the two key questions I address in this study are: **1) How do the rebuilt military institutions in the two new regions of partitioned societies consciously use political socialization policies to foster distinct and separate political communities (nations)? 2) And perhaps more importantly, do these state-controlled military institutions directly contribute to the creation of these different and discernable political communities?**

To answer these questions, I compare the cases of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany for the period before their unification in 1991. The study, consequently, looks at the military as conscious agent in the *political socialization process* to explain the creation of a distinct *political community*. In sum, I attempt to investigate the extent to which the military matters in the political change resulting from Cold War partition. Additionally, I intend to identify the ways by which the military participates in this endeavor.

Given these research questions, the remainder of this chapter highlights the general research approach and the related literature important to this study. The next chapter develops and outlines in more detail the definitional issues, the case selection, research problems, and methodology. The third chapter provides the situational background for the two German cases. Here I attempt to highlight the historical legacies that influenced the civil-military relations for both states before and during the Cold-War. This chapter is followed by two others that identify the specific, conscious political socialization policies and processes in the two German militaries; that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Chapter 4, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides analysis of the outcomes of these processes. In the conclusion, Chapter 7, there is a discussion of possible explanations for the results as provided by both the author and other related literature, followed by recommendations for further research.

B. General Research Approach

In addressing the research questions outlined above, this dissertation reflects, in short, a comparative analysis of the two German cases during the Cold War.² More specifically, the strategy of inquiry includes a combination of survey, archival,

² On the comparative method, see Alexander George (1979); Arend Lijphart (1975); Harry Eckstein (1975); and Theda Skocpol (1979).

interview, and secondary-source data. All are used, on the one hand, to illustrate that there were indeed conscious political socialization processes/policies at work in the two militaries during the Cold War (and what these policies were), while on the other, to determine the related outcomes of these socialization processes and, thus, their contributions to political community (or nation).³

Moreover, this hypothesized relationship is conceptualized by identifying three possible *outcomes* of the socialization process, which also act as *primary indicators* of political community itself. These three “intervening outcomes” include: 1) the creation (or continuation) of a new and distinct *political culture*, 2) the development (or reinforcement) of a separate *cultural identity*, and 3) the enhancement (or maintenance) of legitimacy for the new socio-political structure, or *socio-political legitimacy*.⁴

Therefore, there are two important dimensions in this relationship. First, as this study will show, all three of these outcomes also can be desired goals of conscious political socialization policies in the military. This suggests the existence of a acknowledged *causal* link between the military policies and each of these outcomes. Second, however, these outcomes are also the primary indicators of whether or not there exists a distinct national political community, as well as what its distinguishing characteristics are. This reflects a *definitional* relationship. Thus, the three outcomes also act as defining components of political community. **In sum, this study assumes that each of these three intervening outcomes are not only desired results of calculated military policies, but also indicators of political community itself.** This proposed relationship is described more simply in Figure 1.1.

³ The terms “political community” and “nation” will be used interchangeably in this study. The definitional issues surrounding these terms are discussed in more detail later.

⁴ These three outcomes/indicators will be better conceptualized in the following chapter.




FIGURE 1.1

The present study will attempt, therefore, to show conscious effort on the part of the two German militaries in producing each of the three outcomes. Moreover, when considered together, these outcomes also serve to show both the overall presence, as well as the characteristics, of a distinct political community.

C. Related Research

In focusing upon the role of the military in building political community, there are three related areas of study that provide some general assumptions and foundations for addressing the issues as formulated in this dissertation. First, there is the ongoing theoretical debate over the nature of state- and nation-building -- that is, which of the two comes first, and what actually gives rise to nations and states?

Second, there is the extensive literature that analyzes the role of the military in modern societies, or the nature of civil-military relations in different settings and situations. This includes, more specifically, those studies which look at the role of the military in modernization and political development. Third, there is the enormous body of research concerning attitude change and political socialization, some of which includes the military as an agent in the process.

Within these major areas of study there are, in turn, four ongoing issues that are directly related to the present study. First, can the state in general really *orchestrate* the creation of a distinct political community (nation) or is the state itself simply the result? Second, at what point in human development (life cycle) is political socialization most effective? Third, what are the primary, most effective agents of

political socialization? And most important to this dissertation, the fourth issue, what is the military's role in the political socialization process? Can it truly make a difference in creating political community in various situations? The following provides an overview of this related research.

1. Nation-Building Versus State-Building:

Much of the scholarship which deals with the creation of political community relates to the general research relative to *nation-building* versus *state-building*. That is, which comes first, nation or state? Do states give rise to nations, or do nations give rise to states? Obviously, these two questions reflect seemingly polar positions regarding the relationship between the origins of nations and states as related, yet separate, entities. Moreover, the debate over this relationship provides important assumptions underlying the building of political community in partitioned states in particular.

First, there are those who see the nation as a derivation of the state. In general, this theoretical view holds that the primary foundations for nation-building and political development are a result of modernization, institutionalization, communication, etc., and is reflected primarily in the theories of Karl Deutsch and Ernest Gellner.⁵ More specifically, Karl Deutsch contends that modernization leads to the subsumption and thus assimilation of ethnic and cultural groups within the state. Through what he labels "social mobilization," the state has in its power the ability to engineer a higher loyalty than that given to subnational groups.⁶ In short, states, through modernization and social mobilization, can produce one nation (political community) out of multiple nationalities, or perhaps implicitly, from previous nationalities. This then, to Deutsch, is the process of nation-building.

⁵See Deutsch (1966), and Gellner (1983).

⁶See Deutsch (1966).

Similarly, Ernest Gellner argues that, "...the consequences of an ever-growing, ever-progressing society..." is greater egalitarianism and thus a new kind of nationalism.⁷ Like Deutsch, Gellner argues that modern, mobile society with its standardization of education and societal communications produces a "higher culture" of nationalism, different as well as anathema to previous cultural "sub-units" of society. Therefore, to Gellner, a given society within a political state must inevitably become a greater, more homogeneous community with the state leading the way to a congruence of culture and polity. According to Gellner then, the political community is the logical and most rational result developing under the tutelage of the state; in other words, the state creates the nation.

Other scholars, however, take a contrasting view of the relationship between state and nation. The 18th Century German Historian, Johann Gottfried von Herder, for example, disagrees with the concept that a nation is the product of purely socio/political engineering.⁸ Instead, he recognizes the importance of the *Volksgeist*, the true and natural spirit or soul of the folk (especially in the cultural sense). To Herder, nationality is a moral or spiritual concept, and more normative in that a particular nationality *should* be protected as a unique and beautiful entity. He believes that, although separate political states would inevitably cease to exist, nations (or distinct political/cultural communities) would continue, and importantly, in the form of the cultural nation. In his view, if [cultural] nations were left alone to evolve, more perfect political states *could* result; but, this was not automatic. To Herder, then, the nation always comes first.

Another more recent scholar who also shares this view of the nation-state as the consequence of the nation or nationalism is Hans Kohn (1951). He explores the linkage in terms of communal psychology -- nationalism and nationality motivate man

⁷See Gellner (1983), p.24.

⁸See Herder (1968).

to organized action that results in the modern state. However, to Kohn, this organized action is inherent in the existing nation and not simply the result of planned modernization or state engineering. In that regard, he sees the nation as both a group held together and animated by common consciousness as well as a group with the goal of attaining:

"...the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state. Nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the nation-state strengthens nationalism" (Kohn, 1951, p.19).

Kohn sees nationalism then, as the great transformer of old empires into the more modern entities of the nation-state. The state must exist, therefore, as only a reflection of the collective consciousness of the pre-existing national political community, especially its cultural aspects.⁹

However, the views of Herder and Kohn notwithstanding, if we look at the situation of partitioned nations, the state-versus-nation debate takes on a clearer form. In that regard, the concepts of Deutsch and Gellner -- of assimilation and integration -- seem more appropriate because they recognize the state as the starting point. After all, each of the two new sides of partitioned nation-states was forced to accept a new state apparatus set up by the external victor/s, and it is the state in partitioned nations that must attempt therefore to build a new distinct national political community in the face of forced political change. This state-led attempt to transpose the old nation with its past cultural and political foundations into a new political community with overarching loyalties to the changed socio-political structure indeed represents the case in the two Post-War Germanies.

Therefore, this view of nation-building provides the first major assumption for this study; that in newly partitioned nations, the state is a given, a *fait accompli*, and

⁹ Likewise, Walker Connor (1972) argues against the Deutschian thesis, contending there is even more ethnic and nationality conflict today than ever before. He suggests different possibilities for these theoretical gaps in the modernization theories, including the tendency in these theories to overlook the cultural aspects of the nation.

the type of new nation to be built will be engineered from this new state. Moreover, the concept of nation-building (rather than state-building) indeed appears more pertinent in partitioned nation-states -- a concept which signifies planned or constructed change in the creation of new political communities. As Deutsch states it, nation-building

"...suggests an architectural or mechanical model. As a house can be built from timber, bricks, and mortar, in different patterns, quickly or slowly, through different sequences of assembly, in partial independence from its setting, and according to the choice, will, and power of its builders, so a nation can be built according to different plans, from various materials, rapidly or gradually, by different sequences of steps, and in partial independence from its environment."¹⁰

In the process, the state has at its disposal several means including economic and social welfare policies, various communications media, or the educational system; but important to this study, it also has the military institution reestablished under its control. Thus, the military may also contribute to modernization and social mobilization (in the Deutschian sense) by acting as another mechanism for political change.

2. *The Role of the Military in Political Development:*

Research on civil-military relations constitutes a second important area of research relevant to this dissertation. These studies range from general overviews of the various military relationships within society and polity, to specific case-studies of the military institution in particular countries. From the general perspectives, such classical works as Huntington's *Soldier and the State*, and Janowitz' *The Professional*

¹⁰See Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building' and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in Deutsch and Foltz (1963), p.3.

Soldier and his Civil-Military Relations combine with other works in general analyses of the civil-military dimension.¹¹

However, a significant sub-field in this broad research program relative to the present study is that of the role of the military in general political development and national integration, especially that which has as its focus the relationship of the armed forces in creating different aspects of political community. This includes studies on the general role of the military institution in nation-building and political development.¹² Many scholars contend that the military can contribute greatly to political development through the processes of modernization, mainly within developing nations. This literature includes such works as those by Johnson (1962), Janowitz (1964), Bienan (1971, 1983), Odom (1976), and Welch (1985). For the most part, these scholars analyze the consequences of military *intervention* on the development processes of countries. Consequently, they usually contend that the intervening military is commonly a modernizing force in society. From these perspectives, the military may intervene not only to stabilize the government, restore order, etc., but also intervene in order to implement certain modernization strategies not necessarily adopted by civilian leaders. This, in turn, can lead to overall political development.

However, when specifically applied to regions or individual cases, this thesis is not well supported. There are those who show, for example, that the military does

¹¹See Huntington (1959) and Janowitz (1971, 1981). For other general works, usually edited compilations, see Wolfe and Erickson (1969); Van Gils (1971); Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1977); Martin and McCrate (1984); and van Doorn (1975).

¹²There are naturally numerous civil-military studies that apply one or more of the perspectives in this section to different regions or individual countries, especially in Latin America and Africa. For Latin America in general among others there are studies by North (1966), Corbett (1972), Schmitter (1973), Philip (1985), Lowenthal and Fitch (1986), Goodman, Mendelson, and Rial (1990), Wesson (1986), and Nunn (1992).

Specific Latin American country studies include, for Brazil: Stepan (1971 and 1988), Skidmore (1988); for Chile: Nunn (1976); Ecuador: Fitch (1978); Argentina: Zagorski (1988) and Goldwert (1972); Cuba: Perez (1976); and for Guatemala: Patterson (1988).

For Africa there are general and specific studies by Welch (1970), Odetola (1978), Oyediran (1979), Bienan (1978), and Harbeson (1987). There are also studies on the political role of the military in the Middle East: Fisher (1963), Tachau and Heper (1983), and Tarbush (1982).

not or cannot promote political development. One of the major scholars who does so is Jose' Nun (1967). He argues that military intervention, particularly in Latin America, has tended to act as an obstacle to progress because of the relationship of the middle classes to the lower classes. This is chiefly because the militaries in Latin America tend to incorporate the middle classes into their officer corps more than other Latin American countries. Therefore, these militaries may inhibit social change and development as they actually contribute to the continued failure of the overall middle class in integrating the society as a whole. In short, since the military generally comes from the middle class in these countries, it has a vested interest in maintaining or supporting middle class values, which, in turn, negatively affects the overall development process for all citizens.

Similarly, Sharma (1971) and Perlmutter (1969b) argue that military regimes in Africa and the Arab states (respectively) also have not aided in the modernization process, especially in the development of viable political institutions. Likewise, Nordlinger (1970) found negative relationships between the political strength of the military and development in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia.

Given these studies, most of them seem to argue against the view that the military can influence political development or modernization *in general*. However, these studies do not adequately address the more specific relationship of the military in the political socialization process in particular. They tend to concentrate instead on the more general political and economic policies undertaken by the military *vis-a-vis* the overall society, and usually only those that occur *after* the military intervenes. Consequently, this research does not examine, for the most part, any specific political socialization processes directly carried out by the military (whether before or after intervention). These studies, therefore, may not provide an adequate starting point for any assumptions about the efficacy of the military in creating political community.

In short, even though the conclusions reached by these scholars generally do not support assumptions about the military as an effective instrument in political development, they may focus on the wrong things with regard to this dissertation. A more valid approach may lie within the literature that does indeed deal with specific aspects of attitude change, attitude formation or political socialization, and especially as applied to the military. The next section explores this research.

3. Attitude Change and Political Socialization:

A significant area of research in both comparative politics and sociology is that which examines attitude change in general and political socialization in particular. The most important aspects of this literature relative to the present study concern, 1) the influence of age and life cycle on attitude change, attitude formation, and political socialization, 2) the role and relative influence of agents in the process, and 3) the role of the military in forming and changing attitudes, particularly those attitudes toward aspects of political community.

“Attitude change” is the more general terminology for that huge area of overall sociological (and psychological) research reflecting studies primarily of how, and through what processes and “mechanisms,” people’s attitudes form, evolve, or change.¹³ This literature provides numerous, and sometimes complex, theories of attitude change ranging from psycho-analytical explanations, dissonance theory, cognitive theory, and even to conflict theory. Most important to this study, however, is that literature which assumes that attitudes can be formed or modified by some learning principle. This is often termed “behaviorist “ theory or “Stimulus-Response” theory.¹⁴ A vital aspect of many of these latter studies is their focus on

¹³ These attitudes include opinions, beliefs, orientations, basic perspectives, etc.

¹⁴ See, for example, Malec (1971), Greenwald, Brock and Ostrom (1968), and Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969).

susceptibility to attitude change and/or stability of attitude. Moreover, there has been a great deal of research concentrating, in particular, on identifying the specific determinants of attitude change at the individual level. For example, this includes studies examining the variable differences relative to gender (Cooper, 1979; Carli, 1981),¹⁵ personality (Hovland and Janis, 1959; Newcomb, 1943)¹⁶ and centrality or importance of the particular attitudes about certain issues/areas of concern (Krosnick, 1988; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991).¹⁷ These studies provide evidence for the importance of each of these factors in forming or changing attitudes.

However, there is also that research on attitude formation and change relative to political community, and which deals primarily with *political socialization* and attitude change; **that is, those processes or agents by and through which individuals form or change their attitudes and beliefs about the particular political/cultural collectivity in which they live and interact.**

There are, naturally, several definitions for political socialization, but as David Easton points out, they all share one major implication:

"They suggest that somehow an adult generation is able to mold a rising generation into something like its own adult image. Theoretically this kind of conceptualization clearly implies that the outcome of socialization is to provide for the continuity of existing forms and actions, that is, to insure the stability both in the sense of consensus or order (against chaos) and of consistency of the system over time."¹⁸

Thus, political socialization is concerned with both continuation and stability of the system (whatever that "system" may be). From the perspective of comparative politics in particular, political socialization is assumed to reflect a functional process that is

¹⁵ These studies indicate that females generally are more susceptible to attitude change than males.

¹⁶ Findings in these studies indicate that personality can determine the level of resistance to attitude change.

¹⁷ Krosnick finds that certain issues or attitudes that are most central in important to individuals are more resistant to change.

¹⁸ See Easton (1968), p.134.

shared by all national political systems. As Almond (1960) explains:

"All political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time...they do this by means of the socializing influences of the primary and secondary structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation." (p.27)

The assumption that all countries share these socializing structures therefore highlights the importance of the study of political socialization in comparative research. Underlying much of this research is the assumption that political community is either developed or maintained by conscious political socialization processes; that is, processes aimed at changing or sustaining certain attitudes, which in turn reinforce desired political and cultural norms and values, as well as acceptance of the current socio-political environment. This may be especially relevant for partitioned nations, particularly Cold-War partitioned nations. With this in mind, the following briefly discusses the two major issues in the literature on attitude change and political socialization relevant to this study.

(A)- Age and Attitude Change:

One of the more intensive areas of study concerning political attitude change is that which focuses upon age or life-cycle. In general, there are two major schools of thought. First, there exists a widespread belief that as people grow older, they become either less susceptible to attitude change or become increasingly resistant to attitude change. This view reflects, therefore, that people possess more stable attitudes later in life than as children or young adults. These studies come under the rubrik of the *impressionable years model* (for example, see Cutler, 1974; Dennis, 1973; Easton and Dennis, 1969; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Alwin, Cohen and Newcomb, 1991).

Second, however, are those who believe that people are equally open to attitude change throughout their lives, the *lifelong openness model* (Sears, 1981,

1983; Brim and Kagan, 1980; Tyler and Schuller, 1991). This view holds that individuals are highly flexible throughout their lives and constantly change their attitudes in response to changes in their overall life situations and experiences.

From the *political socialization* perspective, most research has focused on the transfer of attitudes relative to political information and political orientation, especially the modalities of the process; that is, whether political socialization takes place through the adult-to-adult interaction, or through that of adult-to-child. Until recently, the focus has rested primarily on children and young people (for example, see Greenstein, 1965; Hess and Torney, 1967; Easton and Dennis, 1969; Connell, 1971; Andrian, 1971; Jaros, 1973; Beck, 1974; Beck, Bruner, and Dobson, 1975; Elkin and Handel, 1978). More specifically, this body of literature supports the assumed primacy of the adult-to-child relationship in the process, related to the *impressionable years model*. Moreover, some of these studies also have operated under the assumption that early learning is most important because it is also the longest retained, and because it provides the foundations for later learning.¹⁹

There are also studies that attempt to show that the political socialization process may be just as important and lasting throughout the life of the individual, reflecting the *lifelong openness model* described above (see Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Marsh, 1971; Searing et al., 1973; Stacey, 1977; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). These studies assume or recognize that since political behavior is usually manifested after adulthood, it may well be adult learning that actually determines the nature of political attitude which, in turn, translates into political behavior.

However, in those cases where there is a near total control over the resocialization process such as in new communist states or in newly partitioned states, both processes may be at work. Ivan Volgyes (1973) contends that in these cases it is

¹⁹See, for example, Greenstein, 1965; Easton and Dennis, 1969; and Jaros, 1973.

important to recognize both adult-to-adult and adult-to-child processes:

"...we are dealing with two distinct types of political socialization: 1) the transmission of values from one generation to the next, the adult-to-child processes of political socialization; and (2) a *resocialization* attempt operating on the adult-to-child, but more importantly, on the adult-to-adult level.

...[T]he "resocialization" or forcible adult-to-adult socialization, however, is unique to post-revolutionary systems where norms and the traditional values become subject to official disfavor and the new value systems are drastically different from dominant values held by the "influentials" of the previous political system (p.262).

(B) - *Agents of Political Socialization:*

A second issue within the literature is that which focuses upon the primary agents of the political socialization process -- their role and influence. These studies serve to differentiate those particular institutions or entities contributing the most to attitude change and attitude formation. They include studies that identify and compare the importance of such familiar agents as parents, peers, and school (see Hyman, 1959; Langton, 1969; Schwartz, 1975), the mass media (Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Garromone and Atkin, 1986), university (Feldman and Newcomb, 1971), or even political culture itself (Conway, 1989). The military, however, has been traditionally less studied in this regard, even though it may, in fact, prove another viable agent of political socialization, particularly for partitioned nations and nations with mass military conscription. As Herspring and Volgyes (1977) point out,

"Many institutions, both primary and secondary, serve as vehicles of political socialization ... One of the most important of these groups-- and one of the most underresearched--is the military."²⁰

²⁰See Herspring and Volgyes (1977), p.253.

(C) - *The Military Influence:*

There are, nonetheless, studies of the influence of the military either on general attitudes (most often political norms and values), as well as, more specifically, on political socialization itself. These studies can be divided into those which examine the military's effect on attitudes in other nation-states and on those within its own.

(1) - *Foreign Militaries and Attitude Change:*

First, there is the group of studies that looks at the military and the possible effects of its training and education policies, but policies primarily aimed at attitudes and orientations of foreign military members. Thus, this literature most often focuses on training not within one national military, but instead involves more than one nation-state or culture. Not surprisingly, the most common subject of analysis in this literature is the United States military and its relationship with several of its military assistance "clients" in different regions. For example, Ernest Lefever (1979) and J. Samuel Fitch (1991, 1993) both include in their research an examination of the effectiveness of U.S. military training and education for foreign military personnel that has occurred primarily as part of the overall U.S. foreign military assistance efforts. Lefever focuses upon the advice and training provided in association with U.S. arms transfers, and whether this training influenced the political values and attitudes of trainees. He concludes that,

"U.S. military training and advice have had a small, unquantifiable, and unpredictable impact upon the internal political developments of the recipient Third World countries... Consequently, training in the United States, including the official but voluntary information program, has not significantly altered the domestic political orientation or behavior of the foreign students. Much less has it tampered with their political loyalties."²¹

²¹Lefever (1979), p.290.

In a similar vein, Dr. Fitch looks at the U.S. military's ideological influence on Latin American officers, defined as,

“...impacts on the attitudes, values, and belief systems of Latin American officers which lead them to behave differently than they would have without those impacts.”²²

He examines the hypothesis that attitudes and values can be changed at least indirectly through the training and contact provided by various U.S. programs associated with arms sales, joint maneuvers, exchanges, etc. He concentrates his study especially on such U.S. programs as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and its effectiveness at changing attitudes relative to such issues as human rights, civilian control of the military, democracy, and arms control. He finds that these U.S. efforts have failed, in general, because of declining frequency and intensity of contact, but also because of the changes in the “message” from one of promoting anti-communism and counter-insurgency in earlier years to supporting democracy and human rights more recently. But most importantly, Fitch points out that this latest U.S. message is, “...less consistent with Latin American predispositions...” He concludes that American attempts at changing traditional norms and values in these Latin American countries were extremely limited.

Consequently, as in the previous literature on the military and general political development, there is little support in these latter studies for the view that a *foreign* military can play an even indirect role in general attitude change, in this case, through a nation's *indigenous* military. These studies indicate that pre-existing political and cultural beliefs, ideologies, or norms and values appear almost unaffected by this training, whereas it seems that other life experiences (especially early experiences) and socialization agents may have a continuing influence on these views and attitudes.

²²Fitch (1993), p.16.

(2) - *The Military and Domestic Political Socialization:*

The second group of military studies reflects research on the military and its role in political socialization within the same country. This literature combines aspects of both age and agent explanations. The assumption in most of these studies is that a country's military can act as an especially important agent of socialization, primarily aimed at susceptible young adults. This literature generally takes either an East or West focus, and most of its contributors argue the importance of the military in building some aspect of political community, mainly by seeing the military as either transforming or enhancing certain political norms and values, or bolstering regime legitimacy.

Relative to the study of Western societies, some of the more important works include Perlmutter (1969a), Kriesi (1976), Lippert, Schneider, and Zoll (1978), Wakenhut (1979), Bald (1979), Radbruch (1979), Linger (1979), and Janowitz (1976). These studies focus most frequently on the military role in instilling democratic values, especially values relating to service as a citizen-soldier in a democracy. Consequently, these scholars begin with the assumption that the military plays an important part in contributing to western forms of democracy. In that regard, Janowitz believes that,

"...military institutions have been of central importance in fashioning the type of nation-states that emerged in Western Europe and the United States. The role of the military is linked to nationalism; in fact, the armed forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries epitomizes modern nationalism."²³

However, there is relatively little support in this literature that the military is indeed successful. As an example, Lippert, Schneider, and Zoll (1978) test several hypotheses about the influence of the military on political and social attitudes in West

²³See Janowitz (1976), p.189.

Germany. One of these hypotheses relates to how military service develops and strengthens democratic awareness. They analyze four attitudinal dimensions as indicators and conclude that political and social attitudes of draftees were positively affected by military service. However, this occurred not because of planned processes, but instead as a result of general living conditions and life experiences while in the military. Consequently, this study points out the evident inadequacy of the Bundeswehr's pedagogical training on the one hand, while nonetheless highlighting the overall influence of the military service on the other. Another study by Wakenhut (1979) echoes some of these findings also by focusing on the apparent failure of political education in the *Bundeswehr* in preventing political alienation or apolitical attitudes. In sum, these western-oriented studies do not provide general support for the military's role in political socialization.

From a different perspective, there is the literature that concentrates on Communist nations. This includes, for example, studies by Beck and Rawling (1977), Jones and Grupp (1982), Herspring and Volgyes (1977), Wiatr (1988), Sanford (1986), and Barany (1991). Many of these studies attempt to show the importance of the military in inculcating desired political and cultural values in the citizenry primarily as a means of maintaining support and stability for the state. For example, Herspring and Volgyes write,

"As an agent of socialization in a communist society in which conscription is the norm, the army plays a decidedly important role by attempting to instill system-oriented values in the draftees and recruits."²⁴

In general, this literature underscores the emphasis placed by communist leaders on active political socialization and, unlike most other studies, also seems to indicate at least some success in the outcomes. This success is also often tied by these

²⁴See Herspring and Volgyes (1977), p.266.

studies to the usefulness of a universal conscription system as the basis for military recruitment. It is this area of study that may be particularly helpful as a general starting point for studying the military as an instrument of socialization in partitioned nations as well. Moreover, both sides of partitioned nations at the outset usually possess some of the same motivations and goals historically shared by communist countries. Thus, in addition to the fact that the GDR was one of these communist nations and both Germanies relied on universal conscription, there was also a clear need on both sides to "resocialize" after World War II -- just as in the case of most Soviet bloc states (and other partitioned states).

Another important aspect of this research is its recognition that the military acted as a major influence on the educational processes in communist nations. This is described by Barany (1991),

"[M]ilitary education in these states was introduced already at the grade school level and extended to university education. Naturally, political indoctrination was even more intensive in educational institutions operated by the military."²⁵

As this study will show, military education was an important tool in both Germanies for the political socialization process.

However, as useful as some of the latter studies are, they nevertheless do not address specifically the political socialization role of the military in *partitioned* nations. In fact, there exist only a very few works that focus exclusively on civil-military relations, comparing both sides of a partitioned state. On the one hand there are those that attempt only a cursory comparison such as the study by Eugene Kim (1984) of the two Koreas. This study underscores the importance of the external forces who set up the two states, just as in other partitioned nations. However, Kim takes only an historic look at the two militaries in an attempt to explain the major factors behind the

²⁵See Barany (1991), p.90.

two types of civil-military relations. Consequently, he does not address political socialization issues for the two sides.

On the other hand, there are those very few studies that do compare different aspects of the military role in a partitioned nation, but still do not address the specific political socialization processes. Instead, these studies usually emphasize the military and its overall relationship to its respective society and how the two divided sides differ over such issues as the underlying rationale and justification for the existence of the military, etc. For example, Proeli (1983) concentrates on the German cases in exploring how the militaries are legitimized and how they are integrated *into* their respective societies; but again, the possible role in *contributing to* political community is not really addressed.

In that regard, I have located only one article that discusses this type of comparison. Wilfred von Bredow (1981) investigates the problem of political education in the two armed forces of the Germanies. He puts forth the thesis that,

"...the political education of soldiers ... is where the general problem of forming a collective identity is specifically and dramatically accentuated. The soldiers of the Bundeswehr and the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) are expected to fight against one another. They are also expected, at least in the FRG, to develop a national consciousness that transcends the geographical border between FRG and GDR. Their political education aims at helping them understand the difficulty of the situation and accept it."²⁶

However, von Bredow focuses only on the process of using "images of the enemy" in political education of soldiers, and even admits that any assertions relative to this process in the GDR case (at the time of the article) would be almost impossible to prove. Furthermore, he does not discuss the possible outcomes of the process other than some general statements about implications for the future if the thesis is substantiated. Thus, although this article generally addresses the military as an agent of socialization (specifically through political education), it only glances at one small aspect of the case.

²⁶ See Von Bredow (1981), p. 31.

4. Summary of Related Research:

In light of this review, what can we say about the state of our knowledge about the military and political socialization in partitioned nations? In short, there is little or no consensus. First, the nation-building literature does provide some basis for the assumption that the state can engineer political community, and appears logical in the situation of partitioned states. Second, however, there is almost no support for the perspective that a military -- particularly an intervening military -- can contribute to political development or political modernization in the general sense. Third, the debate also continues about whether or not age makes a difference in attitude formation, attitude change, or political socialization, and whether certain agents of political socialization appear relatively more important than others. Fourth, the literature also reflects only limited support for the view that the military can be effective in building aspects of political community specifically through the political socialization process, at least in studies of western industrialized countries. On the other hand, however, there is some limited research support that suggests the military can act as an instrument for political socialization in communist nation-states with conscripted forces. Significantly, these communist states reflect several characteristics similar to those present in partitioned cases. Lastly, there are very few studies that actually compare political socialization (or attitude change) policies for cases of militaries specifically in partitioned states. Consequently, the present study breaks relatively new ground in that regard.

5. - General Assumptions:

Given the discussions in this first chapter, what are the important assumptions underlying this project? There are four major assumptions as primarily derived from the related research literature outlined above, and which are fundamental to this

dissertation. These assumptions are summarized below:

- There is a *general* link between political socialization and the creation of political community.
- A distinct political culture, a separate cultural identity, and a popular perception of legitimacy for the socio-political structure are three important sub-components of political community.
- The military acts as one of many agents of political socialization, but is potentially more important where there exists mass military conscription, mainly because this allows contact with a large portion of the overall society.
- The militaries in the two cases in this study are under firm control of civilian authority, and are, thus, available as subordinate instruments of the state.

These assumptions will enter the discussion in more detail throughout this dissertation.

D. Chapter Summary

This first chapter has outlined the primary research questions, approach, related research, and the basic assumptions of this dissertation. In sum, by examining and comparing the militaries in the two Cold-War German states, this study will attempt, first, to identify the conscious political socialization processes/policies used by the military institutions and, second, determine their consequent influence in actually creating separate, distinct political communities. The related research provides some foundations and assumptions for this study, but generally reflects conflicting evidence about whether the military can or does play an important socialization role. In fact, it tends to provide little support. However, the limited

supporting evidence provided by that research relative to *communist nations with conscripted militaries* nonetheless does provide a starting point for concentrating on the possible relationship for the military cases used in the present study. This is especially valid in light of the various similarities between the situations in Soviet-bloc communist states and the situations in Cold-War partitioned countries. In any event, the particular research issue, at least as formulated here, has not been addressed adequately to date.

The primary goal of this dissertation is to gain a greater insight into the political socialization role of the military in these cases of partition in particular. The research also may provide some generalizability relative to the potential influence of the military in *any* nation-state with mass conscription. The most important results, however, may be the study contribution to filling the evident gap in the civil-military literature on these partitioned countries. Moreover, this type of "one-nation, two-states" case may provide an excellent comparative laboratory that allows one to control for various other "troublesome" factors such as ethnicity, language, or race. Regardless, this study should at least furnish a better understanding of the civil-military dimensions under these specific conditions -- conditions that differ from most others previously studied.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

A. Introduction

There are important research issues and challenges inherent in this study. Many of these are shared generally by most similar types of studies. This chapter addresses these issues and describes in more detail the overall research design. This includes, first, the rationale for selecting the type, or group, of nations to be studied (e.g., Cold War partitioned nations) and the particular cases to compare (e.g., the two German states); second, a discussion of the definitional and conceptual issues involved; and third, the research methodology and data used.

B. Case Selection

1. - Why Partitioned Nations?:

Depending upon what one means by "partitioned nations," there may be several countries of this type in the modern world, or there may exist only a very few cases. For example, if one views partitioned nations as simply the result of, "[T]he creation of new states through the geographical and political partition of older ones...",¹ then we could include numerous states, such as Ireland, Pakistan, India, China, Palestine, Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and others. However, we can delineate even further partitioned nations into different groups; more specifically, these countries fit into two sub-categories of partition -- "colonial" and "Cold War."

Under the colonial rubric are those previous colonies that came to be divided because of indigenous religious and/or separatist elements seeking to establish nationalist states. These cases primarily represent geographically diverse regions that had been combined earlier into administrative lands by the colonizer, and later, deliberately divided by that colonial power in order to placate the rival sub-national

¹See Hachey (1972), P.xi.

(mainly religious or racial/ethnic) groups that had been incorporated into these regions. These colonial partitioned states include such countries as India, Ireland, Palestine, and Pakistan. Furthermore, although external rivalries among the colonial powers played an important part in some of these colonial cases, it was not a necessary prerequisite in the partition process as it was in the cases of the Cold War situations.

Cold War partitions, unlike the colonial cases, were not divided by a colonial power, but resulted instead from the tensions between the West and the Communist bloc that escalated at the end of World War II. In these situations, the partition is one that was set up generally at the end of war, without considering any pre-existing religious or ethnic schisms in society and, therefore, also without the normal concomitant hatreds and prejudices that usually went along with them. Instead, the Cold War partition is based upon other types of rivalries, perceived threats, and suspicions generally originating *outside* of the state itself, and associated with the superpower rivalry of the Cold War. As Robert Schaefer summarizes,

"Partition in these countries has to be understood in the context of two developments: the creation of a new interstate system and the division of that system into spheres of influence."²

Cases of partition resulting from this type of partition include Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, China.

Of the two sub-categories of partitioned nations, it is this latter group of Cold War partitioned nations with which this study is concerned most because there are important, shared aspects of these countries that may aid in comparing the role of the military. First, these Cold-War states reflect partitions occurring *after a major war*, and where *external powers set up new state structures and institutions* of control that usually differed from those of the nation's past. Second, these countries, in general, represented (before partition) *homogeneous nations without major sub-national cleavages*. Third, with the help of their external "partners" they developed new and

²See Schaefer (1990), p.116.

large *military institutions reliant upon large numbers of conscripts*, and because of the nature of the new state structures reflecting strong internal and external control, *these militaries were clearly subsumed under civilian authority*.

Fourth, partitioned nations differ with other types of nations in the new class structure reflected in the military. For the most part, the old, traditional classes that made up the military hierarchy are abolished or at least altered. As Stepan (1971, 1988), Nun (1967), and Fitch (1977, 1989a, 1989b) point out, for example, this is not usually the case in developing nations where the middle class maintains an important influence through its representation in the officer corps.

Importantly, all of the above characteristics for Cold War partitioned nations also may furnish some unique benefits for the specific issues addressed in this type of study. Moreover, these nations represent cases where two new political systems with divergent norms and values now operate in the same region where before there was only one. This circumstance may permit a more valuable focus for comparing dissimilar political systems and related political socialization processes and outcomes - no matter the institutions studied.

Furthermore, because of the relative absence in these cases of sub-national religious or ethnic strife, one may be able to control for several traditional research problems or rival explanations, including principally the socio-political and cultural differences that usually exist across cases. Since these states were previously homogeneous, one may therefore control for those variances in political and cultural identities across different sub-national groups that usually complicate the research in other types of cases. In short, we may, by focusing on partitioned nations, control for one or more of these rival factors that indeed could have influenced the role of the military for those various cases reflected in the related literature -- research that has provided only limited support for the socialization role of the military.

Lastly and more specific to the civil-military literature dealing with communist nations especially, all of these Cold War partitioned nations adopted militaries using mass conscription, thereby providing a ready laboratory for comparing effects and influences of non-volunteer militaries in similar, yet different situations.

2. - Why the Two Germanies?:

The two German cases lend themselves to a study of this type because they share the defining aspects of Cold War partitioned nations as discussed above. First, they represent the outcome of one nation forced into division as a result of defeat from war. In that regard, they reflect a previous, established political community faced with creating two new and different ones, each required to define its own nationhood and brand of nationalism.

Second, these two countries were occupied by external powers that forced new political state structures upon the two different sides of the old nations. These structures differed markedly from those of the "old" Germany. Moreover, the experiences of external influence over internal socio-political affairs were similar in the two new German states, especially during the first 30 years of the Cold War. This was the case, even from the very beginning of their separate existence in 1945. For example, there were similarities in occupation experiences including, 1) the initial stages of denazification programs undertaken by the respective military governments; 2) similarities in the historical military legacies brought by the occupiers, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union;³ (3) a continued external influence and control by these World War II victors that was largely defined and maintained by the ideological

³ Both of these new superpowers possessed past experiences of actively using the military institution in national integration, re-integration, or "nation-building." For the United States, this was primarily in the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War and in the occupation of the Phillipines after the Spanish-American War. For the USSR, this was represented in the ongoing integrations process after the Bolshevik Revolution.

and security issues of the Cold War; and 4) analogous experiences of rearmament and re-creation of indigenous military institutions.

Third, the World War II victors and their new German "allies" set up two large, rearmed militaries dependent upon mass conscription for manpower and, at least initially, dependent upon their respective superpower for weapons, doctrine, and tactics. This represents another important aspect of Cold War partitioned nations, where the circumstances and nature of the resurrected militaries in both countries markedly differ from the civil-military situations in most other types of nation states. Thus, unlike most developing nations or developed nations, partitioned states such as Germany are compelled to accept a certain type of military that is externally imposed upon them. As illustrated in the last chapter, the current literature on the role of the military in political development is generally dominated by studies of developing nations and not with the *redevelopment* of partitioned nations.

Fourth, there is also the useful *difference* between the two new German states in the nature of their new ideological bases and goals, and thus the ultimate type of nation that was to be created -- one democratic, the other socialist. Moreover, the military probably played similar roles in reaching disparate ideological goals for national integration; even though both sides began with the pre-existing elements of the same German "nation" or "political community."

Again, this difference in planned outcomes may provide an excellent means of observing the military role in the political socialization process in the two countries, but at the same time control for previous cultural influences since the starting point was a single German nation. Thus, any pre-existing, divergent cultural or subnational influences should be almost negligible in the study of these particular cases of partition.

Another important consideration in these two cases, however, is the fact that their partitioned status is now ended with the recent unification of Germany,

illustrating that the previous political socialization processes have in many ways played themselves out. Consequently, it may at last prove possible to also determine the relative success of the respective nation-building processes when it comes to the military institution. Robert Rohrschneider describes the usefulness of the German cases,

"I suggest that the conditions created by Germany's division and unification offer the opportunity for a synthesis by examining the influence of political institutions (controlling for individual-level East-West differences)..."⁴

Finally, unification has also brought new access to data that previously was inaccessible. This is especially true for those data concerning East Germany and its military, the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA).

C. Definitional Issues and Operational Concepts

As with most studies of this type, it is always a challenge to outline clearly the major terms and concepts fundamental to the research effort. This challenge primarily represents uncertainties in how to operationalize and thus measure the variables. In this dissertation, this especially includes problems with conceptualizing the three intervening outcomes/indicators of political community.

The following sections discuss in detail the vital issues about conceptualization and operationalization. However, even before that, it is first imperative that we clarify the important definitional issues specifically surrounding the terms, "nation" and "political community."

1. - Definitional Issues: "Political Community":

Needless to say, an important part of this study is a basic understanding of the definitional issues surrounding the concepts of "nation" or "political community." In that regard, unlike the "state," a "nation" is not geographically constricted nor is it as

⁴See Rohrschneider (1994), p. 928.

easily identified or delineated, and thus, not as easily defined.⁵ In fact, there is no universal definition for nation, and at the very least, it is an extremely flexible term throughout the literature. Consequently, related terms such as "nationalism" and "national identity" also share this ambiguity of meaning.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, a nation is defined as a group of people who are linked in a distinct community and perceive themselves as part of a shared, unique society. This sense of community may stem from culture, language, religion, race/ethnicity, shared history, common moral values, mutual goals, commonly perceived threats, or shared political values. Whatever the factors, it is the shared perception of likeness possessed by the people themselves that truly distinguishes the nation -- a likeness of shared political outlooks and orientations, shared cultural/social background, shared loyalties, and perhaps most important, the shared realization of being somehow separate from other "peoples." There are, thus, both cultural and political components of the nation.⁶

⁵ To most political scientists, the state is the most discernable legal-political entity in the international system. To many, it is synonymous with "country" or "government," but most agree that it possesses a rather clear set of characteristics which makes it recognizable as a state. First, the state has of course a territory with physical boundaries. The borders are known, the extent of the jurisdiction of the state is fixed, and thus everything within this geographic area comes under the domain of the state. Second, the population within these borders comes under its responsibility. Its people obtain citizenship from the state and are subject to the laws within its boundaries. They may or may not support and identify with the government of the state, but they are nonetheless under its rule. Third, because the state has the ultimate authority over its territory and population, it possesses sovereignty. It is the final power. And to be a true sovereign state, it must fulfill the fourth characteristic--it must enjoy overall recognition by other states as the indisputable legitimate authority within its territory. This does not necessarily mean that all other states must formally (i.e., legally) recognize it. It suffices that most states, through their actual actions and policies toward a certain state, indicate that they recognize it as an equal player even if full diplomatic recognition is withheld.

In fulfilling these four main characteristics -- territory, population, sovereignty, and recognition by the other state actors -- the state is consequently accepted as the fundamental decision-making entity in the international community. Therefore, a state possesses control over its internal organization (e.g., its political and economic structure) as well as its external affairs (e.g., foreign policies), and no other state has the moral or legal right to interfere in its affairs -- at least in theory.

⁶ Depending on the scholar, the definition of nation usually focuses upon either the cultural or the political foundations of the nation, but not both. This has led to no small amount of confusion and uncertainty when it comes to defining and thus understanding the concept of nation, especially since this definition of nation is also very close to what many scholars as well as non-scholars term as

From the *cultural* perspective, a nation may define itself predominantly in terms of a shared cultural identity -- that is, cultural traits, norms, and values within that particular society. These culturally defined nations can exist in a single state such as in Poland and Japan, for example, or they may transcend borders into multiple countries as illustrated by the Kurds who live in parts of six states, or the Basques who live in two.

On the other hand, chiefly *political* nations are those that may derive their overriding feeling of community or collective loyalties primarily from the political institutions and political values of the society (e.g., as in the United States), even though there may exist numerous sub-groups reflecting different cultural norms and values. These politically-defined nations almost always correspond with the boundaries of the particular state; that is, they are delineated within.

However, it is the combination of both cultural and political aspects that form the overall foundations of the nation itself, not just the predominance of one or the other. Both are important. In this sense, Friedrich Meinecke in 1908 provided important distinctions between the *Kulturnation* made up of the cultural community, and the *Staatsnation*, consisting of the active, political aspects of the nation -- with both parts acting as vital components of the overall concept of nation.

How can we better clarify this combination of culture and politics in creating a nation or national identity? One way to overcome some of the apparent ambiguity surrounding the term "nation" is to use another term, "*political community*," which may prove more accurate in describing this rather complex formulation.⁷ Moreover, although political community also suffers some of the same problems of definition as

"national identity." However, to overcome some of the tremendous definitional problems when it comes to defining and thus understanding nation, nationalism, national identity, nationality, etc., I will attempt to subsume these other concepts into this more fundamental discussion about simply, *nation* and *political community*.

⁷This term signifies political community at the *national* level, and therefore does not represent definitions for certain sub-national collectivities, communities, etc.

other terms in the discipline, there appears to be consensus that both cultural and political aspects are part of its definition. For example, Anthony Smith writes,

"A political community ... implies at least some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all members of the community. It also suggests a definite **social space, a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they belong**. This was very much what the *philosophes* had in mind when they defined a nation as a community of people obeying the same laws and institutions within a given territory."⁸

Similarly, in discussing the ways people form themselves into communities, Hermann Weilenmann argues,

"People are differentiated by their affiliation with a certain state, a governmental district, or commune, a shadowy image of a kingdom that has long since vanished, a piece of land that has been lost to more powerful hands, and even dreams for a future state.... A further grouping is **based on the social relationships existing among people who live in the same area**. Portions of the population can be differentiated from others living outside the community through a common configuration of traits that forms the basis of a people or a society."⁹

In addition to these political and cultural components of the political community, there is also a third important element that seems to be common in much of the literature on political community -- *legitimacy*. Many scholars discuss the importance of legitimacy from both internal and external perspectives, and in terms of whether or not, and to what degree, the population accepts the current socio-political order.

Thus, there are three vital defining factors which seem most prevalent in the related literature about political community, and in conjunction with the term "nation." The following provides summaries of these concepts as they will be incorporated in the present study, while the next chapter will include even greater detail about their actual conceptualization.

⁸ See Anthony Smith (1991), p.9.

⁹See Herman Weilenmann, "The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure," in Deutsch and Foltz (1963), p.34.

(A) - *Distinct Political Culture:*

This represents collectively shared norms and values relative to political ideology, definitions of citizenship, the "proper" structure of the polity, beliefs about the appropriate relationship between individual and government, and the general relationships between the political institutions and the overall society. In partitioned nations in particular this often entails the creation of a new shared *political* value system, an alteration or adjustment of the old political culture.

For example, Walter Rosenbaum outlines three major orientations that better clarify the core components of political culture; these include orientations toward governmental structures, orientations toward others in the political system, and orientations toward one's own political activity.¹⁰ Likewise, Sidney Verba defines political culture as consisting of,

"...the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics."¹¹

As will be shown later, political socialization is an important contributor to the overall political culture, and thus political community. Dawson and Prewitt underscore this,

"[P]olitical socialization shapes and transmits a nation's political culture. More specifically, political socialization *maintains* a nation's political culture insofar as it transmits that culture from old to new constituents. It *transforms* the political culture insofar as it leads the population, or parts of it, to view and experience politics differently from the way in which they did previously. Under exaggerated change or special occasions, such as the bringing into existence of a new political community, we might even say that political socialization processes *create* political culture..."¹²

Finally, this study will also use the more specific term, "political identity" to describe political culture, **but only within the context of the German language surveys.** Moreover, the German word for political identity reflects the closest

¹⁰See Rosenbaum (1975), pp. 6-7.

¹¹ See Pye and Verba (1965), p. 513.

¹² See Dawson and Prewitt (1969), p.27.

equivalent concept to "political culture" in the German language -- *Politische Identitaet*.¹³ In other words, "political culture" is the main operative term for this dissertation, while "political identity" is merely a synonym for the concept (at least for German translation purposes).

(B) - Separate Cultural Identity:

This is a distinct collective identity based upon culture. From this perspective, cultural identity reflects how citizens perceive the primary culture of which they feel most a part; what may be as Anthony Smith describes, the "cultural matrix of nationalism."¹⁴ Cultural identity also includes shared "social norms and values." As Philip Jacob states,

"[S]ocial norms, that is, values which permeate widely throughout the society, are the bedrock on which political integration is built *within* the community that holds them... Values which deviate from social norms, though a threat to the solidarity of the existing community, may be the most potent political force for broader integration, especially if these deviant values are shared by groups in other [sub-national] communities."¹⁵

To address the particular crisis of cultural identity that arises in partitioned nations, the highlighting of a cultural uniqueness that is somewhat different from that of the partition "partner" either is developed or, if in place, reinforced as part of the change process. This can include such strategies as the increased delineation of ethnic, linguistic, or regional particularities already existing in the new, and now separate, political territory. Even Gellner, as a proponent for state-led nation-building, recognizes the importance of these previous cultural aspects of national identity:

"Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist -- but it does need some pre-

¹³In the American sense, political identity has a different meaning, less often used and even more ambiguous than the term political culture. In fact, W.J.M. Mackenzie (1978) authored an entire book about the ambiguity surrounding this term.

¹⁴See Anthony Smith (1991), pp.84-91.

¹⁵ See Philip Jacob, "The Influence of Values in Political Integration," in Jacob and Toscano, eds. (1964), p. 212.

existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative...¹⁶

Importantly, *cultural* norms and values may reinforce, therefore, the new or transformed *political* norms and values that are part of political culture as outlined above.

(C) - *Socio-Political Legitimation*:

This is the perception of legitimacy on the part of the populace for the new social and political order -- legitimacy as a government and legitimacy as a social system. However, legitimacy exists more in the mind of the ruled than the rulers. In that regard, the *Dictionary of Political Thought* defines legitimacy as,

"The process whereby power gains acceptance for itself in the eyes of those who are governed by it, by generating a belief in its legitimacy..."¹⁷

This reflects a more recent perspective on the meaning of legitimacy that differs from the older definitions, mainly revolving around elements of law and recognized rule originating from inheritance. These earlier meanings of legitimacy primarily rested on traditional "rights to rule" and "rights to authority." However, although these aspects of legitimacy indeed may still influence public opinion about legal authority and the right to govern, they are not in themselves -- at least according to current thoughts about legitimacy -- enough to justify public acceptance, or even popular perceptions, that a government is legitimate. As John Schaar writes,

"[These] new definitions all dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion. If a people hold the belief that existing institutions are "appropriate" or "morally proper," then those institutions are legitimate. That's all there is to it."¹⁸

But most importantly, legitimacy is often tied directly into meanings of political community, and, thus, appears as an important factor in describing it. For example,

¹⁶See Gellner (1964), p. 168.

¹⁷See Scruton (1982), p. 264-265.

¹⁸See Schaar (1981), p. 20.

Reinhard Bendix suggests,

"[W]hile governments vary greatly with regard to the subordination they demand and the rights they acknowledge, the term "political community" may be applied wherever the relations between rulers and ruled involve shared understandings concerning this exchange and hence are based in some measure on agreement.

Both those in high office and the public are affected by whatever shared understandings determine the character of the political community." ¹⁹

Accordingly, although legitimacy can be claimed by the particular leadership, in reality it truly can exist only if granted (perceived) by the population at large.

Legitimacy is, thus, identified and hence realized in many ways -- through popular support and compliance, the realization of a recognized sense of national sovereignty and pride by the people, increased patriotism relative to the nation-state, and importantly, through at least the tacit acceptance of the current socio-political structure.

In partitioned nation-states, the question of legitimacy often revolves around the issue of whether there exists a direct link between the present situation of the new state and the past history and traditions of the overall culture -- a competition of sorts over the possession of the historical legacy of the old nation-state. In addition, the perception by the people of their particular nation-state's status in the world at large -- international legitimacy -- is also an important aspect of how the population feels about the legitimacy of the overall socio-political arrangement in which they live. There are, then, both domestic and international elements of legitimacy.

The term *political community* may provide, therefore, a more useful concept for the present study than other similar terms. This may be especially helpful given these three outcomes/indicators that the literature seems to indicate as vital to influencing and defining the particular nature of political community, and which, in

¹⁹ See Bendix (1964), p. 19.

turn, also may help to better conceptualize what we mean by "nation." Consequently, in this study, *nation* and *political community* will be used interchangeably as a result of these three outcomes/indicators.²⁰

2. - Operationalizing the Variables: The Framework:

In order to develop an effective research strategy, especially a strategy that relies heavily on interview and survey questions, it is also necessary to delineate clearly the different concepts to be analyzed in this study. In that regard, there are two important sub-questions in the operationalization phase. First, upon what common aspects of the military institution do we concentrate to understand its role in the political socialization process? Second, how do we ascertain the most important defining elements for each of the three intervening goals that will allow one to, even roughly, identify both the intensity and nature of overall political community? In other words, we must develop some guide for operationalizing the processes and the outcomes.

(A) - *The Process: Political Socialization:*

To identify (and illustrate) the processes of political socialization by the military, this study highlights four specific areas to understand *how* a military may consciously build political and cultural identity, and enhance socio-political legitimacy -- that is, build political community. These four so-called "policy areas," or "policy opportunities," include, 1) comprehensive civilian and military leadership perspectives and policies, 2) specific military entry requirements/screening; 3) military education and training; and 4) means of advancement within the military.

²⁰This use of the term political community does not by any means resolve the definitional problems surrounding the study of nation, nationalism, or national identity. However, this delineation should at least clarify the conceptualization of the *nation* component of the nation-state for the purposes of this dissertation.

- **Comprehensive Policies:** It is extremely important to identify whether or not there was conscious resolve on the part of the civilian and military leadership to use the military institution as an instrument of political socialization for the entire society, and identify the more general policies relative to this process. Thus, this area of policy includes both general perspectives and planned programs that enhanced the role of the military in building toward all three intervening outcomes. Moreover, these statements and policies were very widespread with potential influence throughout the entire society; not just limited to the military organization itself, or only to those personnel moving through the military system.

- **Entry Requirements and Recruitment:** The military has an important initial opportunity for affecting the overall society in the way it prepares, recruits, and selects its members, including both enlisted and officer personnel. Even though there is mass conscription in these cases of partition, the military nonetheless must prepare its citizens for military service, and thereby also justify and characterize its role, as well as the rationale for its very existence.

- **Education and Training:** After entry into the military, members must be trained and socialized to the institution itself. These soldiers provide a "captive audience" that receives both practical and political education, but also which affords an excellent opportunity for socialization. This education and training thus not only affects the members' time in service, but also may have continued impact for them after reentering the civilian community.

- **Means of Advancement:** The promotion system of the military also may furnish an important means by which to alter or reinforce certain attitudes and behaviors. For example, rewarding through advancement (and thus with pay and prestige) those who better reflect and manifest the norms and values reflected in the desired political community is inherent in most human organizations and institutions. In the case of the

military institution, especially in these partitioned nations, it may represent an even more conscious effort.

These four policy areas will be examined for each of the Germanies in illustrating the overall political socialization process undertaken by their respective military institution. Table I outlines these policies and practices of the military which may have provided the greatest opportunities for conscious political socialization.

TABLE I
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE MILITARY:
CONCEPTUALIZING THE PROCESS

POLICY AREA/OPPORTUNITY	DEFINITION
COMPREHENSIVE POLICIES	Broad-based military policies that show conscious resolve on the part of the leadership to use the military for political socialization for the overall society.
RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION	The ways conscripts and officers are screened and recruited from society at large.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING	The ways military members are educated, trained and thus "socialized" into the military, and also prepared for reentering society afterward. This includes both practical and political aspects of training.
MEANS OF ADVANCEMENT	The nature of the military promotion system which can reinforce desired behaviors and perceptions.

(B) - *The Outcome: Political Community:*

Just as with the political socialization processes, it is also necessary to operationalize the vital factors surrounding the outcome or goal. Moreover, since political community is made up of three intervening or intermediate outcomes -- political culture, cultural identity, and socio-political legitimation -- each of these must

be specified in terms that allow further definition. This is essential in formulation of the interview and survey questions, and the consequent determination of their validity and reliability in illustrating any relationship between the military (i.e., its political socialization processes) and political community.

(1) - *Elements of Political Culture:*

What are the most important aspects that illustrate a country's dominant political culture? A nation's political culture reflects how *most* individuals in that society internalize their own perspectives about things political and their relationship to them, and which also reflect a shared set of political beliefs for the majority of citizens in their particular community. This is, thus, the collectively-shared political attitudes and orientations of the society. In that regard, Elkins and Simeon describe this as,

"...a shorthand expression of a "mind set" which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible. Since it represents a "disposition" in favor of a range of alternatives, by corollary another range of alternatives receives little or no attention within a particular culture."²¹

It is this "range of alternatives" that this section seeks to clarify, relative to three major types of political attitudes. These include ideological orientations, perceptions about the desired structure of the polity, and beliefs about the proper role of the "political" citizen. These roughly correspond to Rosenbaum's formulation about orientations mentioned earlier,²² and are similar to Brown's "fundamental beliefs and values" and "political knowledge and expectations" components of political culture.²³

This interpretation is also similar to that of Dawson and Prewitt,

"[T]he phrase "political culture" summarizes a complex and varied portion of social reality. Among other things, a nation's political culture includes political traditions and folk heroes, the spirit of public

²¹ See Elkins and Simeon (1979), p.128.

²² See Chapter I

²³ See Brown (1979), p.10.

institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both formal and informal rules of the political game."²⁴

What are the specific shared perceptions relative to the three areas of political identity?

- **Ideological Orientation:** This entails those political norms and values which seem to form foundations for other political beliefs and opinions. From the perspective of political culture, it relates specifically to those attitudes and beliefs with which most members of the community identify, and importantly, those which influence political *behavior* (thus, their ideological aspects). Often, these ideological orientations can be recognized by trying to place them into a particular category that shares common characteristics of ideology. For example, these can include such familiar groupings of political norms and values (based upon shared political orientations) as communist, capitalist, democratic, socialist, anarchist, etc.

- **Proper Structure of the Polity:** Resulting from the general ideological orientations are those that then deal with perceptions about the proper form of the government, the best types of political institutions, and preferred political groups. This encompasses such issues as the preferred role of government in the life of the individual, and whether social order or individual liberty should take precedence, for example. Consequently, these types of political preferences, in turn, are reflected in resulting types of electoral arrangements, political party structure, etc.

- **Role of the Citizen:** The last focus for determining political culture has to do with understanding what the consensus is for a particular collectivity in relation to attitudes about the "proper" relationship of the citizen to the polity. This includes such things as the nature of individual political participation, the role of the individual in elite selection, the extent of political knowledge, and shared beliefs about the "political duties" of citizens.

²⁴ See Dawson and Prewitt (1969), p. 26.

In sum, all of the above provide a baseline with which to see how citizens view their political relationships relative to their preferred political norms and values, their preferred political structures, and their preferred individual political roles. Naturally, there is some overlap of these areas, but they are nonetheless useful in organizing responses, especially in attitude surveys and interviews. However, the issue surrounding the more general use of the terms "socialism" and "democracy" needs to be addressed briefly. In the case of the two German states in particular, these terms reflect contrasting sets of political norms and values, and as such, help to articulate the different goals of the two sides. Moreover, this broader usage of the terms serves to delineate specific aspects that apply, more specifically, to differences in desired attitudes and orientations. Understanding these perspectives are especially vital when looking at the underlying motivations in the political socialization processes of the two German militaries.

From the perspective of the term "socialism," there are distinctive norms and values that come to mind in the case of the GDR. These are in addition to the classic textbook definitions (mainly relating to means of production and social welfare perspectives). The term "socialism" in the East German sense includes particular attitudes reflecting, 1) a belief in the historical inevitability of the socialist worldwide revolution, 2) a preference for collective orientations in society, over individual "consciousness," 3) a priority of social order over individual freedom, 4) the accepted prevalence of the state in the individual's life, 5) a perceived validity of the Soviet-style communist form of government (and thus, the desirability of its stability

and continuation), and 6) a predilection for greater egalitarianism, that is, egalitarianism in terms of equality of both life opportunity *and* life outcomes, and therefore, the role of the government in fostering both types (what Aaron Wildavsky calls "Egalitarian Collectivism" ²⁵).

In contrast, the term "democracy" used in this study, primarily for the West German case, reflects western-oriented political values such as, 1) the importance of West European and American forms of democratic government, 2) a preference for individual-oriented society over collective society, 3) the priority of individual freedom and civil rights over strict social order, 4) less acceptance of a strong state in everyday life (whether political or economic), 5) belief in the duty, responsibility, and importance of individual participation in the political process, and 6) a desire for equality of opportunity in life, but not necessarily for the equality of results (outcomes) in life (what Wildavsky calls "Competitive Individualism"); ²⁶ consequently, there may be attitudes supporting limited government role in producing the former, but not the latter.

(2)- Elements of Cultural Identity:

Cultural identity, on the other hand, describes how the majority of people see the *cultural-based aspects* of what they believe to be their community, and which may become even more important in divided nations. Anthony Smith describes how this cultural identity has been seen in the literature as "national character" or "national genius," and states, "In former days peoples were chosen for their alleged virtues; today they are called to be nations because of their cultural heritages."²⁷

²⁵See Wildavsky (1989), p.32.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷ See Smith (1991), p. 84.

There are three of these cultural “heritages” that seem vital in understanding cultural identity -- the cultural group with which a people most affiliates itself, the particular defining characteristics of the perceived cultural community, and the prevailing cultural norms and values.

- **Dominant Cultural Affiliation:** This is the basic self-identification of one's culture, and may represent the clearest perspectives about the cultural community. They are clear because most people can readily determine their cultural affiliation and easily communicate it to others. For example, one can affiliate with Germans, East Germans, Bavarians, etc. How the majority of a community identify themselves in this way can tell much about their cultural self-awareness.

- **Defining Cultural Determinants:** This area denotes the primary determinants of the culture itself -- the cultural foundations of the nation. In other words, what are the determining characteristics that differentiate the culture from others? What is it that sets it apart as separate and special? These characteristics can include such cultural determinants as language, ethnicity, religion, economic class, region, etc.

- **Predominant Cultural Norms and Values:** In addition to perceived cultural foundations and self-perceptions of cultural affiliation, there are also shared norms and values within cultural communities. These are different from the previously discussed political norms and values, primarily because they are based upon such values as self sacrifice, discipline, hard work, respect for authority, strong familial obligations, etc. Although these can indeed translate into beliefs about political culture, they are fundamentally rooted in cultural identity.

(3) - Elements of Socio-Political Legitimacy:

Political community is not only the result of perceptions about shared political and cultural beliefs and attitudes, but as already suggested, is also a factor of how the socio-political situation is accepted by the people themselves. In other words, there

may not exist a valid or distinct political community if the population does not recognize their particular political and cultural circumstances as genuine, or legitimate. However, foremost in this regard is the recognition that legitimacy entails both cultural and political factors on the one hand, and internal and external aspects on the other.

- **Perceived Legitimacy as a Regime or State:** This conceptualization is based upon perceived legitimacy of the new state. This is, fundamentally, a reflection of whether or not the general population accepts and supports the new state as representative of the traditional *political* norms and values of the community. In that sense, is it also really representative of past legitimate polities?

- **Perceived Legitimacy as a Society:** Similarly, this represents a measure of whether or not the new social system in the partitioned nation is accepted by the overall community as one reflecting traditional *cultural* norms and values of the previous society. Is it really representative of the past accepted culture?

- **Perceived Legitimacy as an International Actor:** Since legitimacy also has an external perspective, especially in light of the importance of externally-recognized sovereignty and authority, the public's perceptions about the new partition as an international actor are also vital in understanding overall socio-political legitimacy. Consequently, this raises the question of whether or not the populace accepts the new state as representing the "true" nation in the world at large.

All of these aspects of legitimacy in partitioned nations thus reflect important considerations about how each "side" represents itself. Is it the legitimate heir to both the social and political aspects of the old nation, and furthermore, is it legitimate in the domestic sense, as well as in the eyes of the rest of the world?

Table II summarizes all of the various concepts underlying the three intervening outcomes/indicators of political community. Along with Table I, this is the framework used to guide the research strategy, particularly the interview and survey questions.

TABLE II
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: CONCEPTUALIZING THE OUTCOMES

Political Culture	Cultural Identity	Socio-Political Legitimacy
Ideological Orientation: With what political norms and values -- i.e., ideology? -- do most of the populace identify (e.g., Socialist, Communist, Democratic)?	Dominant Cultural Affiliation: With what cultural community do most people identify? (e.g., East German, West German, German, Prussian, Bavarian, etc.)	Perceived Legitimacy as a Regime or State: Does the general populace accept and support the new state as representative of the traditional political norms and values of the nation -- the logical successor to its past polities?
Structure of the Polity: What form of government and what types of political institutions/political groups do most people prefer?	The Defining Cultural Determinants: What are the perceived primary cultural foundations of the partitioned nation (e.g., region, language, ethnicity, religion, economic class, etc.)?	Perceived Legitimacy as a Society: Does the general populace accept and support the new social system as one reflecting the cultural norms and values of the past nation?
Role of the Citizen: What is the proper relationship of the citizen to the polity (e.g., the nature of political participation, role of the individual in elite selection, the extent of political knowledge, etc.)?	Predominant Cultural Norms and Values: What are the cultural norms and values which prevail in the society (e.g., values such as self-sacrifice, discipline, hard work, respect for authority, etc.)?	Perceived Legitimacy as an International Actor: Does the general populace accept the new state as one which represents the "true" nation in the world at large?

D. Methodology

1. - Unique Research Problems:

In addition to the above definitional and conceptualization issues, this study also faces, from the outset, some specific research problems that prove difficult, but not necessarily insurmountable. They are divided into four issues: 1) the problem of showing that there were indeed two distinct political communities that developed in

the Germanies before unification; 2) the need to show conscious effort on the part of the policymakers in using the military for political socialization specifically to create or enhance separate and distinct political communities; 3) the necessity to clearly identify any relationship between the military policies and resulting political community; and 4) the identification of possible rival institutions/agents in the process.

First, in order to determine whether or not the two militaries contributed to the building of distinct political communities in Germany, it is helpful to show that there indeed did exist general differences in political community between the two cases. If there were no apparent differences, the task of comparing the two processes and outcomes would prove infinitely more difficult. This problem is addressed by outlining other literature that supports the perspective that there existed two German political communities, and by providing additional evidence collected by the author. This is accomplished in Chapter 6.

Second, although there is ample data and evidence suggesting the *Bundeswehr* devoted conscious effort in the political socialization process, in the East German case it was not as apparent nor as readily available. This was a difficulty confronted by further interview and archival research in Eastern Germany.

The third, and perhaps most difficult, challenge facing this study is the requirement to clearly determine the presence of, and show, any link between the military (in its role in the political socialization process) and influence in creating a distinct political community. This was addressed primarily by conducting new surveys and interviews in order to provide some measures and/or indications of this linkage, or its absence.

Fourth, it was also necessary to identify other possible rival agents of political socialization that may have played more important roles in the political socialization process. Likewise, the new surveys and interviews addressed this problem in the

context of the wording of the questionnaires/interview protocols, but the existing literature relating to these issues furnished the most important clues.

The following section outlines the overall methodology used in this dissertation to answer the basic research questions, and in addressing these four areas of research challenge. It reflects several different data sources and analysis techniques.

2. - *Methodology:*

As briefly mentioned earlier, this study uses a broad comparative historical strategy combining several interpretive techniques. This approach encompasses various types of data and data collection including archival, interview, survey, governmental, and other secondary research sources. However, to address the second, more difficult research question, I relied more heavily on the interview and survey data to ascertain the relative success of the two German militaries in influencing the three political community outcomes/indicators.

(A) - *The Comparative Historical Method:*

Alexander George terms this approach the "controlled comparison method," where, "... an intensive analysis of a few cases may be more rewarding than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases."²⁸ It is, likewise, similar to Lijphart's "comparable-cases strategy"(1975) and Theda Skocpol's "comparative historical analysis" and the "method of agreement" where,

"...a comparative historical analysis can try to establish that several cases sharing the phenomenon to be explained also have in common the hypothesized causal factors, even though they vary in other ways that might seem causally relevant according to alternative hypotheses."²⁹

²⁸ See George (1979), p.49.

²⁹ See Skocpol (1979), p.378. In addition, because this study uses a conceptual framework for studying the specific processes and outcomes of political socialization, it also includes aspects of Harry Eckstein's "disciplined-configurative" case-study approach -- that is, a method of research where cases are applied to frameworks of inquiry, "...hopefully intended to help knowledge become

Because of the small numbers of cases involved in these types of case-studies, the strategy of inquiry usually depends more upon an interpretive methodology, especially when there are also only a few variables for each case under scrutiny. Moreover, since this type of research design has a primary goal of establishing controls over variation in order to better differentiate valid from invalid causes *in a small number of cases*, it contrasts with probabilistic techniques of statistical analyses of many cases. In the latter, large numbers of cases (large N) is preferable in order to increase reliability and validity of data, and thus supposedly lead to controlled empirical generalizations.

However, as Lijphart points out (1975), this statistical method suffers from important disadvantages. First, because this method requires that, "...the entire universe of cases be taken into account in order to maximize control,"³⁰ the most manageable set of cases with comparable data and characteristics seem to be nation-states. This produces what many call the "whole-nation bias" in these statistical studies.

Consequently, this does not take into consideration other possible sub-national differences, especially cultural differences and differences in the modalities of the institutions or processes studied. This can often cause skewed results. For example, comparing GDP for many cases can be very deceiving because of the different meanings attached to measuring economic output across cases. Likewise, statistical analysis of electoral results in large country data-sets does not allow for differences in how popular choices among certain parties or political groups may differ within the process itself (e.g., primaries in some countries may carry more weight than elections in another).

nomothetic, [but] not deductions from theory in any strict sense of the term." See Eckstein (1975), p. 99.

³⁰ See Lijphart (1975), p. 167.

Secondly, the desire to maximize the number of cases in statistical analysis may, in fact, lead to unconsciously "stacking" the study with dependent cases, and thereby bias the results in the case-selection process. For instance, Lijphart points out that studying elections as separate cases across countries may actually give greater emphasis and weight to those countries with more frequent elections. This is a sort of "case-stretching."

These disadvantages suggest that in the effort to increase N, gather more data-sets, and generalize the concepts, the reliability and validity of the results actually may decrease. These shortcomings of the statistical method also indicate that dealing with fewer cases using a comparable case strategy in an interpretive fashion may allow one to perform a more thorough analysis without overlooking important details, as might occur using statistical analysis. In addition, statistical analyses tend to concentrate on national and systemic levels of analysis, whereas the interpretive nature of the comparative historical method helps the researcher to focus more upon sub-national levels of analysis, including institutional and individual.

Therefore, the current study relies on an interpretive approach that entails the use of several techniques of inquiry. They include archival research, in-depth interviews with informants or experts, secondary source documents, other analysis of documentation (such as textual analysis and news media), or simple observation. There are several advantages to this approach. The researcher can get close to various sources of information and thereby corroborate information and analysis using several different types of data. Consequently, this method allows the use of multiple sources to support or test the arguments, instead of only relying upon certain data sets. Finally, this strategy may permit the researcher to discover, or rule out, more easily other important case-unique factors possibly affecting the hypothesized relationship.

Specifically, this study uses several types of data. First, I concentrate heavily on secondary sources for background and history of the two German militaries,

together with their development, policies, organization, etc. This includes published books, articles, newspapers and magazines, existing survey data, and several unpublished manuscripts provided by other students of German politics and history.

Second, I collected data at several archives, military training institutions, military universities, and research centers. The most important of these included the United States National Defense University, the Pentagon, the Center for Contemporary German Studies, the United States Information Agency, the German Ministry of Defense, the Social Science Institute of the *Bundeswehr* in Strasberg near Berlin), the recently consolidated Military History Institute of the *Bundeswehr* and NVA in Potsdam, the German Air Force Academy near Munich, the American Embassy in Bonn, the German *Führungsakademie* in Hamburg, and the *Bundeswehr's Zentrum fuer Innere Führung* in Koblenz.

Third, a major part of this dissertation is its reliance on interviews of policymakers, military members, academics, and ordinary citizens who lived on both sides of the wall before 1989. These interviews took place in various areas of western and eastern Germany. This was the most time- and work-intensive aspect of the data collection phase and is described in detail below.

This twofold research approach thus involves five types of data collection: 1) collection of all secondary source publications pertinent to the study, 2) interviews with military and civilian policymakers, as well as academics who may provide insights about possible processes and results of the military effort in the socialization process, 3) in-depth interviews with veterans of both militaries who returned to civilian life before unification, as well as non-veterans, 4) existing survey literature that may have addressed relevant issues of this study, and 5) the completion of new surveys in Germany.

Finally, the time frame of the study includes the entire Cold War era. However, this study will, in particular, concentrate on finding and identifying

particular aspects of this time period in order to shed light on the proposed relationship between the military and political community for both Germanies. Consequently, this study will not reflect a detailed chronological examination of the military policies and outcomes throughout the whole period.

(B) - Survey Research:

Because this study in many ways is breaking new ground, there were only few existing survey or general public opinion research data that were specifically associated with the types of questions and issues with which this study deals. Consequently, new surveys had to be developed in the course of this study to provide stronger evidence relative to either the link between the military and political community, or the identification of other institutions in the political socialization process that may have, either affected the military role, or proved more influential in creating political community. These attitude surveys are important because they are one of very few "instruments" by which we can ascertain or differentiate, even roughly, feelings and attitudes about political culture, cultural identity, and legitimation.

The surveys for this research consist of in-depth questionnaires given in person or over the telephone, and were administered to ex-members of the two militaries as well as non-veterans (the samples are discussed in more detail below). There are various types of questions on the surveys including such common techniques as requests for agreement or disagreement, simple choice between two alternatives, etc. However, a vital part of the surveys used here also are the "self-report" questions which ask the respondents to rate their attitudes relative to different institutions (i.e., the "attitudinal objects").³¹ Termed the "semantic differential" technique by

³¹See Kessler, Collins and Miller (1969), p.16.

Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), this survey approach relies on bipolar adjectives like "good-bad," "important-unimportant," or "great influence-little influence," etc. Each of these pairs of adjectives is separated by up to ten intervals (the Osgood, et al. study used seven), and the respondents are asked to identify the point on the scale between these adjectives that best represents their feeling about the object. In the present study, these objects usually are institutions or groups. Importantly, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum reported that these scores often were highly correlated with other measures of attitude toward similar "social objects." I provide further support for the validity of this technique later in this section.³²

(1) - *The Sample: Purposive versus Random*

The survey sample reflects a non-random, *purposive* sample, consisting of approximately 200 respondents, roughly divided in half according to veteran or non-veteran status. My goal was to obtain as many responses to the surveys as possible, while at the same time, trying to gather them from several locations in both sides of Germany. Obviously, the fact that only 191 individuals completed the surveys leads to questions of sample representativeness -- that is, are the respondents truly representative of the overall German population in terms of not only numbers, but also gender, region, or age? Just as important, *should* they be representative of the entire population? Second, is there other research evidence suggesting that the respondents themselves can provide accurate and credible evaluations of the relative influence of various agents (or processes of socialization) on their own attitudes and beliefs?

³²The questionnaires and interview protocols, both German and English translations, are included in the Appendix.

191 respondents may not provide a truly random sample. Samples can, however, prove representative without necessarily being large or random. By selecting the survey population based upon certain **characteristics related to the issues important to the study**, representativeness may be reflected instead by making, "... the whole sample similar in a number of ways to the population that it is to represent"³³ (but not necessarily in all ways). It is, therefore, desirable to produce, "... a forced agreement between sample and population on a number of characteristics or controls..."³⁴ This is the main reason this study uses a *purposive* sample population instead of a simple random sample. Its relevant selection characteristics include certain age groups, a more equal inclusion of veterans and non-veterans, and selection from several regions in both sides of Germany. Thus, because of the research issues here, it is, perhaps, more useful *not* to obtain a representative sample of all Germans *per se*, but instead, only those who could have been affected by the military and the socio-political system before unification, as well as those who either served or did not serve in the military, which helps control for other possible socialization influences.

- **Age:** The survey does not represent the entire population from the standpoint of age because there are many who were too young to have served in the military before the end of the Cold War, or too young to have experienced overall life in either side of Germany -- especially experiences relating to the military. Thus, it would not make sense to include all ages in the sample. In that regard, these surveys were aimed at

³³ See Nimmo and Bonjean (1972), p.94.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.88.

those between the ages of 25 and 75, with most averaging in the 30-50 age group. This allows enough time for these individuals to have served at least 18 months in the military or to have been old enough to have experienced life as young adults within the divided German system.

Many surveys, especially some German surveys in particular, commonly use this selection criterion of age in various ways. These include surveys and studies, among others, by the EMNID Institute, the Social Science Institute of the *Bundeswehr*, the University of Bamberg, the *Die Welt* and *Der Spiegel* magazines, the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. Information Agency.

- **Veteran Status:** The second major criterion for sample selection has to do with veteran status. The sample represents in total, approximately 45% veterans and 55% non-veterans, for the entire group of respondents. These are differentiated further between East and West German samples: for the GDR -- 50% veterans and non-veterans -- and for the FRG -- 42% veterans and 58% non-veterans.

This approximately equal distribution of veteran/non-veteran respondents is helpful in allowing the comparison of **two different German groups** -- one which was directly involved in the military and one with only an indirect relationship. This, in turn, serves to control for the possible influence of other institutions or processes in the socialization of the population. In short, this sampling technique produces two groups based upon presence of military experience, and thus, any differences in attitudes and outlooks between the two groups should also reflect differences in the

level of influence by the military institution (more than other possible agents of socialization). However, this is even more valid if other aspects of the sample show some general representativeness of the overall population. In this study, this is done essentially by regional sampling.

- **Region:** In the attempt to represent the German population from the regional perspective, the surveys were conducted over several areas in both East and West Germany. This included surveys conducted in Hamburg, Bonn, Koblenz, Kaiserslautern, West Berlin, Augsburg, and Munich for West Germany; and for East Germany, in East Berlin, Potsdam, Strasberg, Eisenach, Erfurt, Magdeburg, and Ruhla. 53% of the respondents were from the former West German regions and 47% from the East German areas.

This attempt at obtaining a representative regional sample helps to illustrate that any differences found between veterans and non-veterans across the two German cases would be similar in all areas of Germany, and thus for all of those people who could have experienced life in either West Germany or East Germany during the Cold War.

- **Gender:** Because of the nature of military service in the two former German states, there is also the issue of possible gender bias in the survey sample. That is, does the predominance of males in the military skew the results? Moreover, since conscripts on both sides of the East-West German border were almost exclusively young males, the

results of this research may indicate not differences between veterans and non-veterans, but, perhaps, differences between males and females. At the same time, however, both sexes must be included, since this study not only attempts to measure the military's influence on veterans who serve, but also its influence on the overall society at large.

First, there exist other public opinion surveys and attitude samples which tend to show less of a gender-bias in the German population relative to questions of security or the military than most people would predict. Except for questions relating to the use of military *force*, most of the responses in these similar surveys reflect only minor differences between German men and women, usually ranging between 4 and 8 percentage points.³⁵ This is also indicated by other research that treats gender as an independent variable for attitudes about political culture or political values. For example, Robert Rohrschneider shows there is very little correlation between gender and democratic values among German members of parliament, especially relative to attitudes about democratic rights.³⁶ In his study, gender was significantly less influential than other variables such as education and income.

Lastly, the survey sample used in this study included only 17.5% women (33) versus 82.5% men (158). This reflects the focus on finding roughly equal numbers of veterans and non-veterans in the sample, and does not represent demographically the much more equal gender distribution reflected in the entire German population. This is the case even if we consider that the women are included primarily on the non-

³⁵For example, see Akademie der *Bundeswehr* fuer Information und Kommunikation (1991,1992), and RAND Corporation/USIA/(1991).

³⁶See Rohrschneider (1994).

veteran side of the survey sample (30% of non-veterans). Consequently, this sample selection may serve to actually minimize some of the gender-bias that would occur if the sample were selected simply by demographic representation. That is, the proportion of women is actually less than would have been represented in the overall population.

To summarize, the surveys represent a purposive sample based upon age and military service in order to ascertain the influence of the military, while also attempting to include respondents from across Germany to control for regional influences. In so doing, this dissertation also acknowledges the possibility of gender bias. In that regard, however, other research suggests attitudes relative to the military and political values and norms are not that different between the two genders in Germany, nor do these attitudes seem to be as influenced by gender as most other factors. Nevertheless, the sample here reflects an even lower proportion of females than would have been included in a more random sample.

(2) - Are the Respondents Accurate?:

An important issue when looking at the nature of the survey questions has to do with whether or not people can reasonably evaluate the relative impact of different socialization agents. First of all, this is an acceptable research tool well-represented in the research on attitude and attitude change. Besides the Osgood, et al. study discussed above, there are, in fact, many studies in the existing survey literature that assume individuals can accurately evaluate the personal impact of various institutions or processes on their attitudes about political culture, cultural identity, or legitimacy. For example, in the late 1940s, Iisiger (1949) administered a questionnaire to Danish

men and women which asked them to report on the factors which influenced their level of political interest, and Queener (1949) measured a group of Englishmen's evaluation of the variety of sources that influenced their political orientations. In another study, Mason (1985) uses several questionnaires asking Poles to identify various sources of attitudes and beliefs about which institutions were most responsible for different political outcomes. Similarly, Martin and Stronach (1992) ask their respondents to identify various institutional sources behind feelings of "national pride." Langton (1976), in one of his chapters, posits questions related to beliefs about political institutions as he asks respondents to identify their attitudes about those institutions deserving the greatest popular support.

For that matter, Germans also are especially well-represented in these types of surveys where the researcher relies upon respondents' self evaluation of the political and cultural influence of various agents. Beginning with the end of the Second World War, for instance, the American Occupation Forces for Germany (OMGUS) conducted numerous surveys of German attitudes about perceived sources of political beliefs and orientations. These concerned, among other things, such relative institutions as the church, trade unions, school, family, etc.³⁷ Additionally, Hoffmann (1991, 1992) uses similar survey techniques (to those employed in the present dissertation) as he asks Germans to identify the "influence factors" for various institutions in forming political attitudes about security and defense issues.³⁸ Likewise, Zoll examines individual opinions about the relative "effect of governmental agencies and institutions."³⁹

Thus, there are numerous studies based on the assumption that individuals can accurately ascertain the relative importance of various agents in the political

³⁷See Merritt and Merritt (1970).

³⁸For example, see Hoffmann (1991), pp.147-152.

³⁹See Zoll (1979), p.532.

socialization process. Secondly, however, many of the findings of these survey studies also appear to support the predictions and findings of other related research on attitude and attitude change, particularly that literature showing the importance given to the family and school as agents of political socialization. For example, Hoffmann (1991) shows the relative predominance of family and friends in forming attitudes about German armed forces.⁴⁰ This limited corroboration of the theoretical aspects of related research also lends credibility to the individual evaluations provided by this type of survey.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The two German states as Cold War partitioned nations may provide useful cases for exploring the process of political socialization in the military and its relationship to creating distinct political communities. To address both broad and specific research problems and issues, these German cases are examined in this study with a comparative historical analysis using an interpretive approach. Various data sources are included, but especially archival research, secondary source documents, in-depth interviews, and attitude surveys. This provides important advantages over statistical methods of inquiry. The timeframe of the dissertation includes the entire Cold War period, but with selective analysis in support of the thesis, and not a chronological, detailed review.

Both the processes and outcomes are further clarified within a framework of analysis that allows better formulation of research strategies. On the one hand, this framework includes the identification of the four aspects of the military socialization process; while on the other hand, it provides further conceptualizations of the cultural,

⁴⁰See Hoffmann (1991), 152.

political, and legitimacy goals within political community. The specific interview formats, survey questions, and research tactics were developed using this framework of analysis.

Lastly, the attitude surveys were developed with purposive, non-random samples in mind, and with the assumption that peoples' attitudes are useful measures of the relative importance and influence of different institutions. This assumption is reflected in numerous surveys and studies of attitude and attitude change.

PART II
CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF CASES

A. Introduction

There are important and unique historical circumstances underlying the two German cases, both before and after partition. Accordingly, this chapter delineates the historical background of the two German states in order to understand the overall setting and influences affecting the use of the military in both sides of the former Germany. It reviews aspects of the German past that, in most ways, continued to influence the military policies of the two states throughout the Cold War years. Thus, it highlights both the *indigenous* and *foreign* civil-military experiences that affected Germany and its two successor states.

In this chapter, I will outline first the circumstances of partition that set the stage for the future political socialization processes in the quest for the creation of distinct German political communities. Second, because of this situation of partition, these two cases also encompass three major historical legacies that have influenced the military's role in political socialization. These are, specifically, German pre-war civil-military experiences, the Soviet use of the military after the Bolshevik revolution, unique American attitudes about the role of the military in society, and the U.S. experiences during the period after the American Civil War, especially during reconstruction in the South.

B. The Circumstances of Partition

Identifying the particular circumstances leading up to the permanent division of Germany at the end of the Second World War is important in understanding how and why the two German states were created initially, and how and why the Soviets and Americans became involved directly. An understanding of this situation also is vital as a starting point to determine the various motivations underlying the political socialization processes as the two societies endeavored to form their separate political communities. Thus, this section briefly reviews the circumstances surrounding the partition of Germany.

1. - Post-War Options for the German Problem:

Even before the end of World War II, the Allies had determined to divide Germany into occupation zones for purposes of administration and military control after its eventual defeat. These decisions had occurred at several conferences, most important of which was a meeting at Yalta in the Crimea where the outlines for the structure of postwar Europe were agreed upon, as were a whole series of measures for dealing with postwar Germany. However, by the end of the conflict, implementing this agreement had become rather complicated in the rapidly evolving European situation. This became especially evident at the Potsdam Conference between July 17 and August 2, 1945. At that time, there seemed to take shape five hypothetical solutions to the German problem. Among other things, these alternatives illustrate the

growing differences and divergent aims developing between the Soviets and the western allies during this crucial period.

First, there were those who desired a so-called "Carthaginian Peace," especially the populations of the victorious nations. This would have entailed dissolution and permanent Allied control of German territories and industrial areas, along with reparations and dismantlement of certain industrial capabilities.¹ This option depended, however, upon continued and close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, it would have, in any case, proved anathema to the German people themselves.

A second alternative called for the United States to retreat once again from the international arena in a return to isolationism. In that event, the Soviet Union would be allowed full control in Germany. This was naturally unacceptable to the United States in its new role as a true world power. Americans now generally realized that earlier U.S. isolationism had contributed in many ways to the causes of the war itself, as well as the nation's overall lack of preparedness to fight the war once it had come.

Western domination of all of Germany was a third possibility, but could have been attained only by clear and aggressive Western military superiority over the Russians. To maintain this superiority, however, there would have to be total cooperation and commitment among the three major western allies. Given the

¹ A distressing part of this option was reflected in the Morgenthau Plan put forth by the U.S. Treasury Department. It included the planned destruction of Germany's heavy and medium industries, the detachment from Germany of the Ruhr, Saar, and Silesia regions, and the creation of a partitioned, agricultural nation kept well below its neighbors in standard of living. See Ulam (1981 and 1974).

circumstances in the immediate post-war period in Europe, this was also a rather unlikely alternative.

The fourth option was the development of a four-power agreement that would neutralize completely Germany, but yet keep it intact with the possibility of future autonomy (as in the Austrian case later). The growing Cold-War hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as immense differences over civil, economic, and political administration in the respective zones, also proved this option unfeasible.

The final alternative -- ultimately embraced by the allies on both sides -- was the division of Germany into sections with clear zonal borders. Large areas of the former Reich were separated from the rest of Germany and divided into four zones of occupation. Those zones under Polish and Soviet administration included the regions east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, while the remaining areas were divided into occupation zones with the former capital, Berlin, governed jointly by the four powers. Responsibility for the overall government of all of Germany was placed under the authority of the Allied Control Council made up of the four military commanding officers for the four allied powers. In short, this option reflected the shared view of all of the allies that Germany was to be prevented from causing any future war, as well as the wish to eradicate completely the National Socialist regime.

2. - The Development of Permanent Partition: With the creation of occupation zones in Germany, both the Americans and the Soviets immediately realized that they would

have to quickly rehabilitate and integrate their zones into their own respective ideological and security "communities."

From the American standpoint, initial U.S. policies were undertaken to promote cooperation with the Soviets to solve the German problem.² However, these policies proved detrimental to American interests in Central Europe, especially in light of continued food shortages in the mostly non-agricultural British and American zones, and the ongoing and harsh reparations of a severely war-damaged German economy. It was, therefore, soon evident to the Americans that if this situation were allowed to continue, it would spell certain economic ruin for Germany in particular, and instability for Western Europe in general.

With this realization, American policy began to change in a way that ultimately would lead to dividing Germany permanently. This began in September, 1946, when the Secretary of State James Byrnes announced the creation of Bizonia -- an economic fusion of the British and American zones. This reflected the increasing tensions with the Soviets,³ and although there were other American interests motivating support for a divided Germany during this initial post-war period -- political as well as economic -- American policy toward Germany would be influenced from that time on primarily by the perception of a growing Soviet threat.

² This reflected the so-called "Left" view, supported by those who believed themselves to be carrying out the mission on which the United States embarked in World War II. It targeted for elimination, militarism, Junkerism, big capital, and naturally, Nazism. Conversely, the "Right" desired to utilize Germany to fight against Russia and communism.

³ This announcement came after a Council of Foreign Minister's meeting in Paris during April and in June and July, 1946; where Secretary Byrnes proposed a 25-year disarmament pact for Germany as a demonstration of Allied solidarity. The Soviets (Molotov) criticized the "inadequacy" of the plan and demanded the "democratization" of Germany. Byrnes also reiterated the demand for 10 billion dollars in reparations and the creation of four-power control of the industrially rich Ruhr valley. This served to widen the rift between the two new superpowers. See Hans Gatzke (1980), pp.157-158.

From the Soviet perspective, their zones in defeated Germany came to serve important functions -- functions which encouraged the Soviets to consolidate these zones into their own German state. First, as with western views, the continued existence of a divided Germany guaranteed against a reunited and revanchist Germany which had cost so much in Soviet human and material losses during the Great Patriotic War.

Second, the development of a separate East German state would serve as one of the most important parts of an East European buffer zone.⁴ Its strategic position was vital to the maintenance of the political and military hegemony of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe. Angela Stent goes so far as to call East Germany, "... the political-military bulwark of the Soviet security system in Eastern Europe."⁵ Lastly, the continued presence in eastern Germany and the subsequent creation of the GDR provided important opportunities for Soviet influence in *West* Germany as well as leverage in the Western alliance in general.

In light of these motivations, the resulting Soviet intransigence, aggression, and actions in Eastern Europe also affected both U.S. public opinion and leadership attitudes towards the USSR. Americans now saw themselves responsible for the security of a new Europe that no longer retained the traditional balance of power as before. As a result, it had become an area of both demarcation and competition

⁴ Regarding the idea of the GDR as a buffer state, Vernon Aspaturian also considers that all of Eastern Europe was either a buffer zone, a defense glacis, or a springboard for Soviet westward expansion; to him, one choice seems to be as valid as another. See Aspaturian (1984). In this respect, the Soviet military (deployed in Germany from the onset) formed the "front line" against any aggression from the West or, conversely, provided the forward forces with which to launch military operations if necessary for "defensive purposes."

⁵ See Stent (1981), p.3.

between the two new superpowers, and the future of Germany and the German question emerged at the center of this east-west struggle. Given these conflicting interests and goals between the East and West, a relationship, thus, had evolved where,

“Too many differences separated the two sides for them to work together on a matter so centrally important as Germany; even when they used the same words, they could not understand each other. The division into two Germanys would be preferable to a struggle for the soul of a united Germany, a contest that might well end in a third world war.”⁶

Throughout the Spring of 1947, continued Russian intransigence caused a virtual standstill in negotiations over Germany's fate and served to arouse further American suspicions over Soviet intentions in Europe. Shortly thereafter the Truman Doctrine was announced and in June, the three western German zones were invited into the Marshall Plan. Then in July, the famous Mr. X article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” was published in *Foreign Affairs*.⁷ All three of these important events -- the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan invitation, and the Mr. X article -- underscored the beginning of an American policy of worldwide “containment” in regards to communism, and the future of Germany was linked inextricably to this foreign policy orientation. From then on, the evolution of the two

⁶ See Yergin (1978), p.230.

⁷ The author was actually George Kennan, the Foreign Service's foremost expert on the Soviet Union. The article spelled out the communist outlook on world affairs; defining Soviet interests in terms of the inevitable overthrow of the capitalist West. In so doing, the article outlined the necessity for the United States to counter this hegemonic power. Kennan has also authored the “Long Telegram” in 1946 as chief of mission in the American Embassy in Moscow, probably the most famous telegram sent within the Foreign Service. This telegram had also explained the Soviet perception of the world as a product of its traditional insecurity.

German states and their integration into the Western and Eastern blocs became the *sine qua non* for both Soviet and American policies in Europe.

From 1947 to 1949 events moved rapidly as both East and West consolidated their positions in Germany -- years that would prove to be the most decisive in its postwar history. Currency reforms were undertaken in the western zones to spur economic recovery (1948), and in the process also helped to spur the first international confrontation over Berlin. In the meantime, the French had become the target of American and British diplomacy to allay French fears of a revitalized Germany. The February 1948 Czech coup served as a further stimulus for Western Europeans and the Americans to begin working seriously on an acceptable formula for the Western zones to be merged. This occurred in 1949. Also in 1949, NATO was created as a Western alliance with twelve members, and later that year, the constitution of the new Federal Republic of Germany was adopted at a time when "elections" were occurring in East Germany to establish the German Democratic Republic.

Thus, by May, 1949, the Americans and their allies generally were convinced that the division of Germany had been, more or less, rendered "permanent," and the creation of NATO provided the means to begin the integration of the new Bundesrepublic into western Europe in order to counter Soviet influence. It was thus perceived by the West that a divided Germany in the Western sphere of influence was indeed better than a united Germany under the control of the USSR. The next few years, consequently, were devoted to preparing the Germans in the west to take greater part in the Alliance and become a major player in Western Europe.

By the close of the 1940s, the division of Germany took on the appearance of a *permanent* condition for the remainder of the Cold War. The Soviets and East German communists began in earnest the construction of socialism in their zone, while the western powers initiated their own political, economic, and cultural rebuilding in West Germany. Subsequently, the German Democratic Republic was set up on the Soviet zone in October 1949 after the Soviet Union had failed to block the formation of a West German government earlier in the year. Thus, temporary military occupation became seemingly permanent and paved the way for the eventual rearmament of both sides; and in the process, it also introduced the necessity for creating separate nations.

C. The Domestic Legacy: Pre-War German Civil-Military Relations

1. - *The Beginning*: The history of civil-military relations in modern Germany, especially until World War II, is largely a reflection and outcome of the development of the Prussian state in the 17th century. Frederick William, on assuming the throne of Brandenburg toward the end of the Thirty Years War in 1640, found his kingdom surrounded by hostile Dutch and Spanish forces, with some areas actually occupied by foreign armies. He immediately became convinced that a strong military was the only means by which to grasp and maintain independence. Thus, as Gordon Craig observes relative to Prussia,

“... The key to safety lay in military force, and the Elector set out deliberately to create a reliable military establishment.

From the very beginning, the military problem was closely intertwined with the whole question of state administration and local politics.”⁸

Frederick addressed his military needs by compromising with the great Brandenburg estates (the so-called *Junkers*) in 1653. In return for recognizing and granting sweeping powers only to these landholders -- such as eliminating past legal restrictions binding these Junkers, exempting them from taxes, giving them absolute control over their peasants and lands, and making them his personal representatives in important matters in Brandenburg -- he gained their political and financial support to, at last, build his army. Subsequently, with the Swedish-Polish War of 1655-1660 as a backdrop, Frederick's standing army was born. This Prussian army was to remain intact, continually evolving throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries.

Moreover, Frederick and his successors developed an army whose loyalty and allegiance increasingly belonged to the king as both *de jure* and *de facto* commander-in-chief. As one of the first developments in this new military, the General Staff was created with central planning and organizational authority. Its centralizing nature was also used to unify the various military forces that formerly belonged to the different parts of the Prussian kingdom. As a result, the consolidated army came more and more to be recognized as the true determinant of domestic and foreign authority for the Prussian rulers. Consequently, both size and efficiency of the army continued to grow.

There also developed fundamental changes in recruitment, especially during the reign of Frederick William I beginning in 1713. He sought to overcome problems with

⁸ See Craig (1980), p.75.

available manpower and high rates of desertion by immediately introducing universal liability to military service through the establishment of a canton system of recruitment. This system filled shortfalls of volunteers with personnel taken from recruiting lists of available conscripts for every region. Above all else, this development further served to transform the character of the Prussian military from a patchwork of provincially-controlled and locally-recruited units to a predominantly national organization. At the same time, Frederick also mobilized the nobility to fill exclusively the ranks of his officer corps, and in so doing, he reinforced the society's class relationships within the military as well. In sum, all of these developments contributed to the overall goal of unifying the Prussian nation.

2. - *The Period of Reform*: With the challenge of Napoleon in the beginning of the 19th century there began a time of important reform for the Prussian and, ultimately German, military. After disastrous military defeats at the battles of Jena and Auerstaedt (1806-1807), a team of civilian and military leaders under the direction of such men as Hardenburg, Baron vom Stein, and Generals Scharnhorst and Gneisenau totally reformed the Prussian army system. In addition to the short-term defeat of Napoleon, these reforms also would lead eventually to an almost continuous attempt to identify German nationalism with an army-led militarism.

One of the primary goals of these reforms was to tie better the population to its government and military; for it was clearly evident that during the early Napoleonic period, the Prussian people had disassociated themselves from both. It was this aspect

of the situation that Scharnhorst and Stein, among others, desired most to remedy. They called for a building of a sense of duty, commitment, and sacrifice on the part of the average citizen to replace the widespread feelings of resentment and oppression against the King and army; and to accomplish this, the military was seen as an important tool.

First, the creation of a system of both professional and territorial (i.e., trained militia) forces aided in this endeavor. In describing this goal, Perlmutter writes,

“The reformers strove for a happy union of the warrior with civilian society, viewing the Landwehr (the territorial army) as the link between the civilian amateur and the military professional.”⁹

However, this was not enough. Since the army’s leadership was made up entirely of the Junker class at the time of the proposed reforms, the other social classes could not in most instances enthusiastically embrace it or even identify with it. As Craig puts it,

“...how, above all, could Prussian subjects who were called to the colours be expected to fight loyally and bravely in an army which showed no respect for their individual moral worth, which allowed them no opportunity for advancement during their service, and which regarded them as cannon fodder rather than as citizens?”¹⁰

In the attempt to overcome this problem, one of the principle means incorporated in the reforms aimed at linking the military to the broader society was the opening of the military officer ranks to all citizens possessing the requisite education, bravery, intelligence, and various other relevant qualities. All previous social preference, consequently, was decreed as officially terminated within the military, and

⁹ See Perlmutter (1977), p.44.

¹⁰ See Craig (1980), p.82.

everyone now, in theory, possessed the same rights and privileges as well as the same duties as other citizens.¹¹

In addition, to further open the military hierarchy to all classes, the military school system was reorganized. This new system now concentrated on preparing officer candidates for commissions, regardless of background. Moreover, these schools served to bring those of more humble birth up to the same levels of education and military skills necessary to compete with the young Junkers for regular military commissions.

Initially, these reforms were received favorably by the general populace and contributed to reduced bitterness against the state and the army which had been so rampant after the debacles of the Napoleonic years. This apparent initial success also implied that the military could serve as a possible means for national integration and the building of political loyalty, especially in light of its new, more effective nature. As Perlmutter writes,

“...these reformers created the modern professional army par excellence -- a centralized, rational, efficient, and highly skilled officer corps, loyal to the dynasty and its national ideals.”¹²

The reformers, therefore, succeeded in institutionalizing new concepts of military professionalism that included an increased sense of corporatism, better skills, greater administrative autonomy, relatively high levels of officer education, an overriding loyalty to the Prussian state, and bolstered German nationalism. However, on the other hand, the unchanging conservative, aristocratic nature of the state

¹¹ For example, any young man who had served in the ranks for at least three months could take examinations for admission to the rank of cornet (the apprentice stage for officers).

¹² See Perlmutter (1977), p.43.

structure and the monarchy still predominantly oriented the officer class toward the monarch. This became increasingly contentious within the German society as liberalism gained strength throughout the population in the mid-19th century. Moreover, the monarch continued to discriminate against the *bourgeoisie* within the military, and the natural ties between the crown and army always favored the Junker class as the most rewarded, and thus prominent, class of army officers. Added to this, the Junker influence in the officer corps seemed diametrically opposed to its new bourgeois elements introduced by the military reforms. Talcott Parsons suggests,

“...by virtue of its connection with the Junker nobility the German, especially the Prussian officers’ corps did not constitute an ordinary “professional” military force in the sense in which that is true of our regular army. ... the officer corps, in continuity with the whole Junker class, carried on a highly distinctive “style of life” which was in sharp contrast with everything “bourgeois,” involving a strong contempt of industry and trade, of the bourgeois virtues, even of liberal and humane culture.”¹³

There was a short time, however, when the military nevertheless appeared to grow closer to the overall German nation. This occurred during, and shortly after the Prussian unification of the German states into the German Empire (under the leadership of Bismarck), which was to make the army, at least for a short time, immensely popular. Germans universally regarded the creation of this new imperial “Second Reich” as a defining moment in the history of the German nation and, understandably, gave great credit to the army for its role in the related conflicts leading up to imperial unification in 1871.¹⁴

¹³ See Parsons (1954), pp.106-107.

¹⁴ These included the German-Danish War (1864), the Austro-Prussian War (1866), and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.

This apparent move toward a national integration of military and civil society was very shortlived. Within a few years the traditional separation between the two returned to its former confines where the army generally existed apart from the broader German society, with only limited support from the *bourgeoisie* whose sons now were serving alongside nobility. In fact, the officer corps became progressively *more* alienated than ever from both politicians and the overall society. With the increased industrialization of Germany and its concomitant social changes, the gulf between citizen and soldier widened further.

Ironically, this was the case even though the earlier reforms in military recruitment had caused a marked decrease in the percentage of Junkers represented in the officer corps. Moreover, it also became rapidly apparent that the sons of the bourgeois class who were displacing the Junkers were at the same time limited in their upward mobility within the officer ranks,¹⁵ and thus their potential influence severely restricted. However, these bourgeois officers nevertheless seemed to adopt readily the Prussian military as a new way of life regardless of its limitations -- a trend that continued well into the 20th century. Parsons explains this phenomenon,

“[I]t has been remarked that toward the time of the first World War considerable bourgeois elements had penetrated into the officers’ corps. They were, however, in Germany, predominantly what was called the “feudalized” bourgeoisie. That is, though sons of civil servants, professional men, even on occasion bankers or industrialists, they tended to take on the style of life of the *Junker* group rather than vice versa, and to be acceptable in proportion as they did so.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Interestingly, as late as 1932, 52% of the German army generals came from noble background, although only 23.8% of the officer corps came from such families. See Bald (1979), p.645.

¹⁶ See Parsons (1954), p.107.

Thus, although other lower social classes made inroads into the officer corps, they realized and accepted both the limitations and rewards of their particular positions as career military officers. Some of these officers went so far as to admit that the German officer must possess a *Heerenbewusstsein* (consciousness of nobility).¹⁷ Consequently, the Junkers maintained virtual control of the military, while at the same time fostering its continued detachment from German society.

Therefore, even though the Prussian reforms had improved the overall professional and institutional effectiveness of the military -- its administrative, technical and organizational aspects -- it generally remained by the end of the 19th century very conservative, elitist, traditional, and aristocratic in its social consciousness. It existed as an exclusive, detached institution with its own elitist education system staffed by a conservative and nationalistic officer corps, even in the midst of the changes in officer recruitment.

The Prussian military's ongoing detachment from its civil society, its enduring conservatism in the face of liberal reforms, and its maintenance of Junker influence even as the percentages of Junkers in the officer corps decreased, all symbolized the nature of civil-military relations through the Bismarck years, up until World War I, and even into the Weimar Republic.

¹⁷ This was declared in 1927 by General Heye, a senior officer of middle-class background. See Carsten (1966), p.217.

3. - The Interwar Years: After its defeat in 1918, the German military underwent a new renaissance under the tutelage of Generals von Seeckt and Groener, and was later completely transformed by Adolf Hitler.

During the 1920s, Generals Von Seeckt and Groener were forced to rebuild the military institution on the ruins of defeat, as did Scharnhorst and Gneisenau before them. Von Seeckt especially was directly responsible for rearming and reorganizing the German military (the new *Reichswehr*) within the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, and he also strove to preserve the German military traditions so ingrained into the army.

Termed "revisionism" by many, this rearmament process during the Weimar Republic reflected a German officer corps that struggled to reconstruct the old order, which they identified with earlier, better times -- that is, the Wilhelmine system. The military searched for a more acceptable, more suitable order than that forced upon them by the defeat in World War I. In so doing, the military and its command structure became the dominant political force in post-war Germany.

During these Weimar years, the army's growing organizational autonomy *vis-a-vis* the civilian government, and its increased intervention into politics reflected von Seeckt's view that the German army should act as a "state within the state" and as the "purest image of the state."¹⁸ In fact the extreme weakness of the civilian authority in the republic fostered a *Reichswehr* with independent and suprapolitical national organization that contributed ultimately to the failure of the Weimar Republic and to the rise of Hitler.

¹⁸ Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett (1980), p.99.

However, with von Seeckt gone by the late 1920s, and as Hitler consolidated power, the military temporarily returned to its tradition of remaining aloof from both society and politics. In general, military officers were disgusted totally with the politics of the republic.

“They had become disenchanted with the republic, parliamentarianism, the political parties and their “squabbles,” the new ministers and deputies. This new world was alien to the officers, and only a few tried to build a bridge to it. Weimar remained the ‘system’ that had destroyed the ideals of the officer’s youth.”¹⁹

To its senior leaders, the military’s well-established corporatism demanded that the officer corps should remain apolitical, and allow the state to handle the events unfolding around them. They were, therefore, above both the parties and the bourgeois society in which they found themselves. Thus the older officers did not consider themselves as serving the government nor the republic, but instead perceived themselves as servants of the German “nation” and the German “fatherland.”

This relative isolation lasted only from the mid 1920s to the early 1930s when a gulf began to open between the young officers and their seniors within the Reichswehr. Moreover, the new generation of military leaders lobbied for greater political action and tended to agree with much of the National Socialist propaganda, especially its extremist views of the Weimar Republic. These internal conflicts within the military eventually unseated senior military leaders and spilled over into the civilian government. This was manifested most clearly in the military’s role in the fall of the Bruening government in 1932, and the ascension of General von Schleicher as German

¹⁹ See Carsten (1966), p.217.

chancellor later that year. This served to open the door for other, more aggressive pro-Nazi officers to lobby for greater military intervention in politics.

For example, General Werner von Blomberg, the First Division Commander in Prussia, emphasized the need for the army to take on a more active role in supporting the National Socialists, and consequently, the end to military non-involvement in politics,

“Our being non-political never meant that we were in agreement with the system of the former governments; but it was a means to prevent our getting too involved in this system... Now this being non-political is finished, and there remains only one thing; to serve the National Socialist movement with complete devotion.”²⁰

With this support from the military, Hitler came to power in 1933. As a result, the clear transformation of the military's traditional sense of detachment from politics to active support for the Nazi cause would ultimately cost the officer corps both their particular type of military institution and for the senior officers, their careers (and in many cases, their lives).

Under Hitler the military subsequently became totally subservient, forced to accept Nazi control from above, and Nazi influences on all levels from both within and without. Hitler's militaristic policies eventually led to a new reorganization in 1938 when he took direct command of the military, purged the most senior officers, and appointed his own persons to the highest positions within the new *Wehrmacht*. Under Hitler then, the army slowly disintegrated as a separate, autonomous entity, and became instead simply his instrument of violence for fulfilling the Nazi agenda -- an agenda which went far beyond simply defending the *Vaterland*. Thus, by the

²⁰ Quoted in Carsten (1966), p.397.

beginning of World War II, the military's decision to forsake its traditional isolation and aloofness in supporting Hitler helped bring about the end of almost three hundred years of one of the most distinguished and efficient military systems in the world.

In summary, although the Prussian/German military before the Second World War often was used consciously in an attempt to unify and build political community -- especially in the quest for political loyalty and German national unity -- the process was on the whole a failure. Instead of serving as a link between the state and the overall society, or as a means to socialize that society, the German military existed as an insulated and isolated institution, even when it wielded extensive political power for a short time during the Weimar years. Its direct subservience to the Prussian monarchy and the predominance of the Junker class in its social and political life directly contributed to this separateness. Hence, it developed its own sense of being, its own norms and values, and even its own lifestyle that in most ways were not shared by the broader German population.

D. External Civil-Military Legacies

Obviously, all previous German military and governmental structures were initially replaced by the military occupation forces of the Allies in the immediate aftermath of the war. The occupying forces brought with them their own views about how the military and society should interact, or how the military should be used to pacify, control, or even change political and cultural aspects of a population -- views

that also reflected historical legacies developed in the course of distinct experiences in other wars and other times. These historical influences were important in the initial occupation of the two states, as well as in the ways the two Germanies were rearmed.

1.- The Soviet Military Legacy: Any attempt at examining East German military policy must be accomplished within the context of the fettered relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union, and consequently, the influence of past Soviet experiences in using the military in molding a socialist society. From the beginning of military occupation after the Second World War throughout the Cold War, it was largely the Soviet influence in the GDR that limited the level, and largely determined the nature of East German civil-military relations under the Communist Party in East Germany.

(A)- *The Early Years:* By the end of the Second World War, the Soviets already had extensive experience in using the military to consolidate state power and build a socialist political community, dating back to the very beginnings of the Soviet state. The "Great October Socialist Revolution" in 1917 had initiated a fundamental transformation of Russia's social affairs, including the organization, training, and indoctrination of its soldiers to socialist ideals, values, and expectations. This began in the first days after the revolution even within the old imperial army and navy still serving on the front.

The civil war that quickly followed the revolution forced the new Bolshevik government to mobilize and train its own large standing army in order to defend the

“working class interests” (and in the process, repudiate its initial preferences for a “classless militia”). Subsequently, the army immediately evolved into the largest of the first Soviet political institutions -- a new institution that came to serve the new political elite as a, “...model for state-building activities in other spheres as well.” ²¹ As a result, the military was put into use promptly for influencing the broader Soviet community, and this was accomplished in several ways.

(B) - *The Class Criterion*: First, political reliability in the military from the outset was defined in terms of the class criterion. Naturally, Marxist-Leninist ideology has always assigned considerable weight to class background. Herspring and Volgyes write,

“Those from working-class or peasant backgrounds are presumed to be sympathetic to the system, while those with aristocratic or bourgeois backgrounds are considered hostile. Consequently, it is no surprise to learn that one of the first acts of all communist parties during the first period was to purge those with undesirable backgrounds from the military and replace them with individuals with a ‘more appropriate heritage’.” ²²

This reliance on class in an attempt to build political reliability was evidenced early on in the Red Army, especially as intensive efforts at this time went into the rebuilding of the officer corps along acceptable class lines. Class purging was most evident in the early years of the Soviet state when over ninety percent of the ex-Tsarist officers who had been coaxed or blackmailed into serving during the Civil War were removed. However, as the officer and enlisted ranks came to reflect mostly worker and peasant classes, and the numbers of acknowledged bourgeoisie and nobility rapidly

²¹ See Von Hagen (1991), p.268.

²² See Herspring and Volgyes (1977), p.255.

declined in the overall society, the necessity for intensive class cleansing within the military also rapidly decreased.

(C) - *Political/Ideological Indoctrination*: Second, in order to incorporate and maintain the correct "class outlook," the political administration of the army worked energetically to indoctrinate new recruits, especially those mostly peasants taken in at the end of the Civil War. These recruits neither knew, nor cared, what "ideology" was, but thanks to the introduction of mass conscription, large numbers were exposed quickly exposed to almost daily doses of socialist propaganda in a variety of socialization techniques.

The importance of indoctrinating the officer corps was realized quickly as well, and, thus, also began the decades-long process of creating the "red" and "expert" communist military officer who,

"would have so internalized the party's value system that he could be expected to support the party as well as the political system in the same way that military officers in the U.S. are expected to support the American political system."²³

These various socialization techniques used for enlisted personnel, and especially for officers/officer candidates, included the use of political commissars at multiple levels of command, regular ideological indoctrination, required educational courses at military schools and colleges, and the offer of party membership (with its corresponding prestige and rewards). Such strategies would continue in various ways until the very end of the Soviet Union itself, and illustrate that Soviet leaders

²³ *Ibid.*, p.254.

recognized early on that the military could act as a sort of, "...halfway house between the majority of largely unreliable peasants and the putatively trustworthy proletariat." ²⁴

(D) - *Influence of Military Veterans*: Third, primarily as a result of this ideological and political socialization, there was a parallel influence on civil society by those soldiers and sailors leaving the military. Moreover, it became evident especially by the end of the 1920s that hundreds of thousands of conscripted veterans during this period played increasingly important roles in the new communist bureaucracies rapidly developing at that time. These men and in some cases, women, had undergone a common experience during their military years, and not surprisingly they took these experiences and their accumulated attitudes and behaviors with them into their civilian jobs. Thus, as Mark von Hagen writes, "Army service became one of the passports to important posts in the postrevolutionary political class." ²⁵

This influence also was evidenced in other ways. For example, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviets extensively used demobilized soldiers in the reorganization of the peasantry into Party-dominated collective farms. The positive efforts of these veterans seemed to illustrate that their time in the Red Army had isolated them from the old peasant influences, and the communist indoctrination to which they were constantly exposed seemed to have "taken," given the support these ex-soldiers gave the regime through their work in the field. ²⁶

²⁴ See Von Hagen (1991), p.270.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.269.

²⁶ This is discussed more thoroughly in Jones and Grupp (1982), p.377.

Additionally, contemporary military writers linked this collectivization of agriculture to necessary preparations for future war. Furthermore, military service was used more closely to define citizenship itself. In any case, veterans, active soldiers and officers played crucial roles in most key areas of the society, and in so doing, most probably helped shape the political culture of the Soviet Union. In sum, the influence of military veterans permeated into almost all areas of Soviet society, and there was a corresponding increase in the perceived relationship between service in the military and the ability to both understand and serve the broader socialist society.

(E) - *Cultural Policies*: A fourth aspect of the relationship between the military and Soviet society was the Red Army's involvement in cultural development. Even Stalin recognized that the army was a melting pot of citizens from all over the Soviet Union with different cultural backgrounds, and, thus, the army institution provided "strong transmission belts" for social transformation.²⁷

Related programs included Trotsky's short-lived plan to use military units to labor in the economy, a plan to eliminate illiteracy and to teach Russian language to recruits (introduced in 1921 and 1922), extensive curricula for civic education for all new military members, and the simple practice of moving mostly rural peasant recruits to urban military stations. All of these contributed to changed cultural outlooks, attitudes, and in many cases, an increased acceptance for the Soviet socialist state.

²⁷ See Odom (1976), p.115.

Thus, by the time the Soviet Union began to consider how to set up the new East German military in the late 1940s, it possessed a vast set of past experiences to guide its development. Most importantly, this included the realization that the military can prove a useful state-controlled instrument in building a new socialist political community. As will be shown in the next chapter, the historical Russian military legacy outlined here also would play a large role in the socialization processes of the East German military as well.

2. - *The U.S. Military Legacy*: Like the experiences brought with the Soviet occupiers in Germany, there was also a unique American past carried by its military leaders into the western regions of defeated Germany. However, these experiences were quite different from those of the Soviet military. For the most part, civil-military relations in the case of the United States were orchestrated less consciously, reflecting, instead, more of an ongoing general evolution as one of many aspects of the development of American society as a whole. This resulted historically in a military (specifically an officer corps) that was, "...of -- and not outside -- of society." ²⁸

However, there did appear, indeed, in the late 19th Century ample opportunity for American policymakers to use the military in less traditional, and more conscious political roles (at least from the American standpoint). These opportunities presented themselves primarily in the American South after the Civil War, but also to a lesser extent in the Phillipines and in the frontier of the American West.

²⁸ See Ambrose and Barber (1972), p.17.

(A) - *The American Military and Society*: Traditionally, until the 1940s the military had been, in many ways, one of the less significant institutions in American life. In fact, before World War II no American industry other than ship-building was even dependent upon the military for its livelihood, and most Americans normally did not give the military much thought. This was more a result of two general factors that have contributed to characteristically American attitudes towards the military; 1) the geographic advantages enjoyed by this country and, 2) the impact of a uniquely American heritage of certain shared values and norms upon the development of the military institution and its policies. These two factors, in turn, affected traditional American perspectives on the role of the military in society.

(1) - *The Impact of Geography*: Even before the colonization of North America, its peoples enjoyed the advantage of geographic separation from other parts of the globe. This separation was not only in terms of oceans, but also in terms of almost incomprehensible expanses of wilderness and difficult topography. These same obstacles that had prevented Europeans from earlier settling the continent also affected the attitudes of those who came *after* colonization. Consequently, geographical detachment played a major role in the development of many of the uniquely American attitudes towards defense, and thus the military.

Apart from the continuing hostilities with indigenous peoples, European Americans did not suffer from the constant fear of invasion and warfare from abroad as did their counterparts back in Europe, where nations shared many borders with

other competitive and ambitious regimes. The result was a feeling of isolation from the rest of the so-called "civilized" world, which, in turn, developed into a preference for *isolationism* in foreign and defense policy. This growing isolationism further contributed to an American fondness for neutrality and a distinct aversion to alliances.

Moreover, isolation provided breathing space for internal development of peculiarly American institutions, values, and attitudes relatively free from outside interference. This differed markedly from those situations in Prussia and the Soviet Union.

An important consequence of this geographic legacy was the absence of the necessity for maintaining a large, standing military establishment. Because "island" America was almost impervious to foreign invasion, and "continent" America too large to successfully conquer, its peacetime military forces were organized for domestic use, and during war depended mainly on a non-professional, citizen military. Thus, the accident of geography played a vital role in shaping distinct American perspectives of the threat from abroad, relationships with the rest of the world, and, consequently, the nature of the national security institutions and policies that were developed.

(2) - *A Heritage of Shared Norms and Values:* Likewise, the development of an American "culture" naturally has influenced the development of perceptions about civil-military issues. In that regard, the United States possesses unique attributes relative to the history and the origins of its people. First, Americans lack a significant shared history. Theirs is relatively short, especially when compared to most European

and Asian countries. There is, thus, an absence of a cultural homogeneity as derived from a common, shared past. However, although Americans did not share a truly common national or ethnic origin, they nevertheless did share some common values. This was due in part to the types of people who sought a fresh beginning in the New World. The shared values and ideals of these Americans of all races and backgrounds were reflected generally in those of the original Anglo-Saxon immigrants.

Such things as the traditional English aversion to large peacetime militaries, commitment to individual liberty and opportunity, a corresponding fear of intrusive government, and the strong dedication to constitutional rule all contributed to the ultimate nature of the American social and political institutions that were developed; and new immigrants embraced these values regardless of their origins.

Second, the resulting democratic nature of American political institutions and government arising from these shared norms and values also played a vital role in the development of American civil-military relations. Moreover, the representative form of government and the constitutional checks and balances inherent in the Hamiltonian model was based upon popular support for all major national choices. As a result, important national decisions were largely determined by representative politics, which, in turn, gave greater credence to public opinion in general.

We can thus distinguish a unique American political and social identity reflecting similar norms and values which contributed to a developed democratic, republican form of government and, consequently, publicly accountable political

institutions. Naturally, these also influenced the evolution of the American relationship between military and society.

(3) *The Resulting Military*: The two factors of geography and shared norms and values described above affected the traditional American view of the military, in particular, especially views about its proper role in society. First, there developed a characteristic opposition to a large military establishment resulting from both the advantages of American geography as well as the peculiar shared American values and norms. Consequently, the peacetime military in America before World War II traditionally suffered disdain and distrust from those it was to serve in war. This ongoing suspicion of the military manifested itself in various ways, including the maintenance of only extremely small military forces,²⁹ their physical isolation from the general public, and their existence only under strictly civilian control (thereby making them more or less apolitical). Therefore, the natural result of this for most of American history was a small, underpaid, and politically immobilized military.

Furthermore, geographical isolation ensured a large military would not be needed on a routine basis. Greater reliance was placed, therefore, on the citizen-soldier, the militia, for defense in times of crisis -- a second important aspect of American attitudes toward the military. This dependence on citizens for defense provided a means by which America could protect itself while at the same time prevent

²⁹ For example, the standing army of the United States varied only from 3000 after the Revolution to only 6000 on the eve of the War of 1812. See Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), p.46.

any internal military threat to the political system. It offered a solution that accommodated all the suspicions and fears about the military shared by most of the citizenry. However, it also influenced American views and perspectives about the role and nature of the *citizen-soldier*, which would influence later the rearmament of the West German military.

Third, the reliance on militias also led to the necessity of adopting strategies of mobilization and demobilization in lieu of constant military preparedness. As a result, the United States generally was unprepared to fight each of the many wars it experienced. Massive drafts and "call-ups" of millions of men for short-term service, followed by immense and rapid demobilization was the traditional American way of war.

In summary, before the defeat of Nazi Germany, the American people had developed unique perspectives about the military and society stemming from geographic isolation and a commonly shared set of social and political outlooks, predominantly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon heritage. These factors, in turn, determined a peculiarly American relationship between the citizens and their military within a democratic society -- a relationship fraught with a distrust of the professional military and reflected in the traditional American reliance on internally-oriented, citizen-based, mobilization-dependent forces. In short, the military had very little impact on the overall American political community, but conversely, the community had tremendous influence on the military. As a result, for most of its history the US

military was a small institution, possessing little political power, and given little opportunity to interact with the broader society which it served.

However, there was a time in U.S. history when Americans were not reluctant to consciously use the military to help in the changing of social and political views of certain of their fellow countrymen. This was the case in the aftermath of the American Civil War.

(B) - *The Military and The Reconstruction Era*: After the American Civil War in 1865, the American army for the first time was forced to govern, control, and more or less coerce large numbers of fellow American citizens. The U.S. military was given a monumental task in the overall reconstruction of the union in general, and the American South in particular. In the process, the military became more than just an instrument of peacekeeping and policing; instead it found itself involved in both social and political aspects of the rebuilding of major portions of the nation.

From the outset, the union army was the most important instrument of federal authority in the South, and it was the only available enforcer of national reconstruction policy, whether under executive leadership as in the beginning of this period, or later under legislative control. Either way, the military found itself performing uncomfortable, unfamiliar and often unprecedented tasks in the process of reuniting the country.

One of the primary reasons for this was the relative lack of guidance within the American Constitution, especially concerning the possibility of secession by large

numbers of states. There was obviously also no guidance for how to solve the multiple political problems after forced reunification. Moreover, there was no satisfactory precedent in the American political experience governing this situation, particularly from the military's perspective. In addition, at the end of the war the army itself was dissolving rapidly as volunteer units left for home, and only regular units became available for peacetime duties in the South. In short, the military at the end of the bitter war between the American states was ill-prepared for its new duties in reconstruction.

Briefly, there were several distinct roles and missions for the military during this time which quickly showed that even the American military possessed greater societal influence than previously thought. First, in the initial weeks after Appomattox, the principal tasks of the army involved the administration of local governments in the many Southern towns and cities, as well as the maintenance of law and order. The former proved to be a rather large problem in the wake of the total collapse of the Confederate government. Out of necessity, army commanders were forced to rely on local civilians for help in this endeavor, and importantly, for the first time, the army found itself having to select these civilians based upon their political reliability. It was now performing the task of political selection and in so doing, providing rewards for "correct" political outlooks and behavior.

Second, after 1865 the military also found itself responsible for supporting new elected officials, openly showing political preference for these individuals. This was also a different development for the military. What's more, this politically-biased

mission for the army was escalated even further after passage by Congress of the Reconstruction Acts in 1867. This legislation directed military commanders to oversee elections, administer oaths to voters, and gave them power to convene electoral conventions and set convention districts and apportionment of delegates. Most importantly, they received the power to remove elected officials from office. Thus, "...the amount of direct military supervision over the political activities of the Southern people was more complete than at any time previously."³⁰ This represented far-reaching powers for the district commanders, and, in the process, set new precedents for the military in the United States.

Third, the Reconstruction Acts also provided for military intervention in judicial affairs. For example, in Virginia, military commissioners were appointed at the county level with broad powers for quelling riots and insurrection, and to accomplish this better, they were given direct authority over local civilian police authorities. Additionally, these commissioners also possessed the judicial powers of county justices and city police magistrates. With this authority, they administered local justice with priority given to federal statutes and military orders over local and state laws. As a result, the traditional separation of the military from the political aspects of society were, at least for the time being, discarded.

Lastly, all of these new powers given the military were used by many commanders to further social goals. This most often involved the fostering of negro participation in the political process, primarily in the electoral and judicial processes. For example, as mentioned before, the military was directly involved in registering

³⁰ See Sefton (1967), p.113.

voters, and in the case of black voters, this also entailed their physical protection and even rudimentary education about the electoral system and process itself. From the perspective of the courts, there were many cases where military commissioners attempted to actively involve blacks in the jury process, even against white defendants.³¹ In addition, the military often tried civilians for defamation of United States flags and symbols, as well as "unpatriotic remarks." Thus, there was also a social dimension to the reconstruction policies involving the military.

All in all, the special powers and roles of the military in the South quickly dissipated, along with those special circumstances of the reconstruction era that brought them about. Nonetheless, during this period, the American military had for the first time become actively involved in the transformation of political community and, in so doing, learned useful lessons for the future. Moreover, these experiences of the reconstruction years would also affect the use of the military on the American frontier during the opening of the West and, later, in governing the newly conquered territories acquired as a result of the Spanish American War. For example, there were several instances of the military intervening in local politics and conflicts in the West, including such famous incidents as the US Army intervention into the Lincoln County War in New Mexico in the 1870s-80s.³² The US military also was involved directly in nation-building activities in Cuba and the Philippines for decades after the 1898 conflict with Spain. However, it was the military experiences of the reconstruction years, in particular, that seemed to repeat themselves during the American occupation

³¹ Ibid., p.147. See also De Forest (1948).

³² For an excellent account of the Army's role in this episode, see Utley (1987), Fulton (1968), and Keleher (1957).

of western Germany after World War II, and which served to influence the eventual establishment of the West German military after the permanent partition of Germany.

D. Chapter Summary

As a starting point for exploring the proposed relationship between the military and political community for the two German cases, this chapter has reviewed the historical circumstances of partition and past legacies of civil-military relations for those three main countries involved in Post-War Germany. Thus, because of the developments in Central Europe after the Second World War, the experiences of the Prussian military, Soviet military, and American military were all relevant to the evolution of the two German states that eventually emerged. These historical experiences would in some ways come to influence different aspects of the two German cases throughout the Cold War.

The next two chapters will introduce the processes of political socialization as carried out by the militaries from each side of partitioned Germany. In so doing, they focus on both the general evidence that policymakers made conscious efforts at using the military in the attempt to build political community, as well as the specific policy opportunities employed by the military in the process -- opportunities that allowed the implementation of socialization methods.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROCESS: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN THE *NATIONALE VOLKSARMEE*

“Die Gruendung und die Erhaltung der Ostdeutschen Streitkraefte waren viel mehr als Verteidigungspolitik. Von Anfang an, das Militaer war bestimmt auch ein Werkzeug fuers Bauen eines Ostdeutschlands -- ein eigenes, sozialistisches Deutschland!”

Dr. Hans Einhorn¹

(“The establishment and maintenance of the East German military forces were much more than defense policy. From the beginning, the military was also definitely a tool for the building of an East Germany -- a distinct, socialist Germany!”)

A. Introduction

As with the Soviet military experiences during the formative years after the October Revolution, the formation and rearming of an East German army and its subsequent Cold-War military policies consistently reflected a conscious effort at political socialization -- a process aimed at building a new communist society separate from that society developing at the same time in West Germany. This chapter outlines these processes by, first, briefly discussing the rearmament period, and, second, by illustrating how the military and civilian leadership actively used the four areas of policy in their attempt to build a distinct East German political community.

B. Rearmament of the East German Military

In addition to traditional defense and security reasons, the East German military, at the outset, was rearmed and developed further to achieve the societal aims

¹ Stated in personal interview with the author in Potsdam, Germany on 24 March 1995. Professor Einhorn is an expert on military science, military economy, and civil-military relations with extensive experience in training and education in the East German NVA, as well as in civilian schools in the GDR.

of the communist leadership. There is evidence of this from the rearmament period throughout the existence of the *Nationale Volksarmee* (National Peoples Army or NVA) in general.

As early as 1942 the Soviets had foreseen the reconstitution of a German military when Stalin said,

“It is not our task to destroy all organized military power in Germany. Anyone with the slightest education will appreciate that for Germany, as for Russia, this is not only impossible, but also from the Victor’s standpoint undesirable...”²

Subsequently, the groundwork for a future military was begun almost immediately after the Second World War with the organizing of communist German police units, further developed by the Soviets in 1948 into *Bereitschaften* (special alert units). These police and paramilitary units had been created for various reasons, but especially as an instrument for controlling the populace during the communist consolidation of power.³ Thus, by the time of its creation in 1949, the German Democratic Republic already had at its disposal a nucleus for a regular military institution in the form of these units. This was well before there existed any semblance of a West German military establishment or even serious discussion about the building of one.

Shortly after the western powers officially created the Federal Republic of Germany these units were renamed the *Kasernierte Volkspolizei* or KVP (Garrisoned People’s Police) growing in strength to 50,000 men by 1950, and 100,000 men (in

² Quoted in Forster (1980), pp.19-20.

³ In addition, these units represented a clear breach of the contemporary Allied Control Council directives.

seven infantry divisions) by the time of Stalin's death in 1953.⁴ The KVP came under central control in each of the new administrative *Laender* (provinces or states), and along with the new frontier police they would make up the core military framework upon which the *Nationale Volksarmee* was later built.

Although Soviet support for a separate East German military was interrupted briefly after the Berlin uprisings in June, 1953, it was always the intention of the Soviet and East German leadership that some sort of indigenous military would remain a significant part of the German Democratic Republic. Then in 1956, shortly after the decision to rearm West Germany, the East German parliament passed a bill that formed officially both the NVA and a new Ministry for National Defense.⁵ However, because of the earlier steps taken to create police and military units, there already existed a *de facto* East German army of over 120,000 soldiers at the time of the bill's passage.⁶

After this creation of the official NVA, the rearmament process continued at a relatively gradual pace until 1962 when the East German military would be given the opportunity to play an even more integral role in political socialization on a national level. It was at this time, shortly after the erection of the Berlin Wall, that universal conscription was introduced and with it increased opportunities for influencing hundreds of thousands of East Germans -- not only persons serving in the NVA (army, air force, and navy), but also those in the border troops, state security and police

⁴ Interestingly, these KVP units included a training cadre of approximately 2500 former Wehrmacht officers and NCOs. See Nelson (1972), p.235.

⁵ Also in 1956 East Germany formally entered the Warsaw Pact Alliance.

⁶ This occurred at a time when West Germany was just ending its lengthy debate about building the *Bundeswehr*.

forces, and various civil defense organizations.⁷ This system of conscription would remain in place until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the East German communist regime itself.

C. The Political Socialization Process

Although most contemporary policymakers and scholars generally believed the NVA was initially created mainly in reaction to political developments *vis-a-vis* the West -- especially the West's decision to rearm the Federal Republic -- there appear to have been other important *community-building* reasons for the existence of an East German military as well. Importantly, these motivations helped produce an East German military that also existed as an essential part of the overall socialist society itself, a military institution that not only actively worked to guarantee that the revolutionary process towards socialism and the classless society would continue, but also one that helped to define GDR society as different from the other Germany in the West. This would be a constant theme throughout all of the Cold-War years of the NVA/SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)⁸ partnership. The following sections outline the overall process of political socialization using the four policy areas and opportunities (discussed earlier) as a framework of analysis.

⁷ These numbered around 180,000 troops in the active forces alone. See Sontheimer and Bleek (1975), p.178.

⁸ More specifically, SED stands for *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* -- the communist party in East Germany -- and thus, the only real political party in power during the Cold War.

1. - Comprehensive Policies:

The Soviet and East German leadership made conscious, ongoing decisions to use the military in creating new political and cultural identities, as well as for reinforcing the legitimacy of the new communist regime on a national level. This was especially true after the introduction of conscription. Johnson, Dean and Alexiev summarize this perspective relative to the East German military and its socialization role,

“The insecurities associated with the lack of legitimacy have prompted the [SED] Party leadership to rely heavily on the military as an instrument of political integration. The military’s role as an agent of external coercion has been supplemented by other nonmilitary, political, and social functions... Among the military’s most important domestic functions is the political socialization of its members.

...The ‘party school of the nation,’ as the NPA [NVA] is commonly known, teaches important technical, pedagogic, and administrative skills... The influence of the NPA on the GDR’s social and political character, and its role as an instrument of political integration and as a vehicle for social mobility, are considerable.”⁹

The following briefly outlines some of the general evidence supporting this view that the military was not just created for security reasons, or that military-related socialization processes were only confined to the military itself. This evidence suggests instead, that the military was indeed consciously organized, and directed to build, on a national level, a distinct East German political culture and cultural identity, as well as greater socio-political legitimacy for the state and SED regime.

⁹ See Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev (1982), p.65.

(A) - Building Political Culture:

The East German military was recognized by the Soviet and new SED leadership early on as an instrument for changing and rebuilding political consciousness, and reflected the previous Soviet experiences in that regard. These important political and ideological missions advocated for the new East German military were very similar to those in the Soviet historical situation. As early as 1952, three years before the formal organization of the National People's Army, this was apparent at the 2nd SED Party Conference,

"The importance of military policy as an inseparable component of overall policy in the Workers' and Peasant's State grew larger as conditions ripened in the GDR for the transition to the phase of constructing the foundations of socialism, and this in turn became an objective requirement in the struggle to resolve the vital issues of the German people. At the 2nd SED Party Conference of July 1952, Wilhelm Pieck quoted Lenin's conclusion in 1919 that the Soviet Republic could not survive without an armed defense capability, and applied it to the historical context of the GDR. ...[the Conference] pointed out that the creation of armed forces in the GDR was the expression of a progressive military policy in harmony with the interests of the entire German nation..."¹⁰

There would be many times when Soviet military experiences would be pointed out similarly in official speeches and documents as applied to the East German case. Thus, the Soviet legacy was used as a major foundation for the East German military and its planned political role in a new German society, and would continue to influence overall civil-military relations throughout the existence of the GDR.

Moreover, there is extensive evidence supporting the view that the Soviet and East German leadership called for the conscious use of the military to support their

¹⁰ Quoted from the East German periodical, *Militaergeschichte* in Forster (1980), p.26.

Marxist-Leninist *political* and *ideological* goals for the entire GDR society. Although this should come as no surprise to students of communist regimes and east-bloc countries, there are nevertheless important indications that the East German military was, in reality, clearly assigned vital missions to further political awareness and consciousness. They did not, as in other cases, primarily pay only lip service to the communist cause, but actively worked to produce a new socialist East German political culture.

For instance, academic work from the various East German military schools rationalized, justified, or generally reflected these political tasks undertaken by the military, and some research considered how it could be accomplished better. This type of scholarship was evident at various times during the Cold War. As an example, Colonel Rudi Hermuth writes in 1971,

“The character of our army and its missions plays a crucial role in enhancing even further the socialist consciousness...so that it [the army] has an especially vital significance.”¹¹

This theme would be echoed constantly in various media throughout the society, not just academia. The official East German law bulletin, *Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, for example, dedicated its January 31, 1974 issue to a discussion of the specific laws requiring participation of young people in the formation and development of East German socialism. One section of this paper clearly defines the required mission that young East Germans prepare themselves for service in the military in order to further socialist goals, protect the socialist (German) fatherland, and most importantly, strengthen the East German “socialist *state*

¹¹ See Hermuth (1971), p.3.

society”¹²-- in other words, they were called to further the political goals of the Party leadership by participating in things military.

In addition, the “Programs and Statutes” of the SED Party itself resulting from each Party Conference also often included statements about the role of the military in building East German political consciousness, identity, etc. As an example, the “Program and Statutes” developed in the course of the IX. Party Conference in May, 1976, states that the military has as its paramount duty and mission the provision of “high quality” Marxist-Leninist political training to its members. Among other things, this document highlights the influence of this training on “socialist patriotism,” “iron discipline”, and “loyalty to communist ideals.”¹³

Political work in the armed forces became the responsibility of specially-selected cadres, as well as party organizations within the military itself, even down to the company level. To support this effort, the military was given its own specific institutions specializing in political education and training of the military political cadre and career officers. One such institution, the Military Political College for Social Science Education and Research (the Wilhelm Pieck Hochschule), held colloquiums on various aspects of building political consciousness and identity not only within the military and border troops, but also for the overall East German society.¹⁴ These types of forums were used often by the party and military leaders to rationalize ongoing political education and training programs relative to the military, or on the other hand,

¹² See *Gesetzblatt der DDR* (1974), p.45.

¹³ See Gesamtdeutsches Institut (1988), p.23.

¹⁴ See Military/Political Hochschule for Social Science Education and Research (1986). See also Hochschulkonferenz der Nationale Volksarmee, der Grenztruppen und der Zivilverteidigung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1982).

change the programs and/or their focus from time to time, depending upon the current political situation or perspectives of the ruling SED regime.

Thus, even apart from the typical Marxist-Leninist rhetoric used by most of the Soviet bloc countries in relation to their militaries, the NVA did appear to possess from the very start a top-down directed, dedicated mission to construct and maintain a distinct political culture in East Germany. This was mission was above and beyond those other more traditional missions for the military.

(B) - Building Cultural Identity:

As in the Soviet Union, the military was also seen as a means to contribute to a distinct *cultural identity* as well. This was evident again and again at different levels within the regime and military, including both Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, the two SED General Secretaries during the Cold War. A typical example is a 1978 speech by Honecker to East German troops in which he explained that contributing to the “social progress” of the society was one of the duties of the armed forces.¹⁵ This perspective was also reflected in the official East German *Dictionary of Military History*, describing a leading and fundamental mission of the NVA as providing for the, “... unity of the *Volk* and army.”¹⁶

Moreover, even previously classified dissertations and theses from the various military schools recognized this cultural mission and its potential contributions. For example, in one such study Lieutenant Colonel Hansjuergen Lueck focuses on the

¹⁵ See Honecker (1978), p.6

¹⁶ See *Woerterbuch Zur Deutschen Militaergeschichte* (1985), p.610.

NVA as a clear reflection, as well as outgrowth, of the unique East German culture. He follows the development of this "unity" between the *Volk* and the army from the 1950s into the late 1960s, and suggests that the military had an important influence on the masses through not only its capabilities and missions, but also in the routine interaction between the civilian and military communities. This occurred through such planned events as the 1957 "Day of the NVA" when over 1.5 million citizens took part in this particular celebration.¹⁷ Additionally, he contends that the army mirrored the proletarian character of the new German socialist community since 81.9% of its officers, 83.1% of its NCOs, and 83% of its soldiers were identified as coming from the working class.¹⁸ In short, Lueck argues that an overall, ongoing cultural union indeed was created between the East German army and the people through shared life experiences, common backgrounds, propaganda, community sport and celebrations, base visits, and simply the fact that large numbers of East Germans passed through the military ranks.

It was not only academic studies and speeches, however, that illustrated the importance of linking the military to its cultural surroundings. Whether defined in terms of German, Prussian, or socialist culture, the SED and military leadership also directed a more specific approach in coupling itself to what was perceived as the cultural fabric of the German Democratic Republic. The military attempted this in one way by publishing books containing the cultural work of military members in particular. One example was a collection of poems, artwork, photographs, and

¹⁷ See Lueck (1986), p.23.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* pp.18-19.

literature issued on the 30th Anniversary of the founding of East Germany. Titled *Soldaten Gedanken -- Soldaten Taten (Soldier Thoughts -- Soldier Deeds)*, this book tried to show that the army was made up of the people -- a people faithful to the German cultural traditions and thus to the German *Vaterland*.¹⁹ Moreover, the editors stated that because of the soldier's love and solidarity with the East German people, the maintenance of a link between the military and the overall culture was just as vital in the defense of socialism as the serious and hard sides of military life. Thus, this book highlighted the fact that members of the military were also members of the larger cultural community.

The NVA also published magazine articles stressing the relationship between the army and the people. One such article appears in a 1983 issue of the *Volksarmee* magazine. Titled "Volk und Armee sind Eins" ("People and Army are One"), this article reports on the celebration in 1983 of the 27th anniversary day of the NVA and the concurrent Week of the "Brotherhood in Arms" which included celebrations with members from all branches, as well as other Warsaw Pact personnel stationed in Germany. The article stressed that the NVA was made up of soldiers of the people -- "...working people and soldiers stand side by side as one so that our republic can be strengthened in all ways through the further forming of a socialist society, and so that socialism and peace can be secured."²⁰

Military units also were attached systematically to schools, local governments, and factories in so-called "patron relationships."²¹ In these instances, officers were

¹⁹ See Politische Verwaltung des Militaerbezirks Neubrandenburg (1979).

²⁰ Translated by Author. See *VA Informiert* (#10, 1983), p.2.

²¹ See Krisch (1985), p.49.

placed into situations that enabled them to participate more effectively in civilian community affairs, and they were encouraged to do so by their military chain of command. The result was an increased military presence in the everyday life of the nation, as well as an increased opportunity to interact and thus influence civilian attitudes toward the military and the overall society.

(C) - Building Both Political and Cultural Identity through Society-Wide

Militarization: In addition to the actions and programs specifically undertaken to enhance *either* political culture *or* cultural identity, the strategy of widespread militarization by the civilian and military leadership attempted to contribute to both. Moreover, the militarization of East German society, in general, became an important part of the SED regime's attempt to build a separate East German political and cultural community -- a community more closely linked to the military and therefore military norms and values, and which also supported many desired *socialist* norms and values. Throughout the 1960s, but especially in the 1970s and 1980s, this militarization of East German society included military parades, massive and highly visible troop movements, regular public maneuvers, the widespread use of war toys in kindergartens and grade schools, hand-grenade practice for youngsters, civil defense exercises, and the official and constant praising of military virtues by the SED leadership.²²

²²After all, by the 1960s the GDR possessed the densest concentration of military troops in the world, with approximately 11 soldiers per square kilometer including both East German and Soviet troops. See Naimark (1979), p.569. There were over 1,200,000 personnel under arms in the GDR. See New York Times (1984), p.E3.

One West German magazine, *Zeitmagazin*, provided a clear picture of the extent of this "*Kriegspiel*" (Warplay) for East German youngsters. With an opening photograph of 11 or 12 year-old children in complete battle-gear with handguns, and operating working miniature T-61 tanks, the article discusses the use of military training in the Young Pioneers Organization.²³ Under the close monitoring of both army and SED personnel, with parents also looking on, these children are shown demonstrating grenade throwing, machine-gun firing, and the use of anti-tank weapons.

The authors suggest that all of this military practice may build a sense of order and discipline at an early age, as well as the development of a "feeling of love of home in the DDR" (DDR-*Heimatgefuehl*).²⁴ Yearly, hundreds of thousands of these young East Germans underwent this type of play and training.

"The pre-military upbringing already begins in kindergarten. In the education and training plans for the kindergartens, that means: 'Through tighter relationships of the children to individual members of the armed institutions, the children will develop for them a feeling of love and affection. They know our soldiers are also workers who protect and watch over the people and their work, so that we can happily play.'" ²⁵

Dale Herspring summarizes the socializing function of this society-wide militarization,

"On the internal scene, it is important as a vehicle for socializing the country's youth. It teaches discipline, works actively to counter Western ideas and influence, and, to the degree possible, inculcates ... acceptance of (if not enthusiastic loyalty to) the GDR."²⁶

²³ See *Zeitmagazin* (1987), pp 8-9. For other perspectives on the militarization of youth, see *Die Zeit* (9 March 1990), p.91.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.12.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p.12. Translation by the author.

²⁶ See Herspring (1984), p.54.

By the mid-1980s, the SED militarization of East German society was reflected even in how school curricula, and career and educational opportunities were linked increasingly to military participation of some sort. This was true even during the higher education years at university when students were forced to participate in pre-military practice in special camps. Refusal to do so resulted in the denial of any pursuit of academic qualifications other than ecclesiastical.²⁷

Military-related sports was also a vehicle for the infusion of military virtues into the populace. For example, the SED placed great emphasis on the role of the national paramilitary youth organization, the Society for Sports and Technology, which in July of 1985 sponsored the 5th military sports games. These games, called the *Wehrspartakiade*, were major events with over 8100 contestants from over 200,000 would-be participants.²⁸

Through societal wide militarization the SED regime attempted to build a link between the military and its larger political and cultural society. In addition, this process seemed to have reflected past Soviet experiences with the military in nation-building as well as the traditional aspects of the Prussian practice of using the military as a "school" for the overall nation. Regardless, the goal was to infuse military virtues into the populace, and these virtues increasingly were touted as best representing the real German identity.

²⁷ See Mleczkowski (1983), p.189.

²⁸ See Boyse (1985), p.1.

(D) - Building Legitimacy:

As mentioned before, one of the biggest problems facing the East German regime was the perceived lack of overall legitimacy, or at least the absence of firm foundations for legitimacy. As with all regimes, the East German leadership realized that legitimacy would assist in bolstering domestic political stability for the new society, and, particularly, for the ruling party -- stability derived primarily from an acceptance by the overall population of the new government's rule and authority. But unlike most other societies, the GDR had to share a past history with another Germany which now existed as its arch rival. Therefore, the building of legitimacy was especially important to the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic for both domestic and international reasons since it was competing with the "other" Germany that was recognized by most western nations.

In the East German case, then, the question of legitimacy as a regime and legitimacy as a sovereign nation-state from the very beginning of its existence revolved around the need to show that it represented the "true German state" in both domestic and international eyes. Although this was generally a primary goal of the GDR leadership throughout the years of a divided Germany, it became especially important to the regime in the early 1970s when the advent of detente and "peaceful coexistence" eliminated any doubts about future German unification. As a result, the East Germans were faced with the necessity of creating a separate, autonomous Germany -- what Walter Ulbricht called at the time a new "socialist German national

state.” Consequently, all perspectives about a single German nation, a single German culture, or a single German responsibility for past sins were discarded.

Henry Krisch analyzes these East German legitimacy concerns after detente’,

“As long as the two German states competed for the prize of a future reunited Germany, the question of national identity did not loom large for the GDR leadership. Once the GDR shifted to buttressing its own state autonomy, however, the appeal to nationalism became a source of delegitimation as well as a political liability. Unlike its East European counterparts, the GDR could not rely on nationalism either to offset Soviet pressure or to justify unpopular domestic policies. The reason is clear: in the context of peaceful coexistence with West Germany, any appeal to [overall] “German” loyalties ran the risk of generating unwanted desires for greater concessions to German unity than the regime could afford.”²⁹

It was in this regard that the SED policy of *Abgrenzung* (delimitation) began in order to separate further the two Germanies in the eyes of the population.³⁰

Furthermore, in its quest for an increased foundation upon which to build socio-political legitimacy, the SED Party increasingly concentrated on the issue of German history to illustrate the GDR as the logical and rightful inheritor of German traditions and German culture -- in short, the German nation. Consequently, GDR political and military leaders sought to illustrate East Germany’s valid place in overall German history, and selected or reinterpreted that history or those traditions which best supported this claim. This included highlighting those aspects of the German past that showed direct links with the new “law-determined” socialist Germany, from the

²⁹ See Krisch (1985), pp.83-84.

³⁰ *Abgrenzung* was the policy of the new SED leader, Erich Honecker. After the beginning of East-West detente, it was quickly realized there would be no unified Germany in the foreseeable future. The long-awaited international recognition for the GDR as part of the Basic Treaty in 1972 also served to further underwrite the permanency of the division. As a result, the *Abgrenzung* policy of delimitation was aimed at constantly monitoring the influence of the West and minimizing its impact on East German perceptions of legitimacy and stability. Thus, emphasizing the separateness of the two German states now became an even more important goal for the SED regime.

accomplishments of such notables as Luther, Goethe, and Schiller, to Scharnhorst.

Moreover, Ronald Asmus argues that the GDR leadership represented this new historical awakening as,

“...the culmination of all ‘progressive’ traditions in German history. The definition of ‘progressive’ became increasingly elastic, allowing for the inclusion of such figures as Frederick the Great, Clausewitz, Scharnhorst, Goethe, and even Bismarck. Criticized or ignored for years, they were to foster national consciousness in line with the party’s theories of separate socialist and capitalist German nations.”³¹

As Asmus points out, these old state-builders were not necessarily seen by the East German leadership as inherently good because they had contributed to a united German nation before World War II, not by any means. Instead, the usefulness of these historic figures was their images as heroes *who helped bring about change* -- whether that change was in literature or military doctrine. Thus, the GDR leadership used them to foster their own change in building an *East* German nation.

Importantly, just as the East German military was used in the attempt to create new political and cultural identities, it also would prove a tool in this historical-oriented quest for domestic and international legitimacy. This was attempted primarily by linking the military with German military history. Consequently, as a state-controlled instrument of legitimation, the East German military, throughout its history, would cloak itself in the traditions of the past German militaries. This included, especially, the use of similar uniforms, rank structures, marching styles, and flags, as well as required, but carefully selected, instruction in German military history.³²

³¹ See Asmus (1985), pp.242-243.

³² The East German *Dictionary of Military History* devotes seven pages to military traditions of the GDR in an attempt to link the NVA with an overall German military heritage. See *Woerterbuch zur deutschen Militaergeschichte* (1985), pp. 569-575.

Even as early as 1956, the SED recognized the legitimizing value of the military in identifying itself with a continuing German historical tradition. For example, as the time came to choose a uniform for the new East German military, the SED leadership held extensive discussions over what style to use, and finally decided on one that was closely patterned after the Wehrmacht model of World War II. This was the first of many steps taken that would ultimately resurrect in the NVA the earlier traditions of the kaiser's armies, the Reichswehr, and especially Hitler's Wehrmacht. Such aspects of the uniforms as Wehrmacht style jackboots, ceremonial belts and daggers, choke collars, collar patches, rank insignia, and traditional Wehrmacht colors and banners underscored this attempt at linking the NVA with the overall German military past. Even the traditional "goose step" was maintained.

In addition to outward appearances, the military also attempted to link itself with those military norms and values of the past that most suited the new East Germany. Primarily from the late 1960s on, this came in the form of an increased effort to link the military with its old Prussian traditions. The communist East German regime tried to establish a Prussian-style army reflecting increased, unwavering discipline, and in so doing create an army consisting of what some scholars termed "Red Prussians."³³ Old statues of Prussian military heroes were repaired, refurbished, or commissioned. Memorials commemorating Prussian military victories and battles were recreated or constructed, and ceremonies were regularly conducted to link further the GDR with Prussian soldier heroes and their deeds. Furthermore, the

³³ See Nelson (1972), pp.261-263. The use of "Prussianism" was thus important to both the Ulbricht and Honecker regimes. See also Bilke (1981), p.32.

regime created a military medal in 1966, the Scharnhorst Order, named for the important Prussian figure, and in 1968 began to place permanent guards at the grave of Field Marshal Gneisenau.

David Childs paints an interesting word picture of this emphasis on German military tradition,

"The goose-stepping guards in 'stone grey' uniforms, the rumbling heavy *Panzerwagen*, and the martial strains of Beethoven's Yorck March on Berlin's Marx-Engels-Platz celebrating the end of the war or May Day could lead a modern Rip Van Winkle to believe that Germany had somehow turned the tide in 1945 and won the war after all."³⁴

East Germany also used the military to help build *external* legitimacy, especially in the Third World. The GDR possessed extensive ties with a number of these countries, and at times there were as many as 22 individual states outside of Europe considered important East German clients -- clients such as Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen, India, Syria, and Brazil. Other relationships in the Third World included many additional states in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

Moreover, East German military aid and assistance were usually part and parcel of these international relationships. For example, during the Grenada invasion in 1983, documents were recovered linking the SED with technical and military assistance in that nation;³⁵ and East German weapons, military advisors, and equipment were also reported in Kampuchea.³⁶ In the case of Africa, the East Germans were second only to Cuba in providing military advisory and support troops

³⁴ See Childs (1969), p.229.

³⁵ See Valenta and Ellison (1984).

³⁶ See *Christian Science Monitor* (1984), p.2.

to socialist-oriented regimes.³⁷ Table 3 provides a summary of East German military forces at the height of its overseas missions.

TABLE 3

EAST GERMAN MILITARY IN THE THIRD WORLD						
COUNTRY	79-80	81-82	82-83	83-84	84-85	85-86
Angola	1500	800	450	450	500	500
Ethiopia	-	R	250	550	550	550
PDRY	-	100	325	75	75	75
Mozambique	-	R	100	100	100	100
Iraq	-	-	160	160	160	160
Libya	-	1600	400	400	400	400
Algeria	-	R	250	250	250	250
Guinea	-	-	125	125	125	125
Syria	-	R	210	210	210	210
Totals	1500	2500	2270	2320	2370	2370
R = Reported, exact numbers unknown.						
SOURCE: <i>The Military Balance 1985-1986</i> (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986).						

The use of the East German military in these countries contributed to international legitimacy in three ways. First, this foreign involvement provided increased opportunities to "outperform" the West Germans in assisting in the development of these poorer nations. Second, by focusing military assistance abroad

³⁷ See Croan (1980), p.23.

in these developing regions, the East Germans demonstrated they were continuing some of the same types of programs carried out by imperial and Nazi Germany abroad, and, thus, thereby acting as the "true" Germany in the international arena. Indeed, some of these areas of East German activity, especially in Africa, were also places with some traditional German influence from before World War II. Third, the emphasis placed upon the diplomatic exchanges and travel of high level officials as part of these military programs raised SED prestige in the eyes of the East German population. That is, the perception was that sovereignty was enhanced through these international projects, and they would give East Germans something in which to take pride. Consequently, the hope was this would lead, in turn, to greater acceptance of a separate, yet legitimate, German nation-state.

Thus, the military was viewed by the East German leadership as a vital means to build socio-political legitimacy both domestically and internationally, and it was used actively in so doing.

In summary, this section has discussed the general evidence that the East German military was used consciously to create or transform political culture, cultural identity, and socio-political legitimation on a national scale. The military institution was recognized and valued by the Soviet and East German leadership as an important tool in this process. The next section will take a more specific look at these conscious efforts by outlining briefly the ways in which this political socialization process was undertaken, primarily within the military itself.

2.- Recruitment and Selection:

Virtually all males between the ages of 18 and 26 served in the active East German military, and military obligation continued afterwards with service either in the reserves or other paramilitary organizations. By the late 1970s, this added up to over 430 military or paramilitary personnel for each 10,000 GDR citizens, not including reserves. This was three times that of the Soviet Union which was also considered to have a high proportion of military members to civilians (at 185 per 10,000 citizens), and over four times that of West Germany.³⁸

Relative to the enlisted force then, obtaining recruits was not a problem, and socialization opportunities for the military were simply an outgrowth of the conscription process itself. In that regard, universal conscription also provided an important rationale and justification for the extensive and ongoing pre-military training and preparation occurring within the broader civilian society, as discussed above. Consequently, conscription was another means by which to disseminate certain desired political and cultural values not only to draftees, but also to the broader GDR society.

However, although the GDR had in place this almost universal draft by the early 1960s to fill its active military, there nevertheless remained other important socialization opportunities in the recruitment process, primarily in the recruitment of officers. After all, it was the officers who represented the future leadership of the military institution itself, and who also would act as the instructors and trainers of the

³⁸ See *The Military Balance* (1978-79).

enlisted force. This was also especially important since there was such a high ratio of officers to enlisted men.³⁹

Over the course of East Germany's existence, there were five different groups that made up the officer corps of the GDR military. The first were the old communists and socialists who had lived in Germany before World War II, and were naturally anti-Nazis. Many in this group had fought in the Spanish Civil War or against the Nazi regime in various ways. This group of officers was important in determining the initial nature and policies of the NVA from 1945 until the mid-1960s. The second group was made up of former Wehrmacht officers most of whom had been captured by the Russians, or who had surrendered to them. This group mainly provided the first cadres for military training and military organization needs, and, for the most part, served only in administrative posts.

The third group were former Wehrmacht *NCOs or enlisted* soldiers captured by the Soviets, and the fourth represented new officers without any military experience before 1945, and who, generally, came from the working class, usually possessing low levels of formal education. These latter two groups provided the backbone of the East German military before and shortly after the official designation of the NVA. The fifth group -- one which quickly became predominant until the end of the Cold War -- consisted of newer officers raised and educated under the communist regime. They

³⁹ This was the case primarily because, as in all communist countries, it was believed to require a greater proportion of officers to ensure more direct control over the overall military forces and thereby also increase enforcement of discipline and political reliability. Military members recognized this themselves. For example, in one interview in March, 1995 (in Strasberg), the author was jokingly told by an ex-NVA private that, "...even to go to the latrine, an enlisted man would have to get permission from one NCO and four officers."

were a product of the East German social, educational and technological society.⁴⁰

These relatively highly trained and highly educated professionals also seemed to reflect actually the overall socio-economic make-up of the East German society.

This last group represented the type of "red" NVA officer created by the Party to ensure a continued high degree of political reliability. The Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Conference called these officers, "class-conscious fighters who master socialist military science from the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory."⁴¹ These young officers had grown up during the creation of a new German society, and thus were neither tainted by pre-World War II activities or bourgeois experiences, nor did they possess "tarnished" opinions or attitudes learned in the old capitalist Germany.

But how did the Party and the NVA create this Red NVA officer? One way to increase the chances of producing this type of officer was in the selection process itself. In that regard, by the late 1950s, there were large pools of young East Germans who had already undergone extensive pre-military training in the various youth organizations and educational institutions, such as the Young Pioneers or the FDJ. In addition to minimum intelligence requirements, it was, therefore, relatively easy to differentiate those candidates potentially most likely to become faithful, socialist officers in the service of East Germany. It was simply a matter of monitoring and reviewing the past behavior and attitudes of these candidates during their earlier pre-military training and related activities.

⁴⁰ The identification and breakdown of these groups were provided by Professor Hans Einhorn in an interview on 24 March 1995 in Potsdam, Germany.

⁴¹ Quoted in Herspring (1978), p.206.

Interestingly, class was not as important as one would expect in the selection of officers, especially after the official formation of the NVA. As in the Soviet Union, the class criterion rapidly diminished as bourgeois elements were eliminated or transformed within the society, and by the late 1970s, most officers came from the “politically correct” social groups.⁴² Table 4 gives an example of the origins of NVA officers at that time.

TABLE 4
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF NVA OFFICERS⁴³
(PARENT OCCUPATIONS BY PERCENT)

	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1978
Worker	81.5	79.0	81.8	78.6	69.8	67.9
White-Collar	11.6	12.9	11.2	12.8	14.8	15.2
Cooperative Farmer	0.2	0.5	2.4	2.9	-	-
Independent Farmer	3.1	3.7	2.4	2.5	2.9	2.5
Intelligentsia	0.3	0.3	1.3	2.6	6.9	8.6
Other	3.5	4.1	3.1	3.0	3.2	2.9

Lastly, until the 1980s the military also ensured that the officer candidates had had ample opportunities to experience civilian life under the SED regime before entering regular military service. Moreover, the Party required that all military officers must have spent some time working in the civilian economic sectors, or in socialist

⁴² In fact, by this time data on class and social origins were not even normally published for students applying for admission to universities, since most citizens came from these accepted social backgrounds. See Childs (1983), p.177.

⁴³ Data taken from Markus(1992), p. 53.

terms, "the productive processes." Consequently, those candidates accepted into officer programs and who had not accomplished this were given up to six months of mandatory duty in the civilian economy. This policy sought to link closely the future military officer with his overall society, and, "...prevent a resurgence of a feeling of superiority or alienation within a German military clique toward civilian society."⁴⁴ The policy was discontinued in the 1980s only when all officer candidates were required to be graduates of the East German polytechnical educational institutions, which were thought to provide the necessary civilian economic experience needed to become a politically reliable NVA officer.

Thus, recruitment and selection for the NVA and other military branches served important socialization functions. Universal conscription provided the large numbers of personnel destined to undergo the socialization processes within the military, and provided further justification for the tremendous militarization of East German society. However, the primary efforts in the recruitment process were aimed at the selection of politically reliable officer candidates for creating and sustaining the new "Red" NVA officer corps. As one former East German battalion commander stated, ..."it was implicit that when one wanted to become an officer in the NVA, he would be trying to further the goals of socialism."⁴⁵

⁴⁴ See Herspring (1975), p.157.

⁴⁵ See Meyer (1992), p.105.

3.- Education and Training:

Both political and cultural aims of overall education and training in East German society were clearly outlined in its Constitution under Article 25. Already well-entrenched when it was codified in 1965, this “uniform socialist education system” existed in order to create the socialist personality that, on the one hand, accepted the Marxist-Leninist view of the world and class, while, on the other, possessed a “love of the German Democratic Republic.”⁴⁶

Socialist values were stressed throughout the East German educational system, and curriculum content was monitored by the government to ensure proper philosophical and ideological values and orientations. Beginning in kindergarten and through college/vocational training, East German youth underwent a daily regimen of learning the fundamentals of good GDR citizenship, intensive political and ideological foundations in socialism, communism and East German government, selected tidbits of German history, and a hate for the West, and West Germany in particular. Even the family by law was to contribute to this training.

As expected, the GDR’s military training and education were integrated closely into this overall system as well, and reflected the identical themes by which East German children had grown up. After all, as mentioned previously, East German youth were exposed early on to military training and military values. This was merely intensified with their entry into military service, as well as further focused. The NVA’s own publication, *Leadership Education and Training*, outlines the importance of the

⁴⁶ See Schneider (1978), pp.64-65.

military in this process,

“...we understand just as Friedrich Engels did, the management of education and training in the National Volksarmee is a *means to an end*, a means for training and educating the socialist “soldier-personality” and military collective.”⁴⁷

This “socialist military *Erziehung*” (upbringing) represented an important part of the overall East German socialist education system. As with all of the educational and training institutions in the GDR, the military institution also had as one of its primary goals the development and maintenance of those particular characteristics, abilities, attitudes, and guidelines for behavior which would enable citizens to fulfill their duties to the socialist fatherland. These included, among other things, certain political and cultural orientations reflecting such desired socialist norms and values as a hatred of capitalism and “imperialism” (i.e., anti-western outlooks), for example, or support for collective, versus individual, consciousness, a belief in the inevitability of world socialism, pro-Soviet feelings, but, above all, general attitudes about the existence of a distinct and legitimate East German nation-state. This was apparent even in the first part of the simple oath taken upon entry into the NVA which linked love of country with proletarianism, and, in turn, set the stage for further differentiating East Germany from the FRG,

“I swear at all times to serve my fatherland, the German Democratic Republic and to protect it against any enemy when so ordered by the workers and farmers government...”⁴⁸

To insure control and monitoring of the education and training process, the SED put into place an extensive political leadership and organization system within the

⁴⁷ See Voitsch and Semmler, p.10. Translated by the author.

⁴⁸ See British Army of the Rhine, p.24.

NVA. This included both political organizations *of* the army as well as outside party organizations serving *within* the military. The highest administration of this vast political network was represented by the Political Central Administration directly controlled by the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party. Consequently, the NVA political organs were integrated into both the military hierarchy as well as that of the Party.

In addition, there were strictly party organizations working from outside-in. These mainly represented political officers at all levels, and importantly, the Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ)), the socialist youth organization in the GDR. In its relationship with the military, this organization was primarily responsible for ongoing socialist education and training, specifically of young people in the military. This was emphasized especially beginning in the 1960s. Because the greatest majority of officer and enlisted men were young, senior civilian and military leaders thought it reasonable that the FDJ could further the socialization process within the military.⁴⁹ The FDJ was also responsible for supporting local FDJ organizations throughout the country in training civilian youth. Table 5 provides an overview of political organizations of, and within, the NVA.

⁴⁹ This was stated in a previously classified thesis from Karl Marx University. See Tietzen (1971).

TABLE 5
POLITICAL CONTROL AND THE NVA

-----SED Politburo and-----			
Central Council		Central Committee	Council of Ministers
FDJ		NVA	
FDJ Organizations	Party Organizations	Political Leadership	Troops
FDJ Region	Party Region	Deputy Minister, Political Central Admin	Ministry of Defense
FDJ District	Party District	Director of Political Admin	Chief of Military Region
FDJ District	Party District	Director of Political Department	Division Commander
FDJ Regimental Organization	Regimental Party Organization	Deputy Commander, Director of Political Group	Regimental Commander
FDJ Local Organization	Local Party Organization	Deputy Commander, Director of Political Work	Battalion Commander
Members of the FDJ	Party Members	Political Deputy of the Communist Party Leader	Company Commander
			Platoon Leader
	All	Members of the	NVA

Source: Meyer (1982), p.103.

With this political apparatus in place within the military, there was total control over the political-ideological and cultural education of military members. Therefore,

although virtually every East German was subject to the military aspects of the overall socialist pre-military and military education and training throughout his or her life, for those undergoing military training for actual service in the regular armed forces, socialist training reached a particularly intense level. In Thomas Forster's words, it was, "...in the National People's Army itself, that 'nucleus of national defence,' that 'socialist military education' [came] into full flower."⁵⁰

The educational process within the East German military contained both political and moral/cultural elements within the framework of technical and military science subjects. This included not only the reinforcement of all of those things learned previously in the civilian years, but also the historic and traditional aspects of military service in the NVA -- packaged in a way that illustrated the Prussian-German image of heroic class-warriors, the glory of military service in defense of socialism, and most importantly, the privilege and duty of defending the true, "legitimate" Germany.

More specifically, political education normally consisted of approximately four hours of instruction and discussion each week for enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers. There were also between 20 and 30 minutes of short instruction before the beginning of each duty day,⁵¹ and it was recommended by some senior officers that daily postings of political information occur.⁵² For conscripts, this continued throughout their 18 months of required service, with refresher training

⁵⁰ See Forster (1980), p.63.

⁵¹ Information taken from interviews between the author and several former soldiers of the NVA between March 20th and April 15th, 1995 in Strasberg, Potsdam, and Ruhla, Germany.

⁵² See Hermuth (1971).

during their periodic reserve call-ups every two to four years (lasting about three months at a time).

In addition, career NCOs and officers had to undergo more extensive political-ideological training since they were required also to instruct these subjects at all levels of command. For example, in the year 1988-1989, the typical officer underwent over 168 hours of dedicated instruction and propaganda primarily devoted to themes on the vital need for the dominant role of the "Socialist Nation" in modern life.⁵³

Through various military schools and seminars for officers, and instructor training for the NCOs, career military personnel were required to both accept and impart a belief in the inevitable advance of socialism/communism, the acknowledgement of the leading role of the Party, the realization that Marxism-Leninism was the only true and scientific explanation for the development of human society, the legitimate place of the GDR in the world, and perhaps most significantly, the aggressive nature of imperialism/capitalism.

This last issue was used as a major point in constructing an image of the implacable imperialist enemies in the west, with absolute vehemence against the West Germans in particular. The creation of the image of West Germany as the enemy of the East German people, or *Feindbild* (image of the enemy), served an important political and cultural function -- it attempted to highlight a clear distinction between the GDR and the revanchist, imperialistic Federal Republic of Germany. For example, one former East German soldier stated,

"We were taught to view our borders as three different colors. The borders with our Warsaw Pact allies were white, signifying openness

⁵³ See Volk and Squarr (1992), p.238.

and cooperation. The borders with the NATO countries and other neutral capitalist nations were to be considered brown, signifying danger and the need for vigilance. However, the borders with West Germany, and particularly Berlin, were considered absolutely black to signify the inherent evil and danger to our country that existed particularly in West Germany with the West Germans.”⁵⁴

This *Feindbild* was even reflected in poetry related to East Germany:

SIX-YEAR-OLD

He bores pins through toy soldiers. He shoves a pin into each belly until the point comes out of the back. He shoves it into the back until the point comes out of the chest.

They fall.

“And why these soldiers?”

“They are the others.”

Reiner Kunze⁵⁵

Feindbild was practiced by even the highest officials in both the East German government and the military. General Heinz Hoffman for instance, the then GDR Minister of National Defense, energetically contributed to this portrayal of the enemy. In a speech to NVA units in October, 1968 he reminded them,

“Educating the soldiers of the NVA to thorough hatred of the imperialist class enemy and his lackeys is at the center of gravity of the ideological political work and hinges on our knowledge of the class enemy’s intentions and on our own persuasive power. To underestimate how dangerous the enemy is constitutes a severe ideological obstacle to the preparation of our soldiers for the possibility of war and for the achievement of optimal training results.”⁵⁶

Lastly, recruits and career soldiers alike also were reminded of their German heritage. In addition to the learned and practiced German military traditions adopted by the NVA as part of its everyday life -- such as the uniforms, flags, marching, etc. --

⁵⁴ Interview conducted by the author in Strasberg on March 22nd, 1995.

⁵⁵ See Kunze (1977), p.13.

⁵⁶ See Hoffmann (1971), p.761.

all military members also were required to learn, in even more detail than ever, the military heritage of their country, especially the Prussian heritage. This was accomplished in initial history and social science classes, reinforced in all military units with classroom instruction, military ceremonies, etc.

This brief discussion of education and training in the East German military suggests several important conclusions. First, political work in the NVA was part of the overall educational system of East Germany, and was well-integrated into it. In that sense, it reinforced all of the political/cultural training that had been received up until entry into the military. Second, administration of the political aspects of military education and training was comprehensive, with total control from within and without, and at all levels.

Third, the military educational system itself revolved around Marxist-Leninist interpretations of society and the citizen's proper place within it. Moreover, the East German soldier was taught to differentiate his Germany as part of this "proper," more politically legitimate workers' society. Fourth, the military used its influence with its hundreds of thousands of conscripts and career soldiers to build an image of West Germany as the enemy of the true fatherland -- an enemy to the political and cultural roots of Germany itself. This was further reinforced by the ongoing use of Prussian traditions and history classes linking the NVA with an overall German heritage.

4.- Career Advancement:

The system for promotion that existed in the East German military reflected the same rules and prerequisites for advancement as in the rest of the society. That meant that promotion came with correct socialist attitudes and behaviors. Although technical expertise and training were also important, the final deciding factor was political reliability, especially when considered for promotion to the senior ranks; or in the case of NCOs, acceptance into the career military. Thus, promotion provided another opportunity to motivate military members to both learn and teach the political and cultural aspects associated with their side of Germany.

For enlisted personnel, any thought of advancing to career status was linked tightly to demonstrated socialist outlooks, as well as the ability to articulate them. For example, one former East German soldier stated that during his third six-month period of required service, his records were screened and he was interviewed by officers and senior NCOs to determine his suitability for career military service.⁵⁷ This seems to have been done regardless of whether or not the draftees had intimated they were interested in such a career. Therefore, the military actively sought those enlisted soldiers who appeared most reliable for entry into the professional military, and potential promotion was, naturally, part of that reliability as evidenced most clearly through their Party membership. As Kurt Held writes, "The bond between the career soldiers and the Party was tight and its influence on the thinking and behavior

⁵⁷ Strasberg Interviews, March 1995.

relatively strong.”⁵⁸ As a result, over the period that the NVA existed, between 30 and 40% of all NCOs were Party members.⁵⁹

Since considerable prestige also was attached to the professional military officer in the GDR,⁶⁰ and they received relatively high pay and benefits in comparison to other East Germans, promotion and career security were, naturally, important issues to the officer corps. They had more to lose by not being promoted, including their desirable careers. Consequently, promotion opportunities also were linked to political reliability and an ongoing demonstration of loyalty and support for the political and cultural foundations for East Germany. Not surprisingly, this had a major impact on the Party membership of the officers. Depending on the source, and the period of analysis, the officer corps fluctuated from about 85% to almost 100% membership in the SED Party over the period of 1956 to 1975. Former GDR officers themselves stated this figure was around 98% at the end of the Cold War,⁶¹ and for the East German Navy this was 99%.⁶²

Another important aspect of the promotion system was the selection process for the higher military schools. Without selection for these schools and universities, there was very little chance for promotion to the senior ranks. Again, these selections considered the past duty and political record of the officer, and, more specifically, whether he had in his career demonstrated political reliability, acceptance for the

⁵⁸ See Held (1992), p.69.

⁵⁹ See Meyer, 1982), p. 102.

⁶⁰ Military officers in the GDR were said to follow only the political functionary and the state functionary in terms of official prestige, and were ahead of the academicians in that regard. There was also prestige in the eyes of the general public. See Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev (1982), p.89.

⁶¹ See Meyer (1992), p.105.

⁶² This figure was obtained by the author from an untitled manuscript at the *Zentrum fuer Innere Fuehrung der Bundeswehr* in April 1995.

socio-political system of the GDR, and a desire to further serve the cause of a distinct, socialist East Germany.

Promotions, therefore, also provided an important tool in the socialization of both enlisted and officer personnel. Although less direct, perhaps, than the opportunities provided by the selection and education/training programs, it nonetheless played an *ongoing* socialization role for the professional members of the military.

D. Chapter Summary

The SED faced a daunting task in East Germany. Its communist leaders needed to create new political and cultural (socialist) values for the population. These values generally reflected such aspects as increased collectivism, a sense of international proletarianism, an acceptance of self-sacrifice for socialism, and a hatred for capitalism, especially capitalist West Germany. Moreover, these new socialist East German norms and values reflected the type of desired society under construction by the Soviets and SED, but did not reflect the traditional values associated with Germany, such as self-sacrifice for family, individual work ethic, beliefs in individual freedom and merit, etc. Additionally, the regime was faced with the need to build, almost from scratch, the perception of legitimacy for the social and political system it had created. This was a constant irritant for the leadership and, consequently, became an ongoing, obsessive quest in both statement and policy.

Furthermore, the SED leadership realized that the impetus for change and continuity of the new socio-political system primarily rested on the shoulders of the

youth, and thus it was the youth upon whom the regime concentrated in order to cultivate the "socialist personality" -- that is, a personality with an internationalist attitude, a socialist work ethic, proper behavior, relevant knowledge, and love for the East German fatherland. In that regard, the military was given the task to instill these values and attitudes into the *young adult* population through both broad-based policies and programs, as well as specific policies for the hundreds of thousands of East German citizens who passed through the different parts of the military institution. Thus, as this chapter has attempted to show, the East German civilian and military leadership consciously used these four mechanisms to incorporate the military as a vital part of their overall strategy of political socialization in the GDR.

CHAPTER 5

THE PROCESS: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN THE *BUNDESWEHR*

"Im Gegensatz zur NVA, Die Bundeswehr musste ein Spiegel einer demokratischen Deutschen Gesellschaft sein, und um das zu schaffen, die musste auf den echten demokratischen 'Staatsbuerger in Uniform' formen."
Colonel Friedhelm Klein¹

("In contrast to the NVA, the Bundeswehr had to be a mirror of a *democratic* German Society, and to accomplish that, it had to concentrate on forming the true democratic 'citizen in uniform'.")

A. Introduction

Although the post-war political system in the western portion of Germany was dissimilar to that of East Germany, the military also was nevertheless used in the attempt to attain some of the same types of socio-political goals. As in the GDR, the West German *Bundeswehr* endeavored to help create, or at least support, a particular and distinct sort of West German political community. This included an attempt to build a certain identity -- both political and cultural -- and to buttress overall socio-political legitimacy for the post-Nazi regime. This was true even though the Federal Republic did not endure to the same degree the legitimacy problems of the East Germans, although an absence of any real democratic tradition was obstacle enough to its perceived legitimacy (whether domestic or international).

This chapter will, therefore, explore how the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* consciously organized and utilized its military to socialize its citizens for domestic integration within a democracy, as well as integration into the western industrialized

¹ Quoted from an interview on 3 April 1995 in Bonn, Germany. Col Klein worked at that time in the German Ministry of Defense, Division S-13.

world. Just as in the last segment dealing with socialization in the NVA, this chapter first will review briefly the rearmament period and then explore the four policy domains for political socialization in an attempt to identify these conscious processes within the *Bundeswehr* on the road to a new distinctive West German political community.

B. Rearmament of the West German Military

In contrast to the situation in the German Democratic Republic, a dedicated military in the western portion of the former Reich was not contemplated seriously by the new West German leadership, nor by the allies, until several years after the end of the war; and even then it was created finally a full five years following the official founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) itself. Understandably, demilitarization after the German defeat was a high priority and at times seemed to be just as important as denazification. Under the terms of the Occupation Statute, the Federal Republic was permitted no military forces whatsoever. Consequently, between 1945 and 1948 any discussion of a rearmed German army in the west was limited, and when discussion did take place, it did so generally behind closed doors. This meant there was no development of German military or paramilitary organizations in preparation for future military rearmament in the west as had occurred in the eastern portions of defeated Germany.

However, after the realization that the division of Germany would, most likely, remain permanent, and given the growth of East-West tensions, initial discussions

began in Germany and Western capitals over possible rearmament of the western zones. This intensified still further after the creation of the FRG in 1949. By that time, even some of the hitherto strongest critics against rearmament -- many of whom were now in power in the German government -- had changed their minds in favor of a new military. Some of these leaders (such as Konrad Adenauer) earlier had even worked against German rearmament after the *First* World War, as well as during the subsequent Hitler and *Wehrmacht* eras.²

From the external perspective, initial support for, and later insistence on, a German contribution to the NATO alliance effort was represented primarily by the United States. By 1950, the United States struggled with increased commitments not only in Europe, but all over the world. This resulted in growing domestic pressure to pursue only those policies that were in the direct interest of the country, or at least those policies aimed at "helping those who helped themselves." Accordingly, the U.S. began to put pressure on its European friends and allies to increase their own military manpower and mobilization capabilities. As part of this, the military participation of the FRG appeared more and more imperative in order to balance the massive forces of the Soviet bloc; for, at this time, West German military manpower was as yet an untapped source.

By the end of 1950 the American policy of disarming Germany was, consequently, reversed. For example, during this time, the U.S High Commissioner for Germany publicly declared that West Germany must be allowed to participate in

² The *Wehrmacht* was the name for the German army during the Hitler years (i.e., the Post-Weimar and World War II eras).

the Western defense arrangements, and American Secretary of State Dean Acheson specifically proposed the formation of at least ten German divisions for NATO use. After some substantial opposition from Western Europeans and many West Germans themselves, negotiations were concluded in May, 1952, to develop a West German defense capability in conjunction with the formation of the European Defense Community (EDC). However, this initial plan failed due to strong opposition from a fearful France, as well as numerous segments of the German population, ranging from socialists to right-wing nationalists.

Finally, with the signing of the Paris Treaties in 1954 and the parallel granting of full West German sovereignty, the Federal Republic was admitted into NATO. This occurred in conjunction with security guarantees provided by the British to allay French fears. As a result, the *Bundeswehr* was officially created in 1955, and the first West German soldiers since the unconditional surrender of the *Wehrmacht* in 1945 donned their uniforms in January 1956. By the end of that year, there were almost 100,000 West Germans under arms, by 1961, over 350,000,³ and by the late 1980s, almost 500,000 -- approximately .⁴

These large numbers of personnel were obtained mainly through the conscription law that also was instituted in 1956, six years before that of the East Germans. This law would remain a fact of life for West Germans until after the Cold War, and as will be discussed later, provided a potentially important means of socializing large numbers of West German citizens. Therefore, although the Federal

³ See Turner (1987), p. 75.

⁴ See Federal Minister of Defense (1986), paragraphs 516-520.

Republic came into being as a state without any military, within six years it had one of the largest militaries in Western Europe, second only to that of the United States.

The initial formation and development of the German military also reflected an *American* military influence. The American military had, after all, provided the only major example and model for a reconstituted German military. Between 1945 and 1949 it was the predominant political institution in West Germany, and the primary military institution between 1945 and 1956. Initially at least, the new German military was even outfitted mainly with American equipment, and in many cases, American uniforms. Hence, just as with the Soviet sway in the East, a strong influence for German civil-military relations would come from the American occupation, the initial Cold-War adjustments, and the subsequent and ongoing massive stationing of U.S. military forces within Germany. American experiences in Germany most assuredly affected the ways in which the *Bundeswehr* was used in the overall society, as well as in its internal socialization policies, especially in the very beginning of West German military development.

At first, American soldiers served as a true army of occupation for only four years. After the political and economic reconstruction of Germany was well underway, they still remained, their mission changing from one of occupation to one of defense. From the very beginning of the war, the Americans had planned to intervene eventually in the rebuilding of the German civilian government after hostilities ceased, but the U.S. Army had not planned to have to completely rebuild and transform a German governmental structure from the ground up. Yet, this was indeed the case

since there no longer existed a government of any kind at the local or national level. In so doing, the American military government shared important similarities with its predecessor from the Civil War Reconstruction years, facing comparable civil-military challenges as well.

First, just as in the Reconstruction Era, the American military was forced to remain in administrative control longer than originally expected, primarily because of this total breakdown of German government. Second, the actual administration of the country remained in the hands of the military, for the most part, without any major civilian input. This remained the case until the official creation of the FRG in 1949. Not only did the military governor, General Clay, and his military commanders remain, they continued to influence politics in Germany even after civil government was in place. The American military had come to regard themselves as *the* government in Germany, remaining aloof from the new American civilian authorities sent by Washington at the end of the war.

Third, and resulting from the first two factors, the American military also was directly involved in what were normally civilian realms, such as civil criminal proceedings, civilian education and training programs, and "political tutelage" missions. This latter mainly consisted of denazification and re-education programs, but also included a program aimed at German youth -- the German Youth Activities (GYA) program -- which, besides purely sports and play activities, also included instruction about the everyday lives of average American young people and, most importantly, introduction to the norms and values of a democracy in general.⁵ Many

⁵ See David (1967), pp. 221-223.

of the German young people who were exposed to these American programs would later serve in the rearmed German military, taking with them many of these lessons learned. The missions and rationale for the new *Bundeswehr* would thus reflect American perspectives on what constituted proper civil-military relations within a free democracy. This would be most visibly evident in the establishment of the twin pillars of West German military education and training, the "citizen in uniform" concept and the *Innere Fuehrung* (internal moral leadership and civic education) concept. As will be discussed later, these two ideas became essential guiding principles in almost all aspects of the West German military, as well as in the general conceptualization of the overall relationship between the *Bundeswehr* and German society, and the German citizen and his military in particular. Therefore, the United States proved to be the mentor that introduced *Demokratie von Aussen* (democracy from outside) -- a political system that included values and norms that were not traditionally German.⁶ That U.S. mentorship included the development of the new German military institution as well, even though in its ultimate form it would differ somewhat from the American model.

C. THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

The initial impetus for West German rearmament indeed reflected security and defense concerns, especially in the context of the creation of NATO and the Western system of alliances against the perceived growth of the worldwide communist threat. However, the factors that played vital roles in the decisions to rebuild a West German

⁶ See Rossmeyssl (1988).

military capability were also socio-political in nature. Catherine Kelleher suggests,

"Probably the greatest factor for change was the centrality of political, rather than military, calculations in the design of the Bundeswehr after 1945. Military requirements and operational military capability was not as important, in Bonn, as was the political utility of armed forces, a political utility that was to be exploited at least as much in peacetime as in war, to shape the perceptions of allies more than the perceptions of opponents. The Bundeswehr's military structures were from the outset shaped to meet political requirements and political demands of coalition warfare. They were designed to be politically acceptable in terms of alliance political and military responsibilities; legitimacy was also sought in the eyes of domestic publics and international audiences."⁷

Although Western leaders (both within and outside of the German government) realized that a new German military could serve both domestic and alliance *political* objectives, they also recognized a dilemma in creating the new military institution -- the same dilemma that, in many ways, had faced all German leaders over the last three hundred years. How could they go about building a German armed force that could adequately defend a geographically vulnerable country (with numerous, potential enemies on its borders, and in the very center of Europe), while at the same time providing assurances to its neighbors of peaceful intent? In addition, in the new security environment after World War II, how could the leadership ensure a new German military would not intervene into government and power as it had in the past?

The main answer to these dilemmas lay in maintaining some form of external control and influence over a rearmed Germany through close cooperation within the North Atlantic Alliance, and the continued stationing of large numbers of forces on German soil. This was a situation of control that was very similar to that in the GDR

⁷ See Kelleher (1990), pp.14-15.

which was well integrated into the Warsaw Pact, and which also endured large numbers of foreign troops stationed within its borders.

In many ways, however, the security dilemmas facing Western leaders also provided the needed justification for creating a new indigenous military that could also serve vital political socialization roles for West German society. In that regard, because the political system established in West Germany was diametrically opposed to that of the Soviet Union, and thus, that of the GDR as well, it was easy to point to the communist threat arising from these regimes -- regimes dominated by an ideology with clear statements of world revolution (i.e., "physical domination" in the eyes of the West). This threat therefore furnished the grounds by which the *Bundeswehr* could be created in order to meet legitimate security and alliance needs of Germany and its Western allies. More importantly however, the system of security that was developed also would provide several opportunities to socialize and thus integrate the new democratic West German society, similar to what was also simultaneously occurring in East Germany.

1. - Comprehensive Policies:

The following provides the *general* evidence of this conscious political socialization process. It illustrates an ongoing leadership commitment to consciously use the *Bundeswehr* to influence the West German population by attempting to build political culture, cultural identity, and socio-political legitimacy for the overall society. As it will show, even though the West Germans did not institute such widespread

societal militarization as did the East Germans, the West German leadership and its allies nevertheless recognized the potential influence provided by a military made up of universal, mass conscription of large segments of the young German population.

(A) - Building Political Culture:

During the rearmament process and throughout the Cold War years, the West German government attempted to rationalize and justify its military not only to its indigenous population, but to the rest of the world as well. This is reflected in numerous, ongoing government publications. One of the primary justifications evident in this vast literature is that of the political contributions provided by the military. These are presented most often in terms of how the military service develops and strengthens democratic awareness, or builds democratic norms, values, and, thus, behaviors. With this perspective also comes the assumption that military service therefore has far-reaching influence on the social and political attitudes of its members -- especially the hundreds of thousands of draftees -- and through these members, it also affects the broader society. For example, as early as 1950, Konrad Adenaur requested the shaping of an "army of democrats" as he appointed Theodor Blank to prepare the way for rearming the new *Bundeswehr*, and further stated that the new army must show, "...civil and military worlds as integrated, and mutually reinforcing."⁸

Likewise, the German government's *White Paper* published periodically to explain and update the development and continuance of West German security policy

⁸ See Thompson and Peltier (1990), p.589.

in general, and the *Bundeswehr* in particular, repeatedly echoes this position. The publication for 1973/74 states, "Draftees acquire abilities useful in civilian occupations and gain democratic awareness through their service."⁹

Similarly, the *White Paper*, 1985 states,

"Political education programmes offered to young servicemen must proceed from and complement the store of political education which they have acquired in their own family, school, and in their social environment."¹⁰

...and elsewhere the same document argues,

"In order to develop political maturity in the young, it is therefore above all necessary that they be made aware of the values protected by the Basic Law. It is equally important that they understand the working of the constitution and the process whereby political wants can be realized through democratic decisions."¹¹

This perspective continued even after formal unification in 1990, as the German government also used the *Bundeswehr* for integration of the former East German areas into the nation. Thus, in discussing the political value of including former East Germans in the *Bundeswehr*, the 1994 *White Paper* suggests,

"These [military] experiences provide them with knowledge and awareness of values and institutions of the constitutional state and contribute to the inner unity of Germany."¹²

This official view was stated consistently by the West German government, not only in these periodic *White Papers*, but also in many other official media and forums. For instance, a 1973 report by a Federal Minister of Defense Reform Commission states,

⁹ See Federal Minister of Defense (1973/74), p.55.

¹⁰ See Federal Minister of Defense (1985), p.307.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

¹² See Federal Minister of Defense (1994), p.21.

"the requirement of service in the Bundeswehr creates a significant potential for democratic and civil awareness -- not only for the soldier himself but also for his immediate surroundings, his family and colleagues."¹³

In addition, the West German Federal Ministry of Defense had enormous resources for getting this message across to the German public, in order to "...promote understanding of both the mission of the armed forces and the significance of the North Atlantic Alliance, and to supply correct information on specific questions to enable the citizens to make well-founded judgements."¹⁴ This was accomplished through the central administration of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, overseeing, 1) the Information and Press Office of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), 2) various Press sections for the MOD, its staff, and each of the service staffs and ministerial divisions, 3) the Defense Minister's Public Information Section which provided functional control and support of visitors, youth programs, and media releases, and 4) the official public information offices of the three armed services and local military installations. This apparatus added up to hundreds of dedicated personnel overseeing public information relative to the *Bundeswehr*, especially politically-oriented information.

Lastly, the importance placed upon the role of the military in promoting democratic norms and values also was highlighted in the official armed forces regulations used specifically for conducting political training in the military. This manual, *Politische Bildung in der Bundeswehr*, clearly states the political goals that the military can work toward achieving include:

¹³ See Wehrstrukturkommission (1972/73), p.155.

¹⁴ See Federal Minister of Defense (1985), p.147.

- “- to develop political awareness and the ability and willingness to make political decisions;
- to increase each individual's awareness of his position within the framework of society;
- to develop and increase the acceptance by the individual of the basic values of a free democracy;
- to increase the conscious awareness of the essence of democratic principles and democratic procedure.”¹⁵

These stated goals, therefore, served to highlight further many of the primary norms and values considered important in western democracies. This included attitudes about, 1) the importance, opportunity, and responsibility for political participation, 2) the significance of the individual in politics, 3) the idea of personal freedom (whether political or economic), and 4) a preference for the western democratic forms of government (in particular, preference for a parliamentary system in the FRG).

This section has shown that, just as in the GDR, the military in West Germany was to be an institution used, among other things, as a tool for defining and imparting new political attitudes and outlooks for West Germans in general. And importantly, the military possessed, and actively used, several means and media that linked clearly the *Bundeswehr* to certain, desired political outlooks and orientations.

(B) - Building Cultural Identity:

An inquiry in 1956 by the *Institut fuer Demoskopie* (Institute for Public Opinion Research) showed that the majority of its survey participants desired that, in organizing the new *Bundeswehr*, the requirements and tasks of military defense should take second place to the overall “forming of the young men.”¹⁶ Furthermore, a 1970

¹⁵ Translated in Wakenhut (1979), p.627.

¹⁶ See Van Doorn (1968), p.175.

poll conducted by the EMNID Institute indicated that over 46% of the West Germans surveyed felt the *Bundeswehr* "belongs in society."¹⁷ This illustrates that even the general population felt that the new military not only could, but should, contribute to the overall cultural aspects of the German society.

Although the West German leadership did not attempt to link the military to culture as overtly as did the SED regime in the East, the theme of doing so was represented consistently in various official statements and publications. However, more importantly, general policies sought to achieve the same goals, and were continued throughout the Cold War years.

From the perspective of statements and publications, the various *White Papers* always contained remarks emphasizing the natural relationship between the *Bundeswehr* and the German people. For example, the 1985 *Weissbuch* echoes the *Demoskopie* survey of 1956 when it states, "Today, the Bundeswehr is an integral part of the society,"¹⁸ and, "Liability to military service in a democracy ensures a continuous, vigorous exchange between the population and their armed forces."¹⁹ The almost exact wording was used about fifteen years earlier in a government publication about the *Bundeswehr*: "Compulsory military service affords a continuous and lively exchange between the people and its armed forces."²⁰

It was the policies actually put into place, however, that provide the best examples of conscious effort at tying the military closer to its overall cultural society.

¹⁷ See Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p.9.

¹⁸ See Federal Minister of Defense (1985), p.131.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.136.

²⁰ See Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, p.5.

In that regard, many of the same types of strategies were used by the Bonn government as were used by the SED regime -- primarily, sports, military-civilian celebrations/events, and military sponsored academic work.

Sports and sports training has always been an integral part of the *Bundeswehr*. It trained thousands of military members in various sports, and administered the earning of "German Sports Badges." In addition, top military participants were encouraged to attend occupational specialty training courses at the Federal Armed Forces Athletic Schools in order to qualify as trainers and examiners in various sports. Furthermore, those who earned these credentials were encouraged to provide their expertise and time to civilian clubs in their garrison locations. Moreover, many of the German Olympic teams contained *Bundeswehr* members.

The *Bundeswehr* also made available to all civilians its numerous sports facilities ranging from over 580 sports fields, over 650 sports halls (gymnasiums), to almost 40 swimming pools.²¹ This differs sharply with most other Western militaries, where one must be either a military member or dependent to use military sports facilities. Sports, therefore, appears to have provided a useful means to increase visible interaction between the military and its society.

The second area is that of regularly scheduled and common celebrations where the military opened its facilities to the civilian population, or where it visibly supported civilian events. This included base "open houses," military displays, and a very common occurrence, the use of military bands for civilian audiences, including television audiences.

²¹ Information from the Federal MOD.

Lastly, the *Bundeswehr*, as did the NVA, organized and staffed dedicated academic institutions for the study of civil-military relations, military history, and other social science research. These were primarily the Social Science Research Institute of the *Bundeswehr* and the Military History Research Office of the *Bundeswehr* (both originally in Munich and recently moved to the Berlin area). However, independent research of these subjects also were encouraged for faculty members at other *Bundeswehr* schools and universities, such as the *Fuehrungsakademie* in Hamburg and the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* in Koblenz. All of this research, no matter the content, served to show that the military could contribute to vital, non-military work in the West German society, and academia was one of those areas.

All in all, when compared to the NVA, the West German military took a more low-keyed approach to linking the military with cultural aspects of society. However, the need to do so was realized early on, and the military attempted to nonetheless contribute in that regard. In so doing, the military tried to show how it fit into the transformed *democratic* Germany, while highlighting the new West German cultural identity as defined by its relationship with its citizen-soldiers.

(C) - Building Legitimacy:

The official founding of the West German armed forces occurred on November 12th, 1955, ten years and six months after the end of World War II. Not coincidentally, the date was the two-hundredth anniversary of the birthday of General Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst, the legendary Prussian military reformer who would be

idolized so by the East Germans. This suggests that, just like the East Germans, the military in West Germany was conscious of its military traditions and military history from the very beginning of its existence and for important reasons. One of these was the need to enhance its legitimacy, and also the legitimacy of the new German socio-political system.

More specifically, because the West German military was reborn in a new democratic state, for political and ideological reasons its rebirth forced West Germany to publicly and privately grapple with questions about the proper role of the soldier in this state, and, consequently, also called for a determination about different aspects of the military's role in German history. Thus, in the eyes of the policymakers and public alike, even the basic legal and political foundations of the new *Bundeswehr* had to be developed within the context of the inglorious past. As Donald Abenheim writes,

"The German Basic Law and the internal structure of the new army were designed with a strong awareness of the failings of the past. The reformed army, as planned and established amid great difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s, reflected a largely honest effort to correct the political failings of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht."²²

Part of this process was the discovery and use of those military traditions and figures of the past that best reflected the types of values and lessons pertinent to the new situation; but, the process also included the adoption of new traditions that served to differentiate the *Bundeswehr* from the failings of the previous German incarnations:

"In effect, the creators of the new army had to reconstruct from the nation's military past those traditions and symbols not fully destroyed by the Nazis: at the same time, they had to fashion new institutions and practices that would assure the loyalty of the new army to the Bonn democracy."²³

²² See Abenheim (1988), p. 292.

²³ See Abenheim (1990), p.31.

This situation represented a "tight rope" walked by the civilian and military leaders between trying to develop a combat-ready military with necessary and useful integrating traditions, while at the same time limiting the danger posed by the old maintenance and worship of those historical German traditions that always seemed to threaten effective civilian control and military accountability. However, the leadership also found that one of the side benefits of this exercise in the quest for a "usable past" tradition was its value in showing continuity between the past German political and cultural entities and the radically changed one of the present.²⁴ This provided an improved basis of legitimacy for not only the military, but also, the new nation-state.

The ultimate outcome of this conceptualization was a new military reborn and reformed at the same time. This reform was best known for the two ideas of "citizen in uniform" and *Innere Fuehrung*. Although assigned a rough translation earlier in the present study, the latter concept is difficult to translate easily, and, in fact, even changes meaning in German depending upon the context of the conversation. Generally, however, *Innere Fuehrung* represents the internal leadership aspects of military education and training -- the teaching of decisive and legitimate leadership and initiative for command, as well as the *moral* responsibilities to the overall democratic society that must necessarily be understood for proper civic awareness. One author, Ralf Zoll, considers *Innere Fuehrung* by itself a legitimizing factor for West Germany:

"[T]he concept of "Innere Fuehrung" has, in practice, often been misunderstood as being only a model of appropriate behavior of military leaders. But, in fact, it is concerned with justifying the many-faceted civil-military relations."²⁵

²⁴ See Abenheim (1988), p.294.

²⁵ See Zoll (1979), p. 526.

In addition, the "citizen in uniform" theme in the *Bundeswehr* underscored the participation aspect of democratic society, and the fact that citizens in uniform also take part in that society while in the military. In short, both of these concepts mutually support one another in providing a foundation upon which to build military traditions on the one hand, and by which to find those military traditions from the past that are relevant, on the other. Although debated and fine-tuned throughout the four decades of the *Bundeswehr*, these concepts remain an essential part of this military institution and how it and the society at large view it.

Based upon these two dominating concepts, the use of military history and tradition by the West German military has run a rather varied gamut. It has, on occasion, combined seemingly irreconcilable aspects of the German past. Initially, this included the rediscovery of the Prussian reformers as "politically acceptable and relevant." They were highlighted as sharing important similarities with the new "reformers" of the *Bundeswehr*. However, there are also examples of ships and installations named for *Wehrmacht* officers who were said to have represented virtues deemed important in any military. Needless to say, there was often strong debate over some of these selections from the German past. Moreover, the virtues included,

"truthfulness, righteousness, respect for the dignity of man, magnanimous and chivalrous conduct, comradeship and solicitude, a courageous defense of justice, bravery and self-sacrifice in misfortune and success, a modest appearance and style of life, cultivation of spirit, language and the body, as well as tolerance, fear of God and a faithful adherence to the dictates of conscience."²⁶

-- virtues worthy of any organization.

²⁶ From a Ministry of Defense Directive issued in July, 1965. Quoted in Nelson (1972), p.154.

In addition to historical figures, the *Bundeswehr* also quickly adopted symbols that were tied to German history. These included the black-red-gold flag, the eagle on the federal escutcheon, the iron cross, gray uniforms, red stripes on trousers, silver uniform piping, etc. This was an extremely popular move for an army that began its existence wearing the "Ike" jackets and green fatigues of an American military. One older *Bundeswehr* veteran interviewed in Kaiserslautern who experienced the change-over from American styles to distinct West German uniforms stated,

"It was unbelievable how the simple changing of clothes could also change our inner feelings. We knew we were still "attached" to the Americans and NATO, but something was very different after the new uniforms were on. We seemed to be now a true German *partner*, at an equal level. I was more than ever proud to be -- and for the first time appear as -- a *German* soldier, and not simply a member of an American-supported force made up of Germans."²⁷

Therefore, like the East Germans, the West Germans recognized the value of physical symbols in linking the present military with the past in the minds of both soldier and citizen.

Lastly, German war memorials and cemeteries for all wars -- including and perhaps especially the Second World War -- were treated as very sacred by the German people, and in many cases, financially supported by different levels of government. The military also occasionally took part in some way. This usually included ceremonies or commemorations which provided a rather visible connection between the German military and their war dead.

To summarize, tradition was an important part of the *Bundeswehr*. Although more publicly debated and sometimes ridiculed by some West Germans, the utility of

²⁷ Interviews given in March, 1995 (Kaiserslautern, Germany).

tradition was nonetheless a factor of legitimacy, just as much as a factor for military effectiveness and preparedness. Guided by the concepts of the “citizen in uniform” and *Innere Fuehrung*, the development of a West German military tradition with selective aspects of the past served to enhance legitimacy by showing a connection between “good” aspects of the past, with new democratic-oriented traditions of the present. Moreover, it was indeed similar to the policies undertaken by the East Germans. In that regard, one of its aims, then, was a contribution to both domestic and international legitimacy.

2. - Recruitment and Selection:

Conscription in the Federal Republic was introduced under the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* (Defense Duty Law) in July 1956. Since then, it has undergone several changes, but always remained in place throughout the years of a divided Germany. Initially touted as a mechanism, “...to prevent a predominance of professional military men...,”²⁸ it fulfilled in actuality two main tasks. First, it provided the much needed manpower for the enormous army outlined and mandated in the rearmament process. The second task was the education and training of the large number of young adults provided by conscription who were to serve as true citizens in uniform within a democratic system, while also learning and understanding the broader meanings of what it meant to be a new (West) German, both politically and culturally.

All able-bodied men between 18 and 28 were obligated to military service for the period of this study, and provided between 50 and 75% of the enlisted force of the

²⁸ See Turner (1987), p. 75.

Bundeswehr. Initially, the term of service for the draftees was 12 months in 1956, raised to 18 in 1962, lowered to 15 in 1973, and then a dual track-system was introduced later that allowed for either 15 or 18-month obligations, depending on job, required training, personal situation, etc. In short, the time of obligated active service ranged from 12 to 18 months of full-time military duty. This was followed by service in the reserves including from 9 to 15 months total reserve training for enlisted personnel, to 18 months reserve service for officers.²⁹

For volunteers, there were also longer terms of service ranging from 2 years to 15. This was appealing to some soldiers, among other things, because of the technical education and training they could receive if they remained longer than the normal conscription periods. These rank and file enlisted personnel and NCOs were first assigned a trial period of 6 months and then they were awarded a contract for a specific length of service only after completing the required education and training.

Lastly, there were more career-oriented positions for enlisted personnel within the NCO (*Unteroffizier*) ranks. An NCO could become a regular career soldier when he reached the rank of sergeant and the age of 25. The system therefore allowed for selection of those types of individuals most preferred by their military superiors, especially those reflecting strong associations with the values and norms of the military institution.

²⁹ Since the Basic Law ruled out compulsory service for those who might refuse, there was also alternative public service in the civilian sectors provided for conscientious objectors. In these cases, the obligated services corresponded to the contemporary conscription obligations of military draftees. However, conscientious objectors were subjected to a lengthy bureaucratic process in order to circumvent the normal military service.

Thus, although the majority of enlisted personnel, indeed overall *Bundeswehr* personnel, were obtained through the system of universal conscription, there were three different selection processes at work in the enlisted and NCO ranks. There were those who committed themselves as volunteers for temporary service (2 to 15 years); those who chose the military as a life-long vocation; and those who simply served because they were legally required to do so.

TABLE 6

COMPOSITION OF THE BUNDESWEHR, 1984

<i>Personnel</i>	<i>Total in Service</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>NCOs</i>	<i>Enlisted Privates, Airmen, etc.</i>
Soldiers on Active Duty	471,448 (100%)	42,039 (100%)	141,800 (100%)	287,609 (100%)
Regulars	65,514 (14%)	31,190 (74%)	34,322 (24%)	2 (-)
Volunteers*	184,346 (39%)	9,650 (23%)	107,474 (76%)	62,222 (23%)
Conscripts	221,588 (47%)	1,199 (3)	4 (-)	220,385 (77%)
Other (including programs for vocational training)	9,244	134	8,984	126
TOTAL	480,692		150,784	282,735

Source: German MOD

*Includes both short-term and long-term volunteers.

For officers, there was a corresponding division of opportunity in military service. There were both short and long-term volunteers in the officer ranks, as well as career officers, and even a few officer conscripts. Table 6 summarizes the

proportions of enlisted and officer recruits for the different service paths during one of the peak years of *Bundeswehr* strength at the height of the Cold War.

One of the most important factors instituted early on in the West German military was the decision that education would prove a decisive factor in selecting officer candidates. For example, by the mid-1960s, over 63% of the officers of all ranks had completed at least two years of college (the *Abitur*), and over 97% of the generals had done so.³⁰ By the late 1980s, all officers in the FRG must have graduated from an academic secondary school with the *Abitur* before entering any type of officer training.

This emphasis on education requirements in the officer selection process was aimed primarily at changing the overall social makeup of the officer corps from one that had overrepresented historically the nobility (i.e., *Junkers*), to one that more accurately reflected the overall society. The result was a significant decrease in the proportion of nobility from about 16% in the mid-1950s to only 2.7% in the 1970s.³¹ Moreover, just as in the East German case, the *Bundeswehr* attempted to level the class structure of the officer corps, and apparently met with some success. For example, Table 7 outlines the social composition of the total officer corps for 1970. This table suggests a more representative distribution across social backgrounds than had been the case in past German militaries.

The primary inducement for officer recruits was *continued* education and training. This became especially important with the creation of the military schools

³⁰ See Bald (1979), p.657.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.647.

and universities of the *Bundeswehr* in the early 1970s offering curricula deemed increasingly useful in preparation for ultimate civilian work (this will be discussed further in the next section). Moreover, this practice of linking military training for

TABLE 7

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE OFFICER CORPS, 1970

Father's Occupation	Percentage of Total Officers
Upper Level Civil Servants	22
Middle and Lower Level Civil Servants	9
Military Officers	9
All Government Employees	40
Executives	16
Middle and Lower Level Employees	11
All Employees	27
Self-Employed Tradesmen and Farmers	23
Laborers and Special Skill Workers	7

Source: Detlef Bald, "The German Officer Corps: Caste or Class?", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.5, no.4 (Summer, 1979): p.655.

knowledge and skills useful for future civilian employment was an important part of the overall education and training concept of the *Bundeswehr*. Thus, it also provided effective motivation for attracting high-quality officer and NCO candidates.

In sum, the recruitment process, including especially the conscription system itself, was similar to that in place in East Germany. However, in stark contrast to East Germany, there was no massive militarization of society to help rationalize and also provide mutual support for this ongoing draft. Instead, the West German government appealed to the sense of legality, duty and conscience of its new democratic citizens, on the one hand, to minimize opposition, while, on the other hand, it offered to fulfill perceived education and training needs to attract high quality officer recruits. This, in turn, led to eliminating the traditional upper class domination of the German officer corps, as well as preventing it from reoccurring in the future.

Most importantly, however, the system of recruitment in the FRG, from the standpoint of conscription and numbers of personnel, provided the opportunity to interact, and, thus, socialize most of the young men of each upcoming generation, just as in East Germany. The next section discusses the specific ways this was attempted within the *Bundeswehr*.

3. - Education and Training:

The twin concepts of "citizen in uniform" and *Innere Fuehrung* discussed earlier also guided overall education and training in the West German military, and relative to the non-technical aspects of military education, this translated into a dedicated process of political training and civic education of conscripts and career soldiers alike. The West German *Guide to Political Education and Training*

highlights the broad focus of this mission:

“Political education and training in the Bundeswehr is a vital part of the overall training of all soldiers. It is neither a special training nor is it only given to special ranked groups. It should enable the soldiers to understand the necessity of the citizens obligation to military service.”³²

Consequently, there were structures created within the MOD specifically for political education and training. Figure 6.2 illustrates the major MOD offices and organizations dedicated to this task.

From the beginning the *Bundeswehr* was supposed to help integrate closely the society and the military. However, it was rapidly evident that most aspects of *Innere Fuehrung* and “citizen in uniform” were difficult to transfer from mere slogans and stated goals into concrete leadership instruction, practice, or systematic learning aids, especially given the nature of the traditional German military training adopted by the *Bundeswehr* in 1956. This earlier system was organized mainly for efficiency, and the West German army’s reliance on “citizen in uniform” and *Innere Fuehrung* were not compatible with a training system of this sort.

As a consequence of this realization, two of the first training institutions developed to meet this challenge were the Center for *Innere Fuehrung* established at Koblenz, and the *Fuehrungsakademie* (Leadership Academy) in Hamburg. Established soon after the creation of the *Bundeswehr*, these institutions were dedicated to imparting the principles and responsibilities of the “citizen in uniform” and *Innere Fuehrung* concepts. The Koblenz center was mainly for new military members, while the school in Hamburg was dedicated to second-tier training and

³² See Lange (1977), p.16.

education. Both institutions catered to enlisted and officers, and included in their faculties civilian academicians, some of whom specialized in civil-military and civic education subjects.

POLITICAL TRAINING IN THE *BUNDESWEHR*




FIGURE 5.1³³

³³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

By the early 1970s, major reforms were begun in the attempt to meet more suitably the socialization needs of the military, and, thus, engender more successfully the two "pillars," specifically for officer candidates. This occurred also at a time when the importance of improved educational opportunities in an increasingly sophisticated society was needed to both attract recruits, and also to educate and train them better for return to civilian society. The result was a recognized need for dedicated *Bundeswehr* universities which also included specific curricula for buttressing the twin concepts. These were established originally in 1973 as federal colleges and later upgraded to university status. Primarily conceived as scholarly institutions, these universities provided young officers with courses of study that would assist them in both the military as well as in their future civilian careers. In fact, the locations for the two universities in Hamburg and Munich were chosen mainly for their cooperation with local civilian universities.³⁴

The *Bundeswehr* university in Hamburg offered majors in electrotechnology, mechanical engineering, education, economics, and management, while the one in Munich provided courses in civil engineering and surveying, electrotechnology, information studies, aerospace technology, education, social sciences, and economic and business management. Studies were limited to three years with three terms each, and at any given time, there were between 1000 to 1500 students at each of these two universities.

In addition to the general areas of study, however, all students at these military universities had to complete courses in education and social sciences -- courses

³⁴ See Thompson and Peltier (1990), p.593.

dedicated to an understanding of the “developmental- and social-sciences” (*Die erziehungs- und gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Anteile des Studiums -- EGA*). This consisted of Christian social and ethical teachings, history and sociology, political science, and certain aspects of domestic and international law. The basic, required EGA curriculum provided a solid foundation for the teaching of the concepts of “citizen in uniform” and *Innere Fuehrung*, and placed the officer candidate on solid political and ideological foundations in order to prepare him as a leader/trainer of soldiers. These required studies were, actually, a major justification for the creation of separate military universities.³⁵

Dedicated training for “citizen in uniform” and *Innere Fuehrungs*-related concepts for enlistees, especially draftees, represented at least 60 hours of instruction divided into general political issues and problems, civic education (*Staatsbuergerlicher Unterricht*), current events under the *Truppeninformation* (“Information for the Troops”) program, and monthly viewing of the films, *Bundeswehrfilmschau* (*Bundeswehr Filmshow*). This basic instruction was strengthened further by periodic classes and lectures on these subjects under the responsibility of the company officers. There were also regular posted information notices and posters. An example of one of these posters is provided in figure 6.2, and shows the different types of relationships that can exist between a military and its society, ranging from, 1) a military dictatorship with no societal input, to 2) a civil- military relationship dominated by

³⁵ See Liebau (1976), p.145-158; and Ellwein (1974), pp. 24-26.

military values, to 3) a clearly separate and divided civil-military arrangement, to 4) the totally integrated model of the *Bundeswehr* under the concept of *Innere Führung*.³⁶




FIGURE 5.2

³⁶ Obtained from the *Führungsakademie*, Hamburg.

In addition, the *Bundeswehr* had over 60 separate schools for technical training, including specialized instruction within the separate branches. All of these institutions included some degree of political and civic education and training in their curricula. For example, the German Air Force Academy uses instructors with law degrees for civic education and instruction on the role of the citizen-soldier in the democratic German military. One instructor said,

“One of the first things we teach cadets here is civil rights and law instruction (*Rechtsunterricht*). They must take a mandatory test of this material as part of the *Innere Fuehrung* process. However, in addition to this type of instruction, they must also learn other parts of the concept. This includes soldier duties and obligations (which are also written into the honor code), military history, political training, the Constitution, the nature of legal military orders, and other aspects of the role of the citizen in his government and in his military.”³⁷

Thus, education and training at all levels of the formal academic military education process included some degree of exposure to the *Innere Fuehrung* and “citizen in uniform” concepts.

The *Bundeswehr* also was mandated to provide vocational training for both active duty military personnel, as well as retiring personnel preparing for civilian life. Political and civic instruction, albeit to a lesser degree, was a part of these programs as well. This was yet another means by which to remind the member that his military was closely connected to the overall society.

To summarize, the civilian and military leaders in the FRG recognized the potential opportunities for political socialization of the large numbers of draftees forced to serve in the military. Through different mechanisms, institutions, and

³⁷ Quoted from interview at the Luftwaffe Akademie, April 1995.

policies, the use of education and training was indeed the *major* military means used by the West German policymakers to socialize both officer and enlisted personnel (draftee and volunteer alike) for a democratic Germany.

4. - Career Advancement:

In general, the promotions and advancement process within the West German military also reflected the above emphasis on education and training. This was the case for both officer and enlisted personnel, and was reinforced with the military education reforms of the early 1970s. Moreover, in contrast with the East Germans, political reliability was not the *primary* player in the promotion process, but instead, the meeting of strict and formal requirements was the determining factor -- what American military members call, "filling the square." This system provided a regulated route through that series of political socialization processes outlined above.

For example, by the late 1970s, to attain the rank of NCO required at least nine years of elementary school, the completion of an apprenticeship training program, and following basic training, a candidate must have attended an NCO candidate training course. This education process, however, only represented the prerequisite for promotion consideration. In addition, the candidate had to obtain the necessary scores on general qualification tests, and take a vocational aptitude test. Those selected for further advancement were allowed to attend two-year vocational schools which provided, in most cases, a civilian-recognized occupational certification.

NCOs were also allowed to apply for an officer specialist career, depending of course on their earning the necessary *Abitur* or equivalent. This could be achieved within the military through the armed forces vocational schools. Chosen candidates then went through an officers' candidate school.

For regular officers, there was an initial training phase lasting at least five years. This included an introductory phase of basic military training lasting over 15 months which also included the qualifying Officer's Examination. This was followed by three years of academic study at one of the *Bundeswehr* universities, three months to prepare for and take comprehensive examinations, and finally nine months of training for specific assigned duties. All of this was required just to be promoted to first lieutenant! Then there was on-the-job training and continued refresher courses in different subjects. In addition, there were stints at the various leadership and training academies within the *Innere Fuehrungs* process. Remember, this extensive training was required for any consideration of promotion on top of such things as officer effectiveness reports and other indicators in the average officer's record. However, promotion was required in order to *continue* technical or academic training in preparation for return to civilian life.

What was the reason for this dependence on this rather long and arduous succession of schools, instruction, training, and tests for determining promotability and retention? Indeed, there is always a definite need for highly educated and trained soldiers in a modern military. Linking promotions to education and schooling simply affirmed that all personnel received the necessary training to ensure that military

missions were met, and that quality leaders were given the proper foundations for command (particularly from the perspective of the technical aspects of the training). However, by tying promotions to educational prerequisites, and, in turn, educational opportunities to promotion, the *Bundeswehr* also ensured that all military members would be exposed to political socialization at numerous levels and in different settings. That is, they would be immersed in the "twin pillars" for months, and even years, at a time. In short, it guaranteed that all military members would have ample opportunity to understand their new political system, how their new German culture and this system complemented one another, and why their socio-political system in general, and their military in particular, were legitimate in the eyes of all Germans and of the rest of the world.

D. Chapter Summary

The *Bundeswehr* was developed as much as a socio-political tool as it was from a security standpoint. Reborn under the shadow of the East-West conflict, it faced some of the same security dilemmas that challenged its predecessors -- dilemmas, however, that also provided the rationale for the re-creation of a military institution that would provide another means to socialize the population for a democratic Germany.

In comparison with the East German case, the West Germans did not initially prepare for rearmament after the war. Thus, a military capability was created relatively late in the Cold War years. It was nonetheless rapidly equipped and

organized, primarily with the help of the United States. Consequently, much of the initial form of its structure and training included many typically American attitudes about the proper role of the military. Moreover, the West Germans, under the eyes of the Western allies even took the American model further by more closely integrating the military and civil society in order to prevent the old traditional "state within a state" manifestation that was present in past German militaries.

As with the East Germans, the FRG leaders were faced with the task of creating a new and different political and cultural identity for their portions of Germany. They had to overcome the lack of any real tradition of democracy in Germany, and thus were forced to build new sets of norms and values in both the political and cultural realms. These desired values included a new sense of individualism, egalitarianism, individual work ethic, civic responsibility, kindred feelings for other democracies, and the recognition of individual rights. In addition, the leadership also attempted to produce in the population a new understanding of the citizen's role in a parliamentary German government, his responsibilities to that government, and above all, his acceptance of that government within a social system that truly reflected a new, but distinct *German* political culture and cultural identity. Many of these new values and attitudes were not typically, or traditionally, German.

Moreover, the military was recognized as a potentially vital means in the attempt to contribute to these things. Like the East Germans, universal conscription provided hundreds of thousands of short-term soldiers who were, for the most part, young, receptive, and, most importantly, *available* for education and training. Like

the East Germans, tradition and history had to be used selectively to build legitimacy and pride in the new military, as well as for the overall socio-political system. Like the East Germans, this political socialization occurred at all levels, on almost a daily basis, and in almost all military institutions and units. Like the East Germans, the *Bundeswehr* was given the task of instilling new values and attitudes not only within the military itself, but also through broad-based policies and programs that affected the overall society. And like the East Germans, there were dedicated organizations and structures placed into the chain of command of the *Bundeswehr* specifically for these missions.

However, unlike the East Germans, there was no massive militarization of society, nor was there any real dedicated *Feindbild*, at least none that was intensively aimed at the other Germany. In addition, there was also an absence of strict control for political reliability in the promotion and selection systems for officers. West German officers were not required to belong to "the Party" or to any party for that manner. Instead, the West German military relied upon its education and training system operated within the strict guidelines of the "citizen in uniform" and *Innere Fuehrung* concepts. This education and training was tied to both promotion *and* preparation for civilian careers, and by so doing, it furthered the opportunities to socialize the military member.

In sum, the leadership of the government and military in West Germany also used the four mechanisms in the attempt to build political community. Different

strategies and policies within each of these realms were clearly aimed at this goal of enhancing, if not creating, a distinct West Germany by using the military institution.

CHAPTER 6

OUTCOMES: THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

A. Introduction

Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that the two German governments consciously and actively used the military as part of the overall attempt to create distinct political communities. There were similarities, as well as differences, in the techniques and methods used, but the recognized process of political socialization was nonetheless an inherent policy element of both military institutions. However, were the political and military leadership successful in these endeavors? Did the military institution really play an important role in actually fostering the desired values, attitudes, and beliefs about their particular side of Germany -- to military members and the overall society alike? Thus, was it as important as other institutional agents of socialization such as school, church, or even family? In short, did the processes of political socialization specifically carried out by the military actually succeed?

This chapter focuses on these questions -- questions about the outcomes of the military's political socialization process. It relies upon extant surveys and secondary literature, but primarily on the new interview and survey data collected by the author in Germany during the Spring of 1995 (see Chapter 2).

The first section briefly discusses the general evidence that there were indeed differences in the political communities between the two German states, at least on the broad level. That is, it is important to point out that, in general, there developed aspects of separate political and cultural identities, as well as distinct feelings of

legitimacy by both East and West Germans. The evidence for this is now particularly strong as shown by several recent surveys and studies accomplished since 1990.

After outlining the evidence that there were generally two German political communities by the time of unification in 1990, the question then becomes one of whether the military institutions contributed to these differences. Thus, the second section addresses this particular issue for each of the two states, and specifically explores the link between the military and each of the intervening factors of political community.

B. Two Distinct German Political Communities?

There is various evidence which supports the view that two distinct political communities did indeed develop over the 43 years of divided Germany. Moreover, periodic studies and surveys illustrate that Germans on both sides of the border increasingly grew apart relative to political culture and cultural identity, and they commonly accepted as legitimate their respective socio-political systems. Surveys and interviews accomplished in the current study also support this perspective. The following section briefly highlights some of this evidence.

1. - Political Culture:

There are several studies which indicate that East and West Germans differed in their political ideologies, attitudes, outlooks, and values. As was evident in several surveys, the Germans themselves recognized there existed two distinct political states.

Some of this research suggests as much as 86% of the population believed this in the mid to late 1980s.¹

Moreover, there is other research reflecting the consensus that West Germans developed a particular liberal democratic political culture. Such studies include Kaase, 1971; Boynton and Loewenberg, 1973 and 1974; Roth, 1976; Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt, 1981; Hoffmann-Lange, 1985; Weidenfeld and Korte, 1991; and Kuechler, 1992. For the most part, this research outlines the development of a distinct post-war West German political culture as different from that in the East, as well as different from that of the German past.

From the GDR perspective, there is research suggesting a contrasting *socialist* East German political value system, mainly representing a continuation of many aspects of the traditional German anti-democratic past, and the historic tendency towards an authoritarian system. These studies include Ludz, 1972; Schweigler, 1975; Krisch, 1985; and Childs, Baylis and Rueschemeyer, 1989. More specifically, other research shows that the East German leadership was at least partially successful in imbueing East Germans with distinctly socialist ideals and values: this mainly is reflected in Friedrich, 1990; Bauer, 1991; and Noelle-Neumann, 1991.

Most recently, is a 1994 study by Robert Rohrschneider which compares both sides of Germany within the context of differing political values and norms. This study suggests that German parliamentarians in the new united parliament in Berlin differ greatly in their political conceptions of democracy, depending upon whether they came

¹ See Hoffmann (1992), p.81.

from East or West Germany.² He argues that individuals gradually incorporate new political values and norms from societal institutions, and over generations, will be shaped by these institutional influences. Thus, western democratic experiences in West Germany and socialist experiences in East Germany, bounded within institutions and over generations will ultimately affect ideological predispositions. Rohrschneider uses various democratic value measures and institutional/generational responses in his multivariate analysis. Moreover, he shows that, "...both East and West German systems were partially successful in reshaping the political culture."³

Some aspects of the present study's surveys also support this general view that discernable, separate national political cultures existed in the two German states. These are mainly reflected in questions about individual liberty versus societal order and those about preferred political parties. For example, Figure 6.1 illustrates important differences in East and West German attitudes about personal freedom. In the interviews, these questions were couched in terms of the preferred role of government in individual lives. The West Germans reflect a more liberal, western attitude towards the role of government and its "proper" influence on the individual, while the East Germans prefer more government intervention for the benefit of all. These suggest typical differences in political values and norms similar to those studied above by Rohrschneider.

² See Rohrschneider (1994).

³ *Ibid.*, p. 936.

-- What do you personally find more important, personal freedom or societal order?		
	%	
	Personal Freedom	Societal Order
All East Germans -	29.4	71.6
All West Germans -	63.0	37.0
N=92		

FIGURE 6.1⁴

This is supported similarly in a 1991 article in a special edition of the German magazine, *Der Spiegel*, which showed that East Germans overwhelmingly felt that government support for women's equality, crime prevention/protection and social security was much better in the former GDR than in West Germany, and thus East Germans implicitly desired more government action in those realms.⁵

In addition, the choice of political party -- or perhaps just as important, the lack of choosing a political party -- also indicates major differences in East and West German attitudes about politics as discovered by the author's surveys. Figure 6.2 suggests that East Germans do not view political parties in the same way as West Germans, resulting most probably from their experiences with the single party (SED) state. However, and perhaps more importantly, further questioning in the personal interviews revealed that most East Germans did not belong to, or agree with any particular party because none truly represented their political values. During the in-

⁴ $\Phi = .33$. NOTE: Φ and τ are measures of association for nominal data, which range from 0.0 to 1.0. Statistical significance levels are not reported because these are not random samples.

⁵ See *[Der]Spiegel Spezial* (1991), p.46.

depth interviews, it was very clear these values seemed to reflect more left, socialist attitudes and beliefs than those most often espoused by the various West German and Post-GDR parties. Furthermore, a large proportion of those East Germans who *did* belong to, or agree with, particular political parties mainly identified with the Democratic Socialist Party (PDS) -- the reincarnated East German communist party. This underscores other research which estimates as many as 20% of former East Germans are members of the PDS, motivated to join mainly because these East Germans perceive the PDS party as representing *their* interests rather than those of the West.⁶


-- With which political party do you most identify or agree?					
	%				
	None	Greens	CDU/CSU	SPD	Other
All West Germans-	13.04	2.1	39.1	43.8	1.96
All East Germans-	62.5	12.5	6.25	6.25	12.5 *
*Mainly PDS					
N=92					

FIGURE 6.2

There were also differences in East and West German attitudes about political *institutions* reflected in the surveys for this dissertation. For instance, in the attitude ratings for overall importance of institutions (N=191), there was a significant difference in attitudes about the importance of a parliament in modern society. East Germans generally felt that a parliament was less important than did West Germans. This is shown in Figure 6.3.

⁶ See Lindemann and Dempsey (1994), p.3.

East and West German Attitudes About Parliament



N=190

FIGURE 6.3

Lastly, in a 1990 survey, about 60% of the East German population felt that, "...socialism was a good idea that was badly implemented [in the GDR]." ⁷ Likewise, in the same survey only between 31% and 41% (depending upon the month of the survey) of East Germans since 1990 believed the Federal Republic's form of government was the best. ⁸ Thus, this also indicates major disparities in East and West German attitudes about desired polities, even in a unified Germany.

This brief sample of evidence serves to show that there is support for the general view that two political cultures did exist, indeed, in the two German states before unification -- two political cultures that, in many ways, seem to remain today, especially in light of the most recent research.

⁷ See Noelle-Neumann (April, 1994), p.7.

⁸ *Ibid.*

2. - Cultural Identity:

As early as 1975, Gebhard Schweigler suggested, "...in short, we find a strong hint... ..that a process of cultural separation between East and West Germans may be in progress."⁹ This strong hint seemed to become reality when various surveys measured East and West German attitudes after the end of the Cold-War division of Germany. For example, one 1994 survey showed that only 47% of the West Germans surveyed and 28% of East Germans agreed with the statement, "We are one people (*Wir sind ein Volk*)."¹⁰ Additionally, when asked about cultural self-perceptions in the research for this dissertation most East Germans did not consider themselves overall Germans, and the percentage of former GDR inhabitants who saw themselves as East German was over twice that of FRG citizens who considered themselves distinctly West German.¹¹ More East Germans also linked themselves with their local, regional cultural identity such as *Thuringer* or *Potsdamer*, etc.

-- How do you perceive yourself culturally?					
	German	W. German	E. German	European	Other
All West Germans -	70.8	16.67	0	12.5	0
All East Germans -	43.75	0	37.5	6.25	12.5

N=92

FIGURE 6.4¹²

⁹ See Schweigler (1975), p. 44.

¹⁰ See Noelle-Neumann (August, 1994), p.6.

¹¹ Part of this difference can be attributed to the common West German attitude of equating "German" with "West German."

¹² *Tau* = .11.

There also seems to have developed differences between East and West German individual behavior -- behavior which seems to reflect discernable cultural differences. Aspects of this were evident in discussions with various faculty members at the *Bundeswehr* training centers and schools. Because these faculty members were responsible for teaching both former East German military members and new recruits/cadets from the former GDR, they were in a position to observe first-hand these cultural distinctions when compared with their West German students. For example, most of these instructors commented in several interviews in March and April 1995, that there was a reticence on the part of East Germans to engage in any open group discussions or to analyze even minor differences of opinion. Instead, these former citizens of the GDR preferred to accept what was told them, and were openly upset by visible dissent, mainly on the part of West German students. Furthermore, according to one professor at the *Fuehrungsakademie*, East German students often perceived overbearing, curt behavior by instructors as simply an expression of the teacher's position of power, whereas most West Germans would consider this instructor behavior rude and arrogant. In addition, the East German students were uncomfortable when asked to critically analyze teacher/professor work or comments. All of these typically East German attitudes and behaviors also seem to be present with members from all parts of the former GDR.

Differences are also evident in how East and West Germans define the *sources* of their cultural identity, especially relative to region and language (see Figure 6.5). Interviews for this thesis suggest that East Germans place more emphasis on the

influence of their *Heimat*, or home region, and West Germans seem to place more emphasis on language. When many East Germans were asked to provide details about these attitudes, there was always a discussion about the difference between *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* (roughly translated into "society" and "community"). Moreover, the majority of East Germans felt as if there was no feeling of community or "neighborliness" in West Germany which they enjoyed in their home regions, and feared that West German influence would eventually erode this in the East. Instead, East Germans perceived there was only a general *society* in West Germany reflecting different classes and different occupations, but with a lack of any feeling of responsibility for one another. It was also apparent these East Germans believed their culture, in this regard, was far better than that of the "Wessies." This characteristic attitude was confirmed by a study by the University of Oldenburg which suggests that East Germans,

"...still live their lives less individualistically than their western cousins: in fact, they wish to retain their "sense of the collective" -- a source of security and an expression of common responsibility."¹³

-- What do you consider to be the main sources of your cultural identity?						
%						
	Region	Family (Birth)	Language	Ethnic Group	Religion	Other
All West Germans -	16.66	27.78	36.11	5.56	11.11	2.77
All East Germans -	54.0	27.0	13.5	0	0	5.4
N=91						

FIGURE 6.5¹⁴

¹³ See Bajohr (1994), p.14.

¹⁴ Tau = .07.

In many ways, this East German perception of the West was indeed upheld to a certain extent by many West Germans interviewed in the FRG. Generally, westerners placed more value on individual effort and rewards based upon individual merit. As a result, these West Germans put less emphasis on collective or community mechanisms of support, and, instead, placed a greater value on a society with more personal freedom of opportunity for growth.

Attitudes about *specific* shared cultural values show some differences as well, although not as great as expected. Detlef Landua suggests in his research that in the FRG values and attitudes in the post-war period changed in favor of pleasure, ecology, a sense of justice, and desire for personal self-determination; while in the east, surveys indicated more "traditional" value orientations toward full-employment, more specifically, the importance of work over leisure.¹⁵ This is somewhat different however from my surveys which indicate that East Germans may place greater emphasis on having a job, but not necessarily on performing hard work. Instead, they place more value on self sacrifice and self discipline -- two aspects of everyday life in the former GDR (Figure 6.6). These findings are also supported by the surveys conducted in 1991 by *Der Spiegel* which indicated similar differences in how East and West Germans perceived themselves relative to descriptive adjectives such as "disciplined" versus "undisciplined," "lazy" versus "hardworking," etc.¹⁶

These differences in perceived origins of cultural identities and their defining values have created what many term a "walls in heads" syndrome highlighting the fact

¹⁵ See Landua (1993), p.83.

¹⁶ See [Der] Spiegel Spezial, p.12.

that the cultural schism between eastern and western Germans has not ceased with the physical removal of the Wall.¹⁷ This is most evident in the apparent universal feeling among East Germans that they are, in reality, second-class citizens in the eyes of the West. Interestingly, these feelings of inferiority are reinforced by the West German media. For example, West German television often portrays East Germans as garish, naive, less intelligent, and less sophisticated than West Germans, and East Germans as a group are commonly the brunt of popular jokes in the West.¹⁸

-- What are the primary values you consider important as part of your cultural identity?								
	Family Values	Self-Discipline	Hard Work	Self-Sacrifice	Responsibility	Respect for Authority	Honesty	Other
All BRD-	29.72	10.8	27.0	5.4	10.81	2.7	5.4	8.17
All GDR-	37.14	20.0	14.3	11.4	5.7	0	0	11.43
N=92								

FIGURE 6.6¹⁹

Lastly, East Germans are very adamant about their distinct culture *vis-a-vis* the west, and are incensed over what they perceive as the West Germans' disregard for their "East German culture." Many East Germans interviewed in the process of the

¹⁷ See Fisher (1993), p.A1.

¹⁸ In addition, this mental division of the two sides of Germany may also be a major contributing factor to the ongoing xenophobia in the east. Karl-Peter Fritzsche, for example, believes the East German susceptibility to authoritarian or extreme right wing solutions to social and civic problems is primarily a result of typical East German political and cultural tendencies, developed over the last forty years, and enhanced by the stress of change. See Fritzsche (1994), p.282-283.

¹⁹ *Tau* = .01.

current study echoed the words of one man who stated,

“We are sick and tired (*wir haben die Nase voll!*) of the Kohl government only throwing money at our problems, while completely ignoring our culture. We are different! Yes, we are Germans, but we did not grow up, go to school, or work in the *same* Germany! We value different things. We don’t even play all sports the same way!”²⁰

In sum, there existed and still exists important *cultural* differences between East and West Germans. This is evident in different perceptions of cultural origins, cultural affiliations, and cultural values -- all of which contribute to the ongoing “walls in heads” problem yet to be adequately addressed in the reintegration of the two Germanies.

3. - Perceptions of Legitimacy:

Were there differences in how East and West Germans perceived and accepted their particular socio-political system, especially as representing the traditional Germany? This is the more difficult of the three intervening factors of political community to differentiate for both sides. However, there was, nonetheless, apparent acceptance and support for both systems, primarily from the perspective of representing the cultural aspects of the “true Germany.” For instance, my research suggests that virtually no West German would consider the former GDR as remotely representing the German culture, but interestingly, a clear majority of East Germans interviewed considered the GDR as the legitimate heir to German culture (please see Figure 6.7).

²⁰ Interview conducted in Ruhla (April 1995).

-- When there were two German states, which for you (personally) best represented the cultural history and cultural traditions of Germany?		
	%	
	East Germany (GDR)	West Germany (BRD)
All West Germans	0	100
All East Germans	64.3	35.7
	N=92	

FIGURE 6.7²¹

Clear differences were also evident when Germans were asked about the *political* legitimacy of the two German states. While most West Germans understandably accepted the FRG as the legitimate political *Deutschland*, almost half of the East Germans still accepted the GDR as best representing the political history and traditions of Germany (see Figure 6.8). When asked about this, most East Germans repeated their opinion that the GDR was in many ways a continuation of traditional German political values and norms, and the socialist regime only reinforced

-- When there were two German states, which for you (personally) best represented the political history and political traditions of Germany?		
	%	
	East Germany (GDR)	West Germany (BRD)
All West Germans	4.5	95.5
All East Germans	42.0	57.0
	N=90	

FIGURE 6.8²²

these. To them, western forms of democracy were not typically German. This view could also explain why almost 5% of the *West Germans* agreed that the GDR was the legitimate political heir to Germany.

²¹*Phi* = .73.

²²*Phi* = .20.

The one area which did not show differences in this study however, was that of international legitimacy -- that is, whether or not the population accepted their particular socio-political system as the legitimate Germany in the international arena, primarily as perceived by the rest of the world. Surprisingly, all of those interviewed believed that the FRG was universally perceived by other nations and their populations as the legitimate German nation-state (see Figure 6.9). During interviews, both East and West Germans attributed this to the recognition that the Soviet Union was in virtual control of all East German foreign policies, and realized that most other populations also recognized this. Whether or not the East Germans themselves desired that other nations see the GDR as the correct Germany in the world was irrelevant to these interviewees. They could not accept that the GDR was ever perceived as more than a Soviet pawn in the international arena.

-- Which of the two German states do you believe was seen by the rest of the world as the true successor of the "old" Germany?			
	GDR	%	BRD
All East Germans	0		100
All West Germans	0		100
	N=92		

Figure 6.9

This did not, however, prevent most of those East Germans interviewed from expressing the view that they were always happier when athletes from the GDR won international sports competitions which also involved West German athletes.

Similarly, from the perspective of international acceptance as measured in terms of popularity, research in *Der Spiegel* showed that East and West Germans shared the perception that the FRG was much more popular in the world than the GDR. 55% of East Germans and 43% of West Germans believed the FRG was popular before unification, while only 24% of West Germans and 26% of East Germans saw the GDR as popular in the world.²³

To summarize, there seems to be credible evidence that there developed distinct differences in the political communities between the two German states, and this was underway well before the 1980s. In fact, one study which asked the broad question about "Germany" -- in whatever way the term was conceived by the particular respondent -- showed that as early as 1967, 43% of those participating in this major survey believed that there were indeed *two* Germanies.²⁴ This reflects the differences discussed above in how Germans perceived their particular political and cultural identities, and how they perceived and accepted the legitimacy of their particular socio-political system.

C. Examining the Military Link

If one generally accepts that there were aspects of two distinct political communities in the German states, and that the militaries of both sides were used consciously in the political socialization process with the aim of contributing to these

²³ See [Der] *Spiegel Spezial* (1991), p.26.

²⁴ See Schweigler (1975), p.171.

distinct political communities, then the primary issue of this study comes to the fore. That is, were the military institutions successful in actively contributing to this goal?

This section will focus upon this question as it provides the results of the author's recent surveys and interviews in Germany. Using the framework for Political Community (introduced in Chapter 2) to structure the analysis, I present the data which correspond to the three intervening outcomes of political community and attempt to identify links specifically with the military institution. These data are those as primarily derived from the attitude scales and in-depth interviews with East and West Germans.

The first two sections concentrate on presenting the data and analysis on the differences between veterans and non-veterans' outlooks in each of the two German states, along with overall perspectives of the entire population relative to the military's contribution to political community. Moreover, each of these sections will contain an analysis of the results for each of the three main intervening goals. The chapter summary then provides general conclusions and comments on the results of these surveys and interviews for both cases.

1. - The NVA Case:

(A) - Political Culture: The following reflects the data which pertains exclusively to how the East German military institution was perceived by the population as fostering the different *political culture* components of political community -- that is, aspects of political ideology, structure of the polity, and role of the citizen *vis-a-vis* government.

The relevant data included are, thus, those derived from questions that relate to, 1) the choice of political party, 2) attitudes about preferred political systems, 3) perceived sources of political views, and 4) feelings about personal freedom/societal order (role of government versus the individual). Again, all questions and survey protocols are in the appendix.

First, when looking at the preferred choice of political party, the interview/survey sample collected in the spring of 1995 indicates some evident differences between GDR veterans and non-veterans. Interestingly, a greater proportion of veterans choose not to belong or identify with political parties, and when they do, it is the more socialist-oriented West German parties to which they are attracted. While most GDR non-veterans also choose not to participate, those who do seem to gravitate towards the Greens and the SED heir, the PDS Party.


-- With which political party do you most identify or agree?						
	%					
	None	Greens	CDU/CSU	SPD	Other*	
GDR Veterans-	75.0	12.5	0	12.5	0	
GDR Non-Veterans-	50.0	12.5	12.5	0	25.0	
All East Germans-	62.5	12.5	6.25	6.25	12.5	
N=48						
*Mainly PDS Party						

FIGURE 6.10²⁵

Although these data suggest that East Germans may retain some fondness for socialism *as a group*, these survey questions about preferred political systems do not reflect necessarily a predilection towards certain political values specifically tied to the terms *communism* or *communist*. It is also evident that the non-veterans tend to

²⁵ $Tau = .07$.

prefer the more communist oriented PDS Party. This is reflected in Figure 6.11; communism falls far below the two democratic systems in preference and ranks similarly to feelings about anarchy, monarchy, and dictatorship. In fact, the East




N=87
FIGURE 6.11²⁶

German veterans are below the non-veterans in their attitudes towards communist systems in particular, and above on the scales for democratic systems. This is somewhat unexpected in light of the intense socialization these veterans had

²⁶Tau = .03

undergone in the NVA.²⁷ However, the measures of association for Figures 6.10 and 6.11 ($Tau = .07$ and $.03$ respectively) do not provide much statistical support for this apparent relationship between military service and differences in attitudes about political ideologies and systems.

When asked about institutional sources of political views and attitudes, the military also consistently ranked below the other institutions. Both veterans and non-




N=87

FIGURE 6.12A

²⁷ One note here; a possible lack of understanding of these systems during the surveys and interviews does not seem to have been a problem since all types of political systems were explained in detail to those respondents participating in the in-depth interviews, and there was no significant difference between their responses and the larger group completing the shorter attitudinal questionnaires.

East German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About Sources of Political Views



N=87

FIGURE 6.12B²⁸

veterans placed the military in almost exactly the same position on the scale showing almost no influence. See Figures 6.12A and B. However, there were particularly noticeable differences between veterans and non-veterans relative to the role of the family as the origins of political views (see Figure 6.12B).

Another question aimed at discerning preferences relative to political systems is illustrated in Figure 6.13 which asks specifically about preferred German governments. Although the majority of East Germans prefer the present government in a unified Germany, a somewhat greater number of veterans longed for the old system.

²⁸Relative to attitudes for "Family," $Tau = .21$.

-- Would you rather have the old political system with two Germanies (before the wall), or do you prefer the present unified Germany?

	%	
	<u>Divided Germany</u>	<u>Unified Germany</u>
East German Veterans -	25.0	75.0
East German Non-Veterans -	1.0	99.0
All East Germans -	12.5	87.5
	N=48	

FIGURE 6.13²⁹

Lastly, when asked about the importance of personal freedom or societal order (a question relating to the role of government in personal lives), more East German veterans preferred societal order. Moreover, many of the veteran interviewees felt the GDR had better control over what they perceived as anti-social behavior by many

-- What do you (personally) find more important, personal freedom or societal order?

	%	
	<u>Personal Freedom</u>	<u>Societal Order</u>
East German Veterans -	12.5	87.5
East German Non-Veterans -	40.0	60.0
All East Germans -	29.4	71.6
	N=44	

FIGURE 6.14³⁰

elements of German society, as well as unacceptable financial freedom for the rich.

They felt the government had a responsibility to curb these problems.³¹

²⁹Phi = .16.

³⁰Phi = .32.

³¹ Interviewees in both Ruhla and Strasberg reflected these perspectives.

- *Discussion*: These data suggest some interesting results. First, although it initially appears that East German veterans were more prone to reject political parties identified with non-socialist values and norms, their civilian counterparts did so in a somewhat more radical fashion. In that regard, those non-veterans who *did* take part in political parties after unification more often did so with the Greens, and importantly, the more radically left-oriented parties in the FRG, especially the PDS. On the other hand, the small number of politically participating veterans stayed primarily with the Greens and Social Democrats (SPD) who espoused more traditional socialist platforms (in the western, non-communist sense of socialism). Additionally, East German veterans specifically rejected communist political systems to a greater degree than non-veterans (see Figure 6.11). Thus, it appears that, although veterans experienced more intense political socialization for communism in the military, it may have had the opposite effect upon them.

Second, the *overall* success of the military in influencing political attitudes and views was, according to these surveys, apparently negligible. Even in the midst of high levels of societal-wide militarization, most East German respondents perceived the military as the least probable source of their attitudes and beliefs relative to political culture. Some of the relatively low measures of association (*Tau* or *Phi*) also lends some support to this perspective.

Third, the one aspect of these data, however, that may indicate some relationship with socialization within the military is that of the preferred German political system. Again, a greater percentage of East German veterans preferred the

old divided Germany over the unified Germany. This may be explained by the preferences on their part for societal order over personal freedom, justified by them during the interviews in terms of an extreme dislike and fear of anti-social behavior and capitalist greed. In this one respect, service in the military may have instilled a greater appreciation for this type of social order and authoritarian control. Several East German veterans, in fact, mentioned that they had gained a greater appreciation for discipline and authority, specifically, while on active duty.³²

In summary, these results seem to counter the notion that constant exposure to political socialization in the East German military influenced a distinct East German political culture. In most of these data, veterans actually seem to show the opposite -- that is, they appear less oriented to communist political values and norms than do their civilian counterparts. In addition, the overall influence of the military appears relatively insignificant as well. This is apparent when the responses across the East German sample are examined. In short, the military appears below all other institutions as a source of political attitudes, opinions, or behavior for both veterans and non-veterans.

(B) - Cultural Identity: This section analyses those data which reflect East German attitudes about sources and origins of culture -- cultural affiliation, defining cultural determinants, and predominant cultural norms and values. Relevant questions include

³²Interviews in Magdeburg and Ruhla reflected these opinions.

those relative to, 1) cultural self-perception, 2) the perceived, predominant cultural values and norms that seem to be shared among the population, 3) beliefs about the main sources of personal cultural identity, and 4) attitudes about the specific *institutional* sources of cultural identity.

Figure 6.15 provides a snapshot of the sample population's self perception relative to how they describe themselves culturally, or perhaps more accurately, how they perceive the cultural group to which they feel closest. There is a clear disparity between East German veterans and non-veterans, particularly between those identifying as German and those identifying themselves as East German. Well over half of non-veterans place themselves in the overall German category, while just under 15% of the veterans considered themselves so. Instead, over 40% of East German veterans saw themselves as strictly *East German*.

-- How do you see yourself culturally?					
	%				
	German	W. German	E. German	European	Other
GDR Veterans -	14.2	0	42.8	14.6	28.5
GDR Non-Veterans -	65.2	0	34.7	0	0
All East Germans -	40.9	0	38.6	6.8	13.6
N=44					

FIGURE 6.15³³

When asked to identify the most important values that define their particular cultural identity, East German veterans and non-veterans provided similar responses,

³³Tau = .14.

both groups placing greater emphasis on family-oriented values (see Figure 6.16). The main differences are reflected in the greater emphasis by veterans on self-sacrifice and sense of responsibility, and by the non-veterans, a greater appreciation for self discipline. Both groups felt that an ethic of hard work was also an important component of their culture.

-- What are the primary values you consider important as part of your cultural identity?

	Family Values	Self-Discipline	Hard Work	Self-Sacrifice	Responsibility	Respect for Authority	Honesty
GDR Vets-	41.6	8.3	25	16.6	8.0	0	0
GDR Non-Vets	34.78	26.1	21.7	8.7	4.3	0	0
All GDR	37.14	20.0	14.3	11.4	5.7	0	0

N=46

FIGURE 6.16³⁴

-- What do you consider to be the main sources of your cultural identity?

	Region	Family (Birth)	Language	Ethnic Group	Religion	Other
GDR Veterans -	44.4	33.3	11.1	0	0	11.0
GDR Non-Veterans -	58.33	25.0	16.67	0	0	0
All East Germans -	52.38	28.57	14.28	0	0	4.7

N=51

FIGURE 6.17³⁵

³⁴Tau = .06

³⁵Tau = .02

Questioned about the *sources* of cultural identity in general (including both cultural affiliations and values), both veterans and non-veterans highlight home region as the main determinant, closely followed by the family. Interestingly, language plays only a minor part in this determination, while ethnicity and religion has absolutely no influence (see Figure 6.17).


Most importantly, the combined East German sample of those survey responses that specifically focus upon the possible *institutional* influences on overall cultural identity indicates the military lies at the very lowest level, just as in the similar attitude ratings for political culture (see 6.18A and 6.18B). Moreover, East German veterans place even less emphasis on the military in this context than non-civilians, with a visible difference evident in Figure 6.18B.

Even when, for clarification purposes, East German veterans were asked to think about the cultural aspects of their military service such as work in the community or factories, participation in local sports events, or cooperation with youth and civilian military training, their responses nonetheless remained the same. In that regard, one veteran stated,

“...no matter what, during and after my military service, I always considered the military as a separate part (*Teil*) of East Germany. When we were in public [in uniform], we knew that some day we would be back in the “real” society, but we were also constantly reminded by our total immersion into military things (*Sache*) that we were for the time being *military* East Germans. Sure, we were constantly told that the NVA was a reflection of the best parts of the East German community, but to us in the service, it [the military] was only a temporary nuisance to endure until we returned to our family and home.”³⁶

³⁶ Interview in March 1995, Strasberg.


East German Attitudes About Sources of Cultural Identity



N=87

FIGURE 6.18A

East German Veteran and Non-Veteran Attitudes about Sources of Cultural Identity



N=87

FIGURE 6.18B³⁷

³⁷Tau = .10.

- *Discussion*: All in all, just as in the case of political culture, the East German military seems to have had far less influence in producing a distinct cultural identity than perhaps other institutions. First, there was no significant difference evident in the surveys and interviews between veterans and non-veterans relative to certain common defining values of their cultural identity, such as family-oriented values and hard work. On the other hand, however, there was an important difference with the one area of self-discipline (26.1% for non-veterans and 8.3% for veterans). Since military service commonly is linked to the teaching and practice of self-discipline, this is a puzzling outcome to say the least. But again, there are also relatively low measures of association for these tables ($Tau = .06$ and $.02$).

Second, there was very little distinction between veterans and non-veterans in all of the main sources of cultural identity identified by the respondents. This suggests a lack of success on the part of the military in this regard as well. Interestingly, the two main sources of cultural identity seem to be family and region -- both cultural determinants not actively reinforced in the military socialization processes. In contrast to this emphasis on family and region, the NVA concentrated, rather, on forming a distinct link between the military and an *overall* East German society through fostering a sense of collectivity or collective consciousness (see Chapter 4). One East German veteran addressed this focus (i.e., concern) of the military when he stated it was a regular practice for the military to ensure that recruits and draftees did not serve in

their home regions or near their immediate families. He also added that this policy only increased his sense of attachment with his hometown and family.³⁸

Thus, although the expected result of these military policies, initially, might be a decrease in attachment to home region and family, the data show that, instead, region and family may have become even more important to veterans than non-veterans (58.3% versus 44.4% for Region and 33.3% versus 25% for Family).


Third, the attitude scales indicate that the military was considered the least influential institution in producing cultural identity, and surprisingly, less influential for veterans as for non-veterans. The military fell even lower than the church in influence, which for East Germany is a somewhat revealing phenomenon.

The only area where there seemed to exist some military cultural influence was that of how East Germans described themselves by name -- that is, whether they considered themselves Germans, East Germans, etc. But even then, veterans considered themselves East German only somewhat more often than non-veterans (42.8% versus 34.7%). This could very well indicate some influence by the military in this regard. Even in light of this, however, the overall evidence seems to argue overwhelmingly against the military in contributing to a distinct East German culture.

(C) - Socio-Political Legitimacy: This section addresses the third aspect of political community, and, consequently, includes those data which explore East German attitudes about perceived domestic and international legitimacy for the GDR --

³⁸Strasberg interviews.

legitimacy as a regime or state (*Staatsnation*), legitimacy as a cultural society (*Kulturnation*), and legitimacy as an international actor. Relevant survey and interview data include those derived from questions about, 1) which nation best represented both the political and cultural histories and traditions of Germany, 2) which specific *institutions* best represented these, and 3) which institutions best represented each population's nation-state to the world as a legitimate international actor.



From the perspective of political legitimacy, Figure 6.19 shows that, in general, East Germans felt that the military played a low-to-moderate role in representing the political culture and traditions of Germany, but was regarded as less valuable than all

other institutions other than the church. Additionally, just as before, veterans surprisingly regarded the military as contributing *less* to the political legitimacy of the nation than did their non-veteran colleagues.

When asked which side of Germany best represented the political history and political traditions of Germany, there was a fairly even division among East Germans in general, with the majority opting for the FRG. However, a slightly greater percentage of veterans recognized East Germany as more representative. Perhaps the military emphasis on military symbols and history influenced these respondents (see Figure 6.20). However, when veterans were specifically asked why they accepted East Germany as the legitimate inheritor of the political aspects of the German past, neither the NVA nor military indoctrination was mentioned as a source of these views. Instead, many East German veterans simply stated in the interviews that the political situation in the GDR seemed to better correspond to what they understood as "German tradition and history."

-- When there were two German states, which for you personally best represented the political history and political traditions of Germany?		
	%	
	West Germany (BRD)	East Germany (GDR)
GDR Veterans	50.0	50.0
GDR Non-Veterans	66.6	34.4
All East Germans	57.1	42.8
	N=43	

FIGURE 6.20

Responses for the cultural aspects of domestic legitimacy were somewhat similar to the political perspectives (see Figure 6.21). While most of the institutions

other than school fell sharply in importance from the results of the political responses, the military in particular was the lowest of all in representing German cultural tradition and history. In this case however, veterans gave a bit more credence to the military than non-veterans, but only by a very small margin. The major difference is evident, however, with attitudes about school. Non-veterans clearly perceived school as a more important institution in this regard.




FIGURE 6.21³⁹

The in-depth interviews, however, showed a wide disparity between veterans and non-veterans in their perception of which state in general possessed the cultural

³⁹As a measure of association relative to "School," $Tau = .21$.


legacy of Germany. Over 83% felt that East Germany was the legitimate cultural heir, while only 49% of the non-veterans similarly viewed the GDR.

-- When there were two German states, which for you personally best represented the **cultural** history and **cultural** traditions of Germany?

	%	
	West Germany (BRD)	East Germany (GDR)
GDR Veterans	16.7	83.3
GDR Non-Veterans	51.0	49.0
All East Germans	28.2	71.7
	N=46	

FIGURE 6.22⁴⁰

East German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About the Institutions Which Best Supported the International View that the GDR was the Legitimate Germany (Before Unification)



N=88

FIGURE 6.23⁴¹

⁴⁰Phi = .206.

⁴¹As a measure of association relative to "Military," Tau = .19

Lastly, in terms of international legitimacy, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, all East Germans and West Germans believed the FRG was perceived by the rest of the world as the legitimate Germany. However, when East Germans were asked to identify the institutions that best supported *any* perception that the GDR was the legitimate Germany, the military was ranked highest by East German veterans and lowest by non-veterans. Further questioning suggested that the foreign involvement of the NVA in the Third World, as well as the reputation of the East German military among the Warsaw Pact countries, were the primary reasons for this.

- *Discussion:* The above data for the interviews and surveys relative to socio-political legitimization imply divergent results. With regard to both political and cultural legitimacy, the attitude survey questions reveal that neither veterans nor non-veterans believed the military institution to be very influential in furthering the perception that the GDR was the heir to the political or cultural traditions/history of Germany *per se*. However, the in-depth interviews nevertheless provided *some* evidence that military service did influence in some degree the feelings about which side of Germany best represented the overall traditional Germany, within the cultural context. For the most part, veterans indicated in the two related interview questions that they held stronger views than non-veterans about the relative domestic legitimacy of the GDR.

Concerning international legitimacy, there was evidence that veterans held different views from those of non-veterans about the role of the military in creating

international perceptions of legitimacy for the GDR regime. It could not be determined from the interviews, however, whether or not this stemmed from simply acquired knowledge or experience of the NVA's foreign activities (gathered by veterans while in the military), or whether, in general, military service itself affected the ways veterans felt about the perceptions of the East German military in the eyes of the rest of the world. Regardless, this discussion of international legitimacy must, after all, take into consideration the survey results illustrated earlier which showed that all of the respondents believed that in reality the FRG was the only legitimate Germany in the eyes of the world. Consequently, the attitudes of the East German veterans may reflect more of their feelings relative to a hypothetical, or normative situation rather than what they perceived as the empirical reality.

(D) - NVA Summary: The results of both the in-depth interviews and the attitude scale surveys suggest that the East German military institution played a minor role in all three components of political community. Given the level of commitment within the civilian and military leadership to use the NVA as an instrument of socialization for the hundreds of thousands of recruits and draftees, these results are surprising, to say the least. Only in a few questions do the data indicate some possible relationship with the military, at least as different from non-military East Germans. First, the attitudes about personal freedom versus societal order suggest that East German veterans may have gained some appreciation for order and control while in the military and, in turn, this may explain their greater desire for the return of the divided Germany. Second, a possible military influence may also be implied by the GDR veterans' attitudes about

the military contribution toward international legitimacy, *if there were international legitimacy for the GDR*. Remember, in the general interview question, 100% of both East and West Germans viewed the FRG as the only legitimate Germany in the eyes of the rest of the world.

In most other areas of the research, the results are, seemingly, counterintuitive. In short, East German veterans seem to take a more moderate view of politics with a lower regard for communism than non-veterans. In addition, although all East Germans rate the military as the lowest in influence, importance, etc. for almost all questions dealing with the three intervening goals, *veterans* often place the military institution even lower, especially for political culture and cultural identity. Instead, other institutions such as family and school are consistently portrayed by veterans and non-veterans alike as the primary institutional sources of political culture and cultural identity, and as vital contributors to perceptions of legitimacy. This is graphically illustrated by Figure 6.24 which shows the mean for the East German attitude (scaled) surveys pertaining to aspects of all three components of political community (all means were simply added and then averaged again).

Aggregate East German Attitudes about Institutional Influences on Political Community




FIGURE 6.24

2. - The Bundeswehr Case:

(A) - *Political Culture:* As with the case of East Germany, to understand the role of the military in contributing to a distinct West German political culture, the same data are used from the Spring 1995 surveys and interviews. Thus, pertinent questions once again relate to, 1) the choice of political party, 2) attitudes about preferred political systems, 3) perceived sources of political views, and 4) feelings about personal freedom/societal order (i.e., the role of government versus individual freedoms).

As Figure 6.25 shows, unlike the East Germans, more West German respondents belong to political parties, the majority of whom participate with either the CDU/CSU or the SPD. The only discernable difference is in which party they

prefer; more veterans belong to the CDU and more non-veterans to the SPD. In general, however, there seems to be little real difference in political orientation other than that which would be expected normally within the West German political spectrum. Only a small percentage of veterans and non-veterans choose not to participate.


-- With which political party do you most identify or agree?					
	%				
	None	Greens	CDU/CSU	SPD	Other
BRD Veterans-	9.0	0	50	41.0	0
BRD Non-Veterans-	11.54	3.8	26.9	53.8	3.8
All West Germans-	10.86	2.17	36.9	47.8	2.17
N=46					

FIGURE 6.25⁴²

When asked to rate political systems, there also was little difference between veterans and non-veterans; but veterans seemed to rate communism and monarchy somewhat higher than non-veterans (Figure 6.26). Interestingly, this is just the opposite of the situation with East German veterans who rated their old communist system lower than the non-veterans.

⁴²Tau = .03.

West German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About Political Systems



N=101
FIGURE 6.26⁴³


From the perspective of preferred German political situation, most West Germans -- both veterans and non-veterans -- preferred the unified Germany of today. However, of those very few who did not prefer the present situation, almost twice as many veterans than non-veterans preferred a return to the old division.

-- Would you rather have the old system with two Germanies (before the wall), or do you prefer the present unified Germany?		
	%	
	Divided Germany	Unified Germany
West German Veterans -	12.5	87.5
West German Non-Veterans -	7.2	92.8
All West Germans -	9.1	90.9
	N=52	

FIGURE 6.27⁴⁴

⁴³ As a measure of association relative to "Communism," $Tau = .07$

Overall West German attitudes about the institutional sources of political views suggest that the military rates the lowest in perceived influence (Figure 6.28A). The media, family and school take greater precedence in their beliefs about influence on political opinions and values. At first glance, this looks very similar to the East German case.




N=101
FIGURE 6.28A

However, when divided into veteran and non-veteran responses, there is a noticeable difference in how veterans view the military as a source of their attitudes about their political culture. In fact, the veterans place the military institution above

⁴⁴*Phi* = .10

political party, church, university, and colleagues in this regard. This suggests there may be something gained in the political socialization processes while in the military that influenced FRG veterans' political beliefs and opinions.

West German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About the Sources of Political Views



N=101

FIGURE 6.28B⁴⁵

Responses to the question about personal freedom and societal order reflect narrow differences in opinion between veterans and non-veterans. Although a small majority of veterans prefer societal order, both groups seem to show a 50/50 split between the two concepts. This also was reflected in further discussions during the interviews.

⁴⁵Relative to "Military," *Tau* = .14.

One interesting aspect of these in-depth interviews was the apparent difficulty of West Germans in making a choice between the two concepts. East Germans seemed to see the options as relatively clear and, consequently, the choice was quickly made. In contrast, West Germans generally struggled over the decision, and there were common comments about the perceived dilemma in separating the two. Moreover, this may represent one discernable aspect of political culture differentiating West and East Germans.

-- What do you personally find more important, individual freedom or societal order?		
	Personal Freedom	% Societal Order
West German Veterans -	42.8	57.1
West German Non-Veterans -	51.0	49.0
All West Germans -	63.0	37.0
	N=40	

FIGURE 6.29

- **Discussion:** To summarize, in most aspects of perceptions about political culture there was little difference between West German veterans' and non-veterans' responses. Survey results for the questions about political orientation, attitudes about political parties, divided versus unified Germany, and freedom/order all indicated very close perspectives for both groups. However, there were slight differences in specific responses for attitudes about political systems and institutional sources of political views and attitudes. Notably, veterans were a bit more accepting of communism than non-veterans, and veterans by far recognized greater influence on the part of the military institution as a source of their political attitudes.

(B) - *Cultural Identity*: This section focuses upon those survey and interview data which reflect West German attitudes about sources and origins of cultural identity, and includes aspects of cultural affiliation, perceived cultural determinants, and predominant cultural norms and values. Relevant questions encompass attitudes and opinions about, 1) cultural self-perception, 2) the perceived, predominant cultural values and norms that seem to be shared among the population, 3) beliefs about the main sources of personal cultural identity, and 4) attitudes about the specific *institutional* sources of cultural identity.

First, the majority of both veterans and non-veterans in the FRG sample perceive themselves as mainly "Germans." For non-veterans, the *only* responses were "German" and "West German," while veterans were more apt to choose between "German" and "European." Moreover, one possible indication as to whether or not the military successfully contributed to a distinct West German cultural identity would be evidenced by a major difference between veterans and non-veterans in the proportion of those survey participants who primarily perceive themselves as "West Germans," and secondarily in the percentage of those who see themselves as "German." This is indeed the case, but in the wrong direction. ***Bundeswehr* veterans clearly are less inclined to see themselves as either Germans or West Germans than their non-veteran countrymen.** In fact, the differences are quite remarkable, and unexpected. Furthermore, not only did fewer West German veterans consider themselves German or West German, a third of them did not even describe themselves as a German of any kind, but "European" instead. This may reflect the common

Bundeswehr experience of working with other European military members within NATO; that is, routine interaction with military members from allied countries. Moreover, West German military personnel, unlike NVA members, were often stationed on the military bases of other nations located in the FRG.

-- How do you see yourself culturally?					
	%				
	German	W. German	E. German	European	Other
BRD Veterans -	55.55	11.1	0	33.3	0
BRD Non-Veterans -	80.0	20.0	0	0	0
All West Germans -	70.8	16.67	0	12.5	0
N=47					

FIGURE 6.30⁴⁶

Second, when asked to identify the most important defining values of their cultural identity, West German veterans and non-veterans showed large differences in

-- What are the primary values you consider important as part of your cultural identity?							
	%						
	Family-Values	Self-Discipline	Hard-Work	Self-Sacrifice	Responsibility	Respect for Authority	Honesty
BRD Vets-	5.0	36.84	10.5	0	36.8	0	10.5
BRD Non-Vets	41.60	12.50	29.1	8.3	4.0	4.0	0
All BRD	25.58	23.25	20.9	4.65	18.6	2.3	4.65
N=43							

FIGURE 6.31⁴⁷

their responses as well. Veterans placed more emphasis on self-discipline and responsibility, while non-veterans accentuated family-oriented values and hard work.

⁴⁶ $Tau = .10$

⁴⁷ $Tau = .11.$

Third, in response to the questions about the sources of values which seem to define best their particular cultural identity, veterans of the West German military chose language, region, and ethnic group respectively, while non-veterans selected family, language, region and religion in order of precedence (Figure 6.32). The predominant source for both groups, then, was language. Veterans and non-veterans were very close in this regard. Importantly, just as with the East Germans, no West Germans proffered the military institution as a major source of cultural identity.

-- What do you consider to be the main sources of your cultural identity?						
		%				
	Region	Family (Birth)	Language	Ethnic Group	Religion	Other
FRG Veterans -	23.07	7.6	38.46	15.38	7.6	7.6
FRG Non-Veterans -	13.04	39.13	34.7	0	13.04	0
All West Germans -	16.66	27.78	36.11	5.56	11.11	2.77
N=49						

FIGURE 6.32⁴⁸

Fourth, similar to the above situation with political culture attitudes, the overall attitude scale sample also placed the military at the lowest point of influence as an institutional source of West German cultural identity (see Figure 6.33A). Again, family, school, and media seem to possess greater influence over cultural perspectives for West Germans. However, also similar to the FRG political identity surveys, non-veterans and veterans differ as to the importance of the military in this realm.

⁴⁸Tau = .05.

West German Attitudes About Sources of Cultural Identity





FIGURE 6.33A

West German Veteran and Non-Veteran Attitudes about Sources of Cultural Identity



N=99

FIGURE 6.33B⁴⁹

⁴⁹Relative to "Military, $Tau = .05$.

Moreover, veterans place greater emphasis on the military as a cultural influence than do the non-veterans, although the military is still perceived as less influential than the media, school, and family.

- *Discussion*: This analysis of the interviews and survey questions relative to cultural identity showed on the one hand some general areas with little difference between veterans and non-veterans, while on the other, there were indications of several apparent dissimilarities. From the aspect of similarities, both veterans and non-veterans identified language as a major source of cultural identity, and both veterans and non-veterans ranked family, school, and media above all other institutions as important influences of West German cultural identity.

From the perspective of divergence, even though there was a slight majority of veterans who considered themselves either German or West German, the fact that a full third of the veterans believed themselves to be European may indeed reflect the influence of military experiences in the *Bundeswehr*. After all, service in the West German military commonly included close integration with other European NATO personnel, and thus a recognition and acceptance by West German veterans of the necessity of this close coordination with European allies. This could have engendered a more international perspective for the veterans during their military service, and therefore affected their overall cultural outlook. **But more importantly, this argues against the role of the military in contributing to a distinct West German cultural identity.** The assumption is that military service along with its concomitant

socialization described earlier would increase feelings of being West German, or at least German. But these data suggest that *non-veterans* are markedly more apt to perceive themselves as Germans or West Germans than *Bundeswehr* veterans.

The differences in attitudes about the primary values of cultural identity also suggest a possible influence by the West German military. Because military members are taught to accept personal responsibility and develop self-discipline as a matter of course, the fact that more veterans distinguished these two values as the most important -- clearly more so than non-veterans -- may also indicate a military connection. Interestingly, the data also show, however, that veterans did not identify another important aspect of military service -- respect for authority.

Lastly, veterans placed a somewhat greater emphasis than non-veterans on the military as an overall influence for cultural identity as reflected in the attitude scales. However, the military institution remained, nevertheless, relatively less significant in this regard compared to other institutions.

To briefly summarize, the data suggest that the military played only a minor role in the development of a distinct West German cultural identity. In spite of the differences between veteran and non-veteran samples discussed above, a clear relationship is not present. To the contrary, there are indications of a negative influence in some areas such as cultural self-perceptions and certain cultural values normally linked to military experiences. Again, the analysis simply does not support the view that the military was successful in the cultural aspects of political community.

(C) - *Socio-Political Legitimacy*: As in the East German analysis, this section will attempt to determine West German attitudes about domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy. Relevant survey and interview data include those derived from questions about, 1) which nation best represented both the political and cultural histories and traditions of Germany, 2) which specific *institutions* best represented these, and 3) which institutions best represented each population's nation-state to the world as a legitimate international actor.


Not surprisingly, most West Germans view the FRG as the primary heir to the political history and traditions of Germany (see Figure 6.34). But, although no non-veterans considered the GDR in that regard, 12.5% of *Bundeswehr* veterans did. This indicates if anything, military service may have detracted somewhat from these veterans' perceptions of political legitimacy for the Cold-War West German regime.

-- When there were two German states, which for you personally best represented the <i>political</i> history and <i>political</i> traditions of Germany?		
	%	
	West Germany (BRD)	East Germany (GDR)
BRD Veterans	87.5	12.5
BRD Non-Veterans	100	0
All West Germans	95.5	4.5
	N=46	

FIGURE 6.34⁵⁰

⁵⁰Phi = .25.

However, it is more likely that this may simply reflect differences in how the respondents defined for themselves what aspects of political history or traditions they perceived as most important. Perhaps military members used the Prussian military as their reference point because of their more intimate knowledge of it. Regardless, the possible relationship is nonetheless very tenuous.



N=102
FIGURE 6.35A

The attitude surveys asking about which institutions best represented the political history and traditions of Germany suggest that all West Germans rank the military well below the other institutions (Figures 6.35A and B). Additionally, both veterans and non-veterans alike maintain that the military played less of a role in

contributing to their perceptions of political legitimacy for the FRG. The most important institutions were the parliament, school, media, and somewhat unexpected, the church. However, the veterans did rank the military just higher than the non-veterans.




FIGURE 6.35B

When asked which side of Germany best represented the *cultural* traditions and past of Germany, all veterans and non-veterans indicated that the FRG was the sole representative in that sphere.

-- When there were two German states, which for you personally best represented the *cultural* history and *cultural* traditions of Germany?

	West Germany (BRD)	%	East Germany (GDR)
BRD Veterans	100		0
BRD Non-Veterans	100		0
All West Germans	100		0
	N=45		

FIGURE 6.36

The surveys relative to the various institutions' contributions to cultural legitimacy also show that both veterans and non-veterans see little role for the military (Figures 6.37A and B). Again, the West German veterans place it higher than the non-veterans (in fact, the rankings are almost identical to those for political legitimacy). Even the parliament seems to play a larger role in these West German views than the military.

West German Attitudes About Institutions Which Best Represented
The Cultural History and Cultural Traditions of Their Nation
(Before Unification)





FIGURE 6.37A

West German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About the Institutions Which Best Represented the Cultural History and Cultural Traditions of Their Nation (Before Unification)




N=103

FIGURE 6.37B

Lastly, when asked in the surveys to identify those institutions which contributed the most to perceptions of international legitimacy, the military was lowest for non-veterans, and considerably higher for veterans, just below the media, party and parliament. This is similar to the same surveys for the East German respondents.

West German Veterans' and Non-Veterans' Attitudes About the Institutions Which Best Supported the International View that the FRG was the Legitimate Germany (Before Unification)



N=100

FIGURE 6.38⁵¹

- **Discussion:** The surveys and interviews relative to this third component of political community -- as with political culture and cultural identity -- generally suggest that the military may have had a moderate to low influence on perceptions of both domestic and international legitimacy, and, at worst, was all but insignificant in contributing to whatever levels of perceived cultural and political legitimacy that existed. The only significant difference between military veterans and non-veterans may be, by implication, their attitudes relative to those institutions that enhanced the perception of legitimacy for the FRG in the international context. However, yet again, the military

⁵¹Relative to "Military," $Tau = .15$.

clearly is perceived well behind other institutions for all West Germans, and regardless of veteran status. In the case of legitimacy, this includes political party, media, and parliament.

(D) - Bundeswehr Summary: Like the East German data and analysis, the surveys and interview results from the West German participants also suggest that the *Bundeswehr* contribution to all three intervening factors of political community were, on the whole, rather negligible. Although the military was committed to the processes of political socialization as detailed in Chapter 4, and in light of evidence suggesting there indeed developed two distinct political communities, the military institution's part in influencing West German attitudes about the components of political community appears, nonetheless, minor.

First, there is little apparent difference in political orientation between veterans and non-veterans. Most participate, and do so in the most popular, and mainstream West German political parties. Even the difference between the proportions of veterans versus non-veterans who belong to one or the other parties is minimal. In addition, there were also only slight differences between West German veterans and non-veterans relative to preferred political systems. The one interesting aspect of this is the somewhat greater support for communism by the veterans. Additionally, most West Germans preferred the current political situation of a unified Germany, but again, the few dissenters were represented by veterans. From the perspective of the influence of institutions as a source of political culture, the military ranked lower than most

other institutions; however, veterans seemed to recognize greater influence for the military than non-veterans. Yet, in the final analysis, the military still falls far short of expectations based upon the apparent level of conscious political indoctrination and socialization that took place in the military.

Second, relative to cultural identity, veterans and non-veterans showed little difference in their attitudes about the importance of language as a primary definer of their culture, and the importance of the institutions of family, school, and media as sources. However, there were important differences in how former *Bundeswehr* members defined their cultural affiliations. Contrary to what would be expected given their experiences in the military, they were more apt than were non-veterans to call themselves Europeans or something else other than German or West German. This appears to counter the view that the military contributed to a distinct West German cultural identity.

Furthermore, cultural values that would be expected to be more important to veterans as a result of their military experiences were not consistently represented in their related responses. Thus, in spite of the differences between veterans and non-veterans, there are nonetheless indications of a negative influence in some areas, especially pertaining to cultural self-perceptions and cultural values normally linked to military experiences. All in all, it seems evident from these data that the military institution remained relatively less significant than other institutions as an influence in producing cultural identity.

Lastly, the surveys and interviews relative to socio-political legitimacy also generally suggest that the military played only a small part in influencing domestic aspects of political and cultural legitimacy, and a moderate to low influence in the international perceptions. Moreover, the results of the attitude scales suggest that other institutions were far more consequential in all aspects of legitimacy building than was the military.

In summary, the West German military relative to all three components of political community appears to have been generally unsuccessful in its political socialization efforts. The extent of this lack of significance is illustrated by Figure 6.39 which aggregates all attitude responses by West Germans about influence, importance, or representativeness of the primary institutions.

Aggregate West German Attitudes About Institutional Influences on Political Community




FIGURE 6.39

D. Chapter Summary

Having earlier outlined in detail that both German militaries were actively used in the political socialization process, and that they possessed great opportunities for access to the population through mass universal conscription, the results suggested by these latest data were greatly unexpected. Moreover, although two political communities apparently developed, the data may indicate that the military institution played little part in these outcomes. This seems to be true for both East and West Germany. In addition, there are some indications in both cases that military service may have actually detracted from aspects of certain of the intervening factors of political community.

Figure 6.40 provides a simple, but effective graphic summary of how both sides' aggregates of all of the institutional responses place the military relative to political community; including political, cultural, and legitimacy influences. Even in light of the various areas of difference outlined above for both the GDR and the FRG, it is apparent that veterans and non-veterans alike place the military below all other institutions for both sides of Germany.

Lastly, in comparing the outcomes for the two Germanies, this research may suggest that the *Bundeswehr* was somewhat more successful than the NVA, especially in affecting political culture. However, although there was some difference relative to East Germany, even the West German military appears, nonetheless, clearly lower than all other major societal institutions included in the surveys and interviews. In short, the results of this research seem to counter the hypothesis that dedicated, committed

militaries can effectively contribute to distinct political communities in partitioned nation-states. It is simply not supported by these data for either side of Cold-War Germany.




FIGURE 6.40

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

The survey and interview data in this study provide some rather mixed, and, perhaps, unexpected results. First, this analysis suggests that the militaries of both German states were relatively unsuccessful in their attempts at building, or contributing to, their respective political communities. This seems to be the case even in light of the conscious efforts and apparent commitment on the part of the leadership to use the military institution to do so. Second, there are, however, a very few areas where there does seem to be a positive military influence. These include apparent impacts on certain aspects of political orientations, cultural identity and legitimacy on the part of the *Bundeswehr* veterans, and differences in attitudes about political systems and legitimacy for NVA veterans. Third, in several areas, there are also significant and surprising *negative* influences by both militaries, primarily relative to attitudes and opinions about preferred political ideologies.

Fourth, these results provide mutual support to much of the other related research on the military and political socialization that has identified a relative absence of any notable relationship between military socialization policies and nation-building. Moreover, these other related studies also provide some possible reciprocal explanations for why the German militaries' efforts did not have the predicted effects. They may also furnish explanations for why the military did appear to matter in those

few areas. Lastly, there may exist yet another explanation not addressed by the related literature outlined in this thesis -- the regional factor.

B. Possible Explanations?

If the military institutions in the two German states were not, in general, primary sources of distinct political community, not even for veterans, what are the most plausible explanations? Second, how do we explain those few areas where the military seemed to have made a difference? Some answers to these questions may come from the related research as well as from other non-related studies.

1. - Explanations for the Overall Lack of the Military Institution's Success:

There are possible explanations provided by existing literature that may help in understanding the overall lack of success by the two Cold-War German militaries in their quest for distinct political communities. These explanations generally come from the related studies highlighted in Chapter 1. They are based upon, 1) the apparent primacy of childhood/youth socialization over adult socialization processes, and 2) the greater inherent influence of certain other institutional agents of political socialization over that of the military, and 3) research results from the literature on civil-military relations and military political socialization. In addition, there is also some research support not covered earlier that may provide another possible explanation for the results in this study centering around possible regional explanations.

(A) - Age and Socialization Outcomes?:

The apparent conclusion indicated by the data and analysis here is that other institutions were distinctly more influential, more important, and, perhaps, more representative concerning the attitudes of Germans on both sides of the wall. One explanation may be that these institutions were at work earlier in the life of the individual. This explanation centers on the issue of susceptibility to political socialization based upon age and development -- that is, the view that childhood political socialization is far more effective than that for adults. Therefore, the "impressionable years hypothesis" (see Chapter 1) as supported by such scholars as Krosnick and Alwin (1989, 1991) may provide a foundation upon which to build some insight into these surprising results.

If the individual is more susceptible to political socialization at a younger age -- that is, the life stage before reaching the minimum age of military conscription -- then socialization efforts afterwards will have a relatively smaller effect upon their attitudes. Or, if individuals' attitudes and orientations simply become more resistant to change (i.e., more stable) as they become adults, the military, likewise, will have a lesser influence than those institutions and processes to which the individual becomes exposed early in life. If this is true, then the military would be expected to have lower influence in producing or changing orientations toward all three components of political community. Thus, other institutions would rate higher, especially childhood institutions.

In this study, if we look again at the particular institutions that were consistently ranked by Germans as influential, important, etc. for all components of political community, the two most conspicuous are family and school, respectively. From the perspective of childhood-versus-adult susceptibility to attitude formation and change, these institutions indeed represent agents of childhood socialization, whereas the other institutions, especially the military, are generally agents of *adult* socialization. In fact, family and school reflect almost exclusively childhood exposure or interaction. Thus, the data may support perspectives of such scholars as Greenstein (1965), Hess and Torney (1967), Easton and Dennis (1969), Connell (1971), and others who argue that early learning is the most important because it provides the foundations upon which all later experiences, information and overall knowledge and understanding are ordered. Consequently, in this context the military could not be effective because the objects of its labor in the socialization process were already "finished products" upon entry into military service. From this perspective, the school and family may play more influential roles in producing political attitudes and orientations toward one's "nation" simply because they are doing so in the individual's early, more susceptible, time in life.

First, the family in the childhood socialization process is almost always taken for granted as paramount in the overall research. As Kenneth Langton states,

"[A]mong the various potential vehicles of political socialization, the family has received by far the greatest attention. In fact, in the past students of socialization have been criticized for their almost exclusive concentration on the family and the experiences of childhood."¹

¹See Langton (1969), p.17.

And Jennings and Niemi describe the viewpoint that the belief about the importance of the family in the socialization process,

“...relies heavily on both the direct and indirect role of the family in shaping the basic orientations of offspring. Whether the child is conscious or unaware of the impact, whether the process is role-modelling or overt transmission, whether the values are political and directly usable or “nonpolitical” but transferable, and whether what is passed on lies in the cognitive or affective realm, it has been argued that the family is of paramount importance.”²

Many of these studies have also concentrated on the role of the family in producing “national character,” and importantly, they include studies about the German family. Bertram Schaffner and others argue that the source of German attitudes toward governmental authority are derived from authority patterns in the family. According to these studies, Germans who were raised in authoritarian families desired the same types of authoritarian traits in their political leaders.³ This same argument has been applied to other countries as well, including Russia and the United States.⁴

Similarly, the Greenstein, Hess and Torney studies mentioned above suggest that children commonly acquire their party orientations and party loyalties from their parents and families. With a like focus, Abramson states, “[W]e discovered that party loyalties are often learned through the family...”⁵

²See Jennings and Niemi (1968), pp. 169-170.

³See Schaffner (1948) and Rodnick (1948).

⁴See Gorer (1948, 1949).

⁵See Abramson (1983), p.307.

In addition, there are many other studies supporting the role of the family in the childhood socialization process. Their overall conclusions also may be reflected in the results of this dissertation.

The second major influence on children's political attitudes as described in the related literature, and perhaps reflected in the present study's results, is the school. For example, Hess and Torney (1967) found the school to be especially important in the development of the child's basic political orientations. In that sense, they assume that, "[E]arly attachments to the nation, then, is basic to political socialization and to subsequent learning and experience,"⁶ and, thus, they believe,

"[T]he school apparently plays the largest part in teaching attitudes, conceptions, and beliefs, about the operation of the political system. ...the school gives content, information, and concepts which expand and elaborate these early feelings of attachment. ...It is our conclusion from these data that the school stands out as the central, salient, and dominant force in the political socialization of the young child."⁷

In addition, Sidney Verba considers the school as,

"...along with the family, one of the basic socializing agencies of a society and is one of the prime sources of political attitudes. In fact, there is evidence that its impact on political attitudes tends for a variety of reasons to be stronger than that of family experience."⁸

And likewise, Verba and Nye underscore the importance of the overall childhood schooling process,

"[None of the other variables] compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a high level of education."⁹

⁶ See Hess and Torney (1967), p.31.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp-217-219.

⁸ See Verba (1965), p.160.

⁹ Quoted in Langton and Jennings (1968), p.852.

This predominance of both school and family in childhood socialization, thus, may be reflected also in the results discussed in Chapter 6. In that sense, age may be the primary explanation for the general lack of success in the political socialization policies in the two German militaries. Interestingly, even Harry Eckstein acknowledges the impact of age, specifically, in situations of "cultural transformation" or "cultural discontinuity."

He considers,

"Changes resulting from war or from the formation of new polities also generally involve upheavals in social contexts. Such upheavals may result as well from economic traumas..."¹⁰

and in these situations (much like those in the Cold-War Germanies), Eckstein sees,

"...that in the process of cultural reformation considerable age-related differences should occur. In fact, age, in cases of pronounced discontinuity, might even be expected to be a major basis for subcultural differentiation."¹¹

(B) - *Other Agents of Socialization?*:

Again, one of the clearer indications from the survey and interview results was the apparent predominance, in both East and West samples (and with veterans and non-veterans alike), of the greater influence of all institutions other than the military. As mentioned above, this was particularly apparent for the institutions of family and school. But what about those other institutions also identified as more influential than the military, including the church, the media, etc. Unlike the general childhood aspects

¹⁰See Eckstein (1988), p.796.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p.798.

of the family and school, most of these other institutions could be considered as influencing both children and adults. One possible explanation is that other institutions simply played much greater roles and thus had much greater influence in the socialization process during the Cold War, regardless of the age of the individual.

This is the perspective most apparent in that research literature which focuses on the various and specific agents of political socialization, and would generally support the conclusion that the military on the whole was simply less successful in promoting political community than these other institutions. Consequently, when viewed in the context of the data results in this current study, it may be that the military was just not as effective as the other institutions for various, as of yet, unidentified reasons. Moreover, this perspective is similar to such research as that by Hyman (1959), Langton (1969), Schwartz (1975), and others. Interestingly, most of these studies assume that the military is a secondary, rather than a primary, agent for political socialization. Thus, this study may uphold these assumptions, at least to a certain degree.

Did the in-depth interviews shed any light on which of the two above explanations were most valid? In that regard, several people interviewed during the research for this study were asked why they believed the military was rated so far below the other institutions **in their individual responses**. A common answer, from academics, military officers, and average citizens alike, was that most of them truly accepted what they were taught by their families and in schools, and some gave credit

to the media and church. However, both veterans and non-veterans did not seem to have accepted the military influence as valid. East and West German veterans commonly stated that they did not pay attention during military training and indoctrination classes, and viewed the military socialization processes only as a temporary inconvenience that was part and parcel of military service.¹² Most non-veterans confronted with the question stated that they simply did not see any influence from the military compared to the other institutions in their individual lives. These interviews seem to mirror the research on the importance of school and family (childhood institutions).

(C) - *Answers from Civil-Military Research?*:

Does the related literature on the military role in political socialization provide any help in understanding the apparent lack of military influence in the process? Most of the studies, other than those of communist nations, reflect similar findings as illustrated here. First, the research on the influence of foreign military assistance programs indicates a relative lack of success in changing traditional norms and values in other nations (see Fitch, 1991, 1993; Lefever, 1979). This research also supports the view that pre-existing, or earlier-learned, political and cultural beliefs, ideologies, or norms and values appear less affected by military training or indoctrination than by other institutions or processes within the nation.

¹²Findings by Davis and Taylor (1987) also found this attitude relative to U.S. veterans. They argue that, "the soldier who expects to remain in the military for only a short time is likely to retain a close identity and ties with the civilian world." p. 91.

Second, the studies which focus on western industrialized nations also support the findings here. This research assumes, as in this thesis, that the military plays an important part in the political socialization process, especially in contributing to attitudes in support of western forms of democracy (i.e., democratic norms and values). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, most of these found little correlation between the military processes and experiences, on the one hand, and changes in political and cultural attitudes of the recruits, on the other.

Some of these military studies of western nations also support the childhood socialization model. For example, Lizotte and Bordua (1980) look at military socialization and childhood socialization to see the effects on firearms ownership. They conclude that it is the early childhood socialization of veterans that determines whether or not they own firearms, and conversely, not the socialization to firearms they obtain while serving in the military. These types of studies lend further credence to the relative influence of childhood learning and family in political socialization.

Lastly, although the literature on communist nations provided much of the basic assumptions for this study, it does not furnish much *empirical* support for the success or failure of the military in actually influencing political community. This represents such work as that by Herspring and Volgyes; Lippert, Schneider and Zoll; Beck and Rawling, and the many others discussed in earlier chapters. To these scholars it is intuitively obvious that the military plays a large political socialization role, simply because they recognize the great efforts expended by these militaries in political indoctrination, etc.; but they stop short of actually demonstrating the success

of these communist militaries. At the same time, the results of this dissertation also *do not* provide any support to these studies in identifying the military's success as a vehicle for political socialization.

In sum, most of the socialization literature on the military provides corroboration for the results of this study. In addition, they may serve to further support the view that childhood socialization is an important reason for the apparent failure of the military institution in its nation-building efforts.

(D) - *Regional Differences?*:

As the East German interview and survey analyses suggest, in particular, a significant proportion of all of the respondents see themselves as East Germans (37.5%), and they identified *Heimat* (region) as the predominant source of cultural identity. This was very different from the West German sample. Thus, the data indicate that the home region may represent an inherently strong influence for many, if not most, East Germans regardless of veteran status. In addition, when specifically asked what they meant by region, the interviewees most often stated either Berlin, Prussia, Saxony, Thuringen, or Potsdam -- names associated with the larger, provincial-sized territories or cities.¹³ Interestingly, if one takes a closer look at the historical geography of what was East Germany, one sees that it was generally made

¹³ These were in response to questions asked in Strasberg, Ruhla, Berlin, Potsdam, and Eisenach in the former East Germany (March-April, 1995).

up of three main German regions, Prussia, Saxony and the Thuringer area, with the cities of Berlin and Potsdam as major cultural, political, and economic centers.

These areas in the former East Germany differed from most regions in West Germany, especially relative to population density, economy, regional differences in culture, etc. For example, West Germany contained numerous and diverse cultural regions that, since unification in the 1870s, had become increasingly integrated and reflected larger concentrations of population, especially along the major rivers. In comparison, the areas of the former GDR are less culturally diverse, and, generally, less populated.

These regional differences between East and West Germany may provide yet another credible explanation for why East Germans display different aspects of political community relative to the West. After all, these regions have always possessed disparate cultures, and resulting political and cultural perspectives in comparison with other regions, just as Bavarians differ from Rhinelanders in the west, for example. Consequently, from this perspective, region may be an important determinant of political community based upon historical local-oriented, traditional customs -- not based on particular institutions, nor other socio-political influences that are unrelated to *local* political and cultural life.

Other political science research provides support for this position. This is represented in the substantial amount of research on the differences of political community across regions, especially relative to the United States. It is, in fact, a rather huge area of study. The most well-known research is that of Daniel Elazar

(1966) who identifies several "political sub-cultures" in the United States that reflect the impact of cultural, ethnic, and religious differences across geographic regions. He emphasizes, therefore, the regional influences on political culture. His work provides the foundation for numerous other studies and is regularly put to the test. For example, Erikson, McIver and Wright (1986) concentrate on his various ideas to show the importance of geographic region in influencing the nature of political orientations. From the perspective of attitude change in particular, John Orbell (1972) shows that where one lives in regards to size of metropolitan environment also affects attitudes, especially attitudes toward feelings of political "demoralization." This type of research may also apply to the different regions represented by the areas of the former divided Germany.

If this is indeed the case, differences in political community could have always been present, and since East Germany represents several regions which seem to share many of the same values and norms, it could affect the nature of the discernable East German political community. Therefore, the data in the present study may suggest a rival explanation similar to Herder's cultural arguments about nation and state. In short, if there are regional explanations for the differences in political community, the military would have had a much more difficult time affecting these regional factors.

2. - Explanations for the Areas of Difference:

What about those few areas where there seemed to be some limited military influence in the two Germanies? First, there are those differences which suggest some

limited success in the political socialization efforts for the two armies and second, there are those apparent differences that reflect an actual negative impact.

- **The GDR:** From the perspective of political culture, East German veterans preferred a divided Germany and, to a greater degree than non-veterans, societal order. They saw themselves more frequently as East Germans, and considered the GDR as possessing more cultural and political legitimacy as West Germany (in the domestic sense). In addition, they felt the NVA was most important in contributing to any degree of international legitimacy for the East German state. Thus, the military may have been somewhat successful in instilling in its members some pride in being East German (as separate from West German) and acceptance for the East German state as legitimate. Moreover, their military service seems also to have provided them with a greater appreciation for societal order over individual liberty.

However, in one area it was apparent that military service in the NVA accomplished just the opposite of one important desired outcome. East German veterans were more critical of communism than the non-veterans, even though they preferred a divided Germany.

- **The FRG:** Similarly, West German veterans also preferred a divided Germany over their non-veteran counterparts and, to a greater extent than non-veterans, they perceived their side of Germany as the most legitimate, both domestically and internationally. They also rated the military higher in terms of contributing to domestic and international legitimacy. In contrast to the East Germans, however, the *Bundeswehr* veterans rated the military higher than non-veterans as a source for

cultural identity and, especially, political culture. Lastly, the veterans placed more emphasis on the values of self-discipline and responsibility.

Important negative influences apparently linked to military service was the tendency for West German veterans to see themselves as "European" rather than "German." Additionally, it was only FRG veterans (albeit a very few) who perceived the GDR as the political heir to the old Germany, and more veterans actually rated communism higher than other political systems. The veterans also perceived themselves more often as possessing less respect for authority.

The similarities in these limited influences for the NVA and the *Bundeswehr* may indicate that, although the military may have played only minor roles in the overall process of nation-building, there was some success in creating in the military recruits a higher level of pride, patriotism, or support for their respective nation-state and military. However, there was also some apparent failure in different areas relative to distinct political community. East German veterans rejected important aspects of *political culture* -- the predominant ideological orientation and structure of the polity as represented by communism. West German veterans rejected an important part of *cultural identity* -- the dominant cultural affiliation. Veterans from both sides differed from non-veterans on some predominant cultural norms and values such as respect for authority or self-discipline. What are some possible explanations for these negative influences?

One explanation relative to the political culture issues may be provided by literature that looks at socialization effects on military recruits relative to, 1) whether

they acquire an understanding of the meaning and purpose of their military service, and 2) whether they change attitudes about political norms and values. Lippert, Schneider and Zoll (1978) provide some evidence that short-term military service in a conscripted army (the *Bundeswehr*) may not, ...”adequately provide the draftee with an understanding of the meaning and purpose of his ‘serving’.”¹⁴ In addition, according to their study, any development of democratic awareness or democratic attitudes probably did not come from planned educational processes in the *Bundeswehr*, but instead, simply from general living conditions and experiences in the military. They attribute this to, “the quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate pedagogical training of the young leaders and in their leadership practices.”¹⁵ Thus, the failure to impart desired attitudes about political ideology or orientations could have been the result of bad socialization techniques.

This perspective is supported by various comments by both East and West German veterans. Many respondents mentioned how they routinely “tuned out” political training and indoctrination lessons, and in many cases, the training officers did nothing to motivate attention or interest in the discussion. This possible failure in techniques sheds some light on why East German veterans see themselves more often as East German, prefer a divided Germany, but reject communism.

There is other research that supports this view that the techniques may be at fault. Wakenhut (1979) also looks at the *Bundeswehr* and political socialization of

¹⁴See Lippert, et al. (1978), p.277.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p.280.

draftees. He believes,

“...draftees are influenced as much through peer pressure as they are through formalized socialization techniques. For this reason, ...organizations tend to measure the socialization effectiveness of their education and training efforts by looking at organizational *prerequisites* rather than the effects themselves.”¹⁶

Wakenhut's research also indicates that three-fourths of the draftees indicated that their civic or citizenship training was “little liked” or “disliked.” In addition, many of these draftees stated that the instruction was not accomplished on a regular basis. Thus, the inadequate political education process itself may be one explanation for the apparent negative socialization outcomes in the present study.

From the perspective of the apparent failure to impart certain *cultural* norms and values, there are also studies which show that these norms and values are, in fact, also negatively affected by military service. For instance, Roghmann and Sodeur (1972) find in a study of 12 companies of the West German Army that authoritarian attitudes and respect for authority were reduced by service in the military. This is similar to the findings for West German veterans in this study as well. Their research, however, does not provide conclusive reasons for this, except to state that it does seem to be linked directly to active duty in the military.

This section has provided several explanations for both the general lack of evidence that the military contributed to political community through conscious political socialization policies, as well as explanations for the limited influence

¹⁶See Wakenhut (1979), p.627.

suggested by the study. The most plausible explanations are provided by the related research on childhood socialization, agents of political socialization, and studies of the military in the political socialization process. Regional influence and the probable inadequacy of political socialization techniques were also presented as possible explanations for the unexpected results. In short, all of these studies provide some possible support for the findings in this analysis.

C. Conclusion

In conclusion, this study began with two primary research questions; 1) *How do the rebuilt military institutions in the two new regions of partitioned societies consciously use political socialization policies to foster distinct and separate political communities (nations),* and 2) *do these state-controlled military institutions directly contribute to the creation of these different and discernable political communities?* In my mind, the dissertation provided answers to both of these questions, but with differing degrees of certainty.

From the perspective of the first question regarding the political socialization process, the research was able to clearly show conscious resolve on the part of the civilian and military leadership (German, American, or Soviet) to use the military institutions in both countries to first transform and then, create, new, distinct political communities. This was done with policies aimed at all three of the intervening outcomes/indicators identified within the concept of political community. The

research and data suggested that both militaries were committed to these goals through most of their existence in the Cold War years.

However, from the perspective of answering the second question concerning the actual relationship between the military's role in the political socialization process and an influence on political community, this study was unable to find any clear and unambiguous link between the two for either German state. This was true even though there is evidence that two distinct political communities did indeed exist in the two Germanies. In only a few areas, there was identified some limited influence by the military, some of which actually may have detracted from elements of the respective political community.

Even in light of the literature discussed above which lends some support to the findings of this thesis, the results were, in most ways, counterintuitive. Given the opportunities and commitment in the two German militaries to actively socialize both veterans and non-veterans, and under firm control by both domestic and external forces, it seemed only logical that the military institution would in the final analysis exhibit extreme influence in the political socialization process. As this study shows, this does not seem to be the case, at least not as directly supported by this analysis. Most certainly, the impact of these political socialization processes in the military were filtered from and through more complex societal relationships, especially those related to other institutions or influences such as childhood exposure to family or school, or such things as regional influences. Additionally, the evidence that the militaries may have been ineffective in actually carrying out their socialization techniques further adds

to the complexity of understanding any relationship between the military and political community.

- Directions for Further Research:

More studies like this are needed to further the understanding of the military as an instrument of nation-building in general, particularly those studies focusing upon militaries with conscripted forces. As mentioned before, the utility of studying the military in partitioned nations is the ability to better control for so many of the other possible factors in the process, and this is increased even more after the two sides are reunified. For example, Robert Rohrschneider describes the opportunity provided by these case studies of partitioned nations, as he writes, "...division and unification enables analysts to examine the institution-culture linkage under quasi-experimental conditions."¹⁷

Second, a more sophisticated framework for measuring political community is needed as well. This should include more questions about the different aspects of political, cultural, and legitimacy components of political community, as well as questions that more accurately identify attitudes and beliefs, and their relationship with the military institution. Most importantly however, more institutions and groups need to be included in the research, specifically, other political and economic institutions.

Third, research focusing on military and civilian *leadership aims and goals* in relation to political community would be extremely helpful in relation to either partitioned nations and their militaries in particular, or conscripted militaries in general.

¹⁷ See Rohrschneider (1994), pp. 935-936.

For the military institution and its role in society, understanding these elite attitudes and articulated motivations would provide valuable guidance for developing interview and survey questions, and thus, more accurate means of determining success or failure in the outcomes.

Fourth, any future study of the military as an agent of political socialization should include much larger samples, and more in-depth questions to tease out the subtle differences in the major components of political community. These types of larger samples could provide further support for the findings presented here.

Finally, this thesis represents one of the first projects that closely examines this “non-traditional” role of the military in building political community in partitioned nations, and thus, provides only a foundation for continued study. In any event, further research is needed to identify more accurately those complex factors, institutions, and overall influences at work that may have detracted from the expected impact of the military institution in the political socialization process.

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APPENDIX

Collecting the Survey Data:

In the process of the survey and interview data collected in Germany during March and April, 1995, there were two versions of the questionnaire given out. The more in-depth version contained both short-answer questions and attitude ratings, and was administered in the context of one-on-one interviews conducted by the author. These surveys were given to 92 individuals (47 West Germans and 45 East Germans).

In addition, there were approximately 100 shorter questionnaires containing only the attitude ratings administered through street and telephone surveys, and with the help of assistants within Germany. 45 East Germans and 54 West Germans completed aspects of these latter surveys. In some cases, several questions contained from the long version of the survey were also addressed to a few of these 100 respondents.

Both versions of the questionnaires were designed so as to hide the specific focus of the research, particularly the focus on the military. The only hint that the military was a primary part was the question about veteran status. Consequently, the protocol generally reflected an overall institutional point of convergence. The two versions are included below (both German and English translations).

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 unimportant<----->important

School	University	Church	Military	Parliament

12. What is the best way to choose political leaders?
 [alternatives were explained]

13. Do you consider yourself an active participant in your political system?

-- In what way? [Explained: voting, lobbying, campaigning, serving, other?]

14. What do you personally consider more important -- order in society, or personal freedom?

15. From where do you think most of your political attitudes came, especially before the German reunification?
 Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 no influence <-----> great influence

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military	Colleagues

16. Would you rather have the old system [of divided states] or do you prefer the present system?

17. Do you consider yourself primarily a European, German, West German, East German, Prussian, Bavarian, Berliner, or...?

18. What are in your opinion the major sources of your cultural identity? For example, is it region, speech (dialect), religion, ethnic group, birth, or?

19. Has your cultural identity changed since 1989?

-- If yes, how and why do you think?

20. What are the primary values of your cultural identity? For example, is it self discipline, self-sacrifice, respect for authority, family, work ethic, etc.?

21. How were your above attitudes about cultural identity most influenced? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
no influence <-----> great
influence

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military	Colleagues

22. Which of the above have changed your cultural identity the most?

23. When there were two German states, which for you personally best represented the political history and the political traditions of Germany?

-- How so?

24. Which institutions or groups at that time best represented the political history and political traditions of Germany? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from very little role to very much of a role in representing the political history and traditions of Germany.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

25. When there were two German states, which state for you personally best represented the *cultural* history and *cultural* traditions of Germany? _____

-- How so?

26. Which institutions or groups at that time best represented the *cultural* history and *cultural* traditions of Germany? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from very little role to very much of a role.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

27. Which German state at that time do you believe was seen by the rest of the world as the true successor of the "old" Germany?

Which of the following institutions and groups most supported this perception? Answer by placing a number from the line which

best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence in supporting this world view?

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

Survey Questions (Short Version):

1. What is your occupation?
2. How old are you?
3. Where did you grow up?
4. Were you ever in the Military in either the BRD or DDR?
-- If so, which one -- Bundeswehr, NVA, or Border Guards?
5. When did you leave the military?
6. Think about it, do you consider yourself to be "politically aware?" For example, do you often think about, read about, or discuss political systems, politics in general, politicians, etc.? Please answer by checking the most accurate description:

(Political Consciousness)

Low Average High

7. What forms of government do you think are the best types that have existed or do exist in the world? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the systems from bad to good.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
bad <----->good

Anarchy	Parliament. Democracy	Direct Democracy	Communism	Monarchy	Dictatorship

8. Which *institutions* do you consider the most important in a modern nation-state? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the institutions from unimportant to important.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
unimportant<----->important

School	University	Church	Military	Parliament

9. From where do you think most of your political attitudes came, especially before the German reunification?
Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
no influence <-----> great influence

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military	Colleagues

10. How were your attitudes about *cultural* identity most influenced? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
no influence <-----> great influence

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military	Colleagues

11. Which institutions or groups before the German unification best represented the *political* history and *political* traditions of Germany? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from very little role to very much of a role in representing the political history and traditions of Germany.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

12. When there were two German states, which one for you personally best represented the *cultural* history and *cultural* traditions of Germany? _____
Which institutions or groups at that time best represented the cultural history and cultural traditions of Germany? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion

for each of the following from very little role to very much of a role.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

13. Which German state at that time do you believe was seen by the rest of the world as the true successor of the "old" Germany? Which of the following institutions and groups most supported this perception? Answer by placing a number from the line which best describes your opinion for each of the following from no influence to great influence in supporting this world view?

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
very little <-----> very much

Media	Party	Family	Church	School	University	Military

German Questionnaire (Long Version):

Die folgende Fragen sind fuer eine sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung. Vielen Dank fuer Ihre Hilfe mit diesem Projekt.

KEINE NAMEN BITTE!!!

1. Was sind Sie von Beruf? _____
2. Wie alt sind Sie? _____
3. Wo sind Sie aufgewachsen? _____
4. Sind Sie Verheiratet? _____
5. Was fuer Ausbildung haben Sie gehabt?
 - Als Kind?: _____
 - Als Erwachsene?: _____
6. Waren Sie jemals beim Militaer in der BRD oder DDR? _____
 Wenn so, welche war es -- Bundeswehr, NVA, oder Grenz-shutz?

7. Wann waren Sie mit dem Militaerdienst fertig? _____

8. Überlegen Sie es sich, haben Sie grosses politisches Interesse? Das meint, denken Sie, unterhalten Sie, oder lesen Sie oft ueber Politische Systeme, Politik, Politiker, u.s.w.?
 - Bitte, als Antwort, haken Sie die Naeheste Beschreibung ab:
 (Politisches Bewusstsein)

Wenig _____ Durchschnittlich _____ Viel _____

9. Mit welcher politischen Partei sind Sie am meisten einverstanden? _____

Die Hauptgrunde dafuer? _____

10. Was ist Ihre persoeliche Meinung ueber Regierungssysteme? Das meint, welches ist fuer Sie die Beste? Als Antwort, bitte zaehlen Sie die folgende Systeme zu ihrer politische Meinung: markieren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 Schlecht <----->Gut

ANARCHIE	DEMOKRATIE (PARLAMENT)	DIREKT DEMOKRATIE	KOMMUNISMUS	MONARCHIE	DIKTATUR

11. Nach Ihrer Meinung, welche Institutionen sind am wichtigsten in einem heutigen Land? Zaehlen Sie die folgende Institutionen zu ihrer politische Meinung: markeiren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 Nicht wichtig<----->Sehr wichtig

Schule	Universitaet	Kirche	Militaer	Parlament

12. Auf welche Art und Wiese sollen Politiker ausgewaehlt werden?

13. Wie aktiv sind Sie in politischen Leben?

Auf welche Art? _____

14. Was finden Sie persoelich wichtiger -- Gesellschaftliche Ordnung oder Persoeliche Freiheit? _____

15. Woher kommen die meisten Ihrer Politische Einstellungen, ueber die Sie oben erzaelt haben, besonders vor der Deutschen Vereinigung? Als Antwort, bitte zaehlen Sie die folgende zu

Ihrer Politische Einstellungen: markeiren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Medien Partei Familie Kirche Schule Universitaet Militaer Kollege

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

16. Wurden Sie lieber das alte System haben, oder ist Ihnen das Heutige System angenehmer? _____

17. Fuehlen Sie sich in erster Linie als Europaeer, Deutscher, West-Deutscher, Ost-Deutscher, Preusse, Bayer, Berliner, oder...?

18. Was sind nach Ihrer Meinung die Hauptquellen Ihrer Kulturellen Identitaet? Zum Beispiel ist es Region, Sprache, Religion, ethnische Gruppe, Geburt, oder...? _____

19. Hat sich Ihr Kulturellen Identitaet seit 1989 geandert? _____
Wenn ja, wie und warum? _____

20. Was sind die sittliche Werte Ihrer Kulturellen Identitaet? Zum Beispiel, ist es Selbstdisziplin, Selbstaufopferung, Autoritaet, Familie, Fleiss, u.s.w.? _____

21. Wodurch ist Ihre Einstellung zu Ihren Kulturellen Identitaet beeinflusst worden? Bitte, markeiren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Medien Partei Familie Kirche Schule Universitaet Militaer Kollege

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22. Welche von diesen haben am meisten Ihre Meinungen und Einstellungen zu Ihren Kulturellen Identitaet veraendert? _____

23. Als es zwei Deutsche Staaten gab, welcher Staat hat fuer Sie persoendlich die politische Geschichte und politische Traditionen Deutschlands am besten repraesentiert? _____
Wie? _____

24. Welche Institutionen oder Gruppen haben damals die politische Geschichte und politische Traditionen Deutschland am besten repraesentiert? Bitte markeiren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Wenig<----->Viel

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

25. Als es zwei Deutsche Staaten gab, welcher Staat hat fuer Sie
persoenlich die Kulturgeschichte und Kulturtraditionen am besten
repraesentiert? _____
Wie? _____

26. Welche Institutionen oder Gruppen haben Ihr Seite
Deutschlands die Kulturgeschichte und Kulturtraditionen am besten
repraesentiert? Bitte, markieren Sie unter Jeden einen
Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Wenig<----->Viel

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

27. Welcher Deutsche Staat ist damals von der Welt als der echte
Nachfolger des "alten" Deutschlands gesehen worden? _____
Welche von den folgenden Institutionen und Gruppen hat diese
Meinung am meisten unterstuetzt? Als Antwort, bitte markieren Sie
unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

German Questionnaire (Short Version):

Die folgende Fragen sind fuer eine sozialwissenschaftliche
Forschung. Vielen Dank fuer Ihre Hilfe mit diesem Projekt.

KEINE NAMEN BITTE!!!

1. Was sind Sie von Beruf? _____
2. Wie alt sind Sie? _____
3. Wo sind Sie aufgewachsen? _____

4. Waren Sie jemals beim Militaer in der BRD oder DDR? _____
Wenn so, welche war es -- Bundeswehr, NVA, oder Grenz-shutz?

5. Wann waren Sie mit dem Militaerdienst fertig? _____

6. Überlegen Sie es sich, haben Sie grosses politisches Interesse? Das meint, denken Sie, unterhalten Sie, oder lesen Sie oft ueber Politische Systeme, Politik, Politiker, u.s.w.? - Bitte, als Antwort, haken Sie die Naehste Beschreibung ab:
(Politisches Bewusstsein)

Wenig _____ Durchschnittlich _____ Viel _____

7. Was ist Ihre persoenliche Meinung ueber Regierungssysteme? Das meint, welches ist fuer Sie die Beste? Als Antwort, bitte zaehlen Sie die folgende Systeme zu ihrer politische Meinung: markieren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Schlecht <----->Gut

ANARCHIE	DEMOKRATIE (PARLAMENT)	DIREKT DEMOKRATIE	KOMMUNISMUS	MONARCHIE	DIKTATUR

8. Nach Ihrer Meinung, welche Institutionen sind am wichtigsten in einem heutigen Land? Zaehlen Sie die folgende Institutionen zu ihrer politische Meinung: markeiren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Nicht wichtig<----->Sehr wichtig

Schule Universitaet Kirche Militaer Parlament

--	--	--	--	--

9. Woher kommen die meisten Ihrer Politische Einstellungen, ueber die Sie oben erzaehlt haben, besonders vor der Deutschen Vereinigung? Als Antwort, bitte zaehlen Sie die folgende zu Ihrer Politische Einstellungen: markeiren Sie unter jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Medien Partei Familie Kirche Schule Universitaet Militaer Kollege

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

10. Wodurch ist Ihre Einstellung zu Ihren Kulturellen Identitaet beeinflusst worden? Bitte, markeiren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Medien Partei Familie Kirche Schule Universitaet Militaer Kollege

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11. Welche Institutionen oder Gruppen haben damals die politische Geschichte und politische Traditionen Deutschland am besten repraesentiert? Bitte markeiren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Wenig<----->Viel

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

12. Welche Institutionen oder Gruppen haben Ihr Seite Deutschlands die Kulturgeschichte und Kulturtraditionen am besten repraesentiert? Bitte, markieren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Wenig<----->Viel

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

--	--	--	--	--	--	--

13. Welcher Deutsche Staat ist damals von der Welt als der echte Nachfolger des "alten" Deutschlands gesehen worden? Welche von den folgenden Institutionen und Gruppen hat diese Meinung am meisten unterstutzt? Als Antwort, bitte markieren Sie unter Jeden einen Standpunkt von der Linie.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Kein Einfluss<----->Viel Einfluss

Parteien Medien Schule Universitaet Militaer Parlament Kirche

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